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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
America is a nation uniquely built upon ideology.  It 
has formed our identity and sense of destiny and purpose 
throughout our history.  In the Preface to Economic History 
of the United States, Bogart (1923) writes, “The keynote of 
all American history, from whatever standpoint it may be 
written, is found in the efforts of a virile and energetic 
people to appropriate and develop the wonderful natural 
resources of a new continent and there to realize their 
ideals of liberty and government” (p. 11).  Ephram Adams 
(1913) explains that “democracy, as a powerful ideal is 
acknowledged by all to have been a steady force in our 
history for over a hundred years, and is still a term of 
national inspiration” (p. 4).  
Despite the conceptual and practical importance of the 
democratic ideal in the American experience, very few 
people can come to agreement regarding the actual meaning 
of democracy in either theory or practice.  If we see 
democracy as a guiding ideology, but do not possess an 
adequate agreement regarding that ideology, we can begin to 
understand the difficulties Americans sometimes have in 
2 
 
 
 
defining themselves and their proper relationship to their 
government.   
If we would come to a better understanding of the 
concept of democracy in the American experience, then we 
must go back to the birth of American Democracy - the 
ratification debates of the federal constitution in 1787-
88.  It is in these debates that the terms and ideals of 
American Democracy were initially set forth.  Through the 
discourse, ambiguities and conceptual difficulties are 
highlighted, questioned, explained, and even, as is the 
case with the absence of a “Bill of Rights,” changed.  The 
disputants on each side of the debate declared their views 
of the proper role of government, and the ideal 
relationship of the people to that government.  Through the 
process, they crafted something entirely new — a new form 
of government and a new form of democracy.  This new form 
of democracy is not the result of clear cleavages or 
agreements that resulted from the rhetorical interactions; 
it is the result of an amalgamation of the two.  While the 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists may have entered the 
debate with a clear picture of the meaning of the contested 
terms, the government and as such, the democracy that 
resulted from the debates is neither Federalist nor the 
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Anti-Federalist, but a mixture of both.  The Constitution 
that resulted from the contest for ratification is an 
amalgamation of the debates, a combining, as it were, of 
both sides’ understandings of the contested terms.   
Given this, and because the process that created 
American Democracy was an instantiation of public 
discourse, it is critical that we come to a better 
understanding of the process and ideas that created that 
democracy.  In particular, it is important to understand 
the normative conventions that framed this discourse.  As 
such, rhetorical analysis of the events is the most prudent 
means of discerning the original understanding and intent 
of the framers. 
In addition, using the ratification of the federal 
constitution as a mechanism for enhancing our understanding 
of American Democracy requires that we examine those 
debates as an instantiation of deliberative praxis.  This 
understanding is necessary and important because the 
Constitution that was submitted to the states in 1787 is 
not the same Constitution that was ratified in 1788. The 
original document, for example, did not contain a “bill of 
rights”; this was added as a result of agreements made 
during the course of ratification.  In more ephemeral terms 
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though, ideas and concepts within the document were 
explained, altered, and reconstituted throughout the course 
of the discourse.  Even terms like “federalism” and 
“liberty” came to be redefined and reconstituted by the 
discourse of ratification.  In advancing this exploration, 
and as I will explore in more depth in the discussion of 
method, I will excavate the classical concepts of prudence 
and decorum and apply them to the discourse. This 
examination will accomplish three major goals: to increase 
our understanding of the United States Constitution by 
increasing our understanding of the people and ideas that 
created it; to enhance our understanding of the process of 
deliberation in public controversy; and finally, to add my 
answer to the question that was first asked by Orrin Libby 
in 1894, why did the Federalists win? 
In the following pages I develop a justification for 
further analysis of the debates for ratification of the 
federal constitution.  Next, I summarize and analyze the 
development of the literature examining and interpreting 
the ratification debates. I also discuss the method and 
scope of the proposed dissertation, and finally, I outline 
a map of the study.  
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JUSTIFICATION 
Due to their centrality in both social and 
governmental history in the United States, the debates for 
ratification of the federal constitution are some of the 
most heavily documented and studied events in our history.  
Despite the voluminous nature of the existing scholarship 
dealing with the ratification discourse, there are still 
important insights to be gleaned from additional inquiry.   
First, as mentioned above, there are important 
deficiencies in our understanding of our own democracy, a 
democracy that was substantially created during the 
ratification debates.  In addition, despite the plethora of 
historical data surrounding the ratification of the federal 
constitution, Americans have a very limited understanding 
of their institutions and the purposes and limitations of 
those institutions.  Therefore, in order to increase our 
understanding of these institutions, we must explore the 
ideas and debates that created our institutions.  Ernest J. 
Wrage (1947) highlights the importance and centrality of 
the study of ideas in the life of a society, explaining 
that: 
Whether we seek explanations for an overt 
act of human behavior in the genesis and moral 
compulsion of an idea, or whether we accept the 
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view that men seek out ideas which promote their 
interests and justify their activities, the 
illuminating fact is that in either case the 
study of ideas provides an index to the history 
of man’s values and goals, his hopes and fears, 
his aspirations and negations, to what he 
considers expedient or inapplicable (p. 451).  
  
Considering this view, the question that arises is: 
what is the most expedient and fruitful way to engage in 
such study?  Historians, typically, have undertaken such 
studies by focusing their efforts primarily on formal 
written texts and documents.  Wrage, however, explains that 
such a focus limits the potential insights to be gleaned.  
He explains that:    
Man’s conscious declarations of thought are 
embodied in a in a mosaic of documents, in 
constitutions and laws, literature and song, 
scientific treatises and folklore, in lectures, 
sermons, and speeches (p 452). 
   
Merle Curti (1937) makes the case even more strongly 
by offering a critique of the traditional mode of such 
historical studies: 
Historians of ideas in America have too 
largely based their conclusions on the study of 
formal treatises.  But formal treatises do not 
tell the whole story.  In fact, they sometimes 
give a quite false impression, for such writings 
are only a fraction of the records of 
intellectual history.  For every person who 
laboriously wrote a systematic treatise, dozens 
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touched the subject in a more or less casual 
fashion (p. 108). 
   
As such, we begin to see that if we wish to increase 
our understanding of our institutions and the ideas behind 
those institutions, we need to expand the artifacts under 
consideration.  As indicated by both Wrage and Curti, the 
main deficiency in such examination is the refusal or even 
inability of scholars to include oral texts in their 
studies.  Wrage (1947) argues that expansion of the 
artifacts under consideration also necessitates a re-
working of the scholarly boundaries.  Therefore, and in an 
effort to maximize the benefits of renewed inquiry, the 
scholarly field best suited to an examination of oral texts 
is that of rhetorical inquiry.   
A second important reason for a re-exploration of the 
ratification controversy is that such an exploration, from 
a rhetorical perspective, will enhance our understanding of 
the process of both public deliberation and the effect of 
public deliberation on social and political ideas.  The 
process of ratification in the several states functioned 
very much like a modern political campaign.  In most 
states, the electorate chose the representatives for the 
Constitutional conventions and in many of those states 
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ratification was tied to the will of the electorate.  In 
many states, the delegates to the ratification conventions 
functioned more as a proxy for the will of the majority 
rather than as an independent representative responsible 
for the “common good.”  It was necessary to “sell” or 
campaign for the ratification to the delegates at the 
conventions as well as to the public at large.  Riker 
(1996) explains the value of exploring political campaigns 
arguing that: 
Electoral campaigns are a distinguishing 
feature of modern representative democracies 
worldwide.  For most citizens in most polities, 
campaigns provide a compelling incentive to think 
about government.  Campaigns thus are a main 
point – perhaps the main point – of contact 
between officials and the populace over matters 
of public policy.  If as democratic theorists 
postulate, rulers are responsible to the ruled, 
responsibility is imposed during campaigns and 
the elections in which they culminate . . . as 
crucial as campaigns are . . . we have only begun 
to accumulate knowledge about how they are 
involved in the transmission and approval of 
political ideas (p. 3).   
 
Gerald Hauser (1986) extends Riker’s argument by 
explaining how studying an instantiation of public 
deliberation will allow the critic to begin to unfold and 
unpack the structures and motives of the discourse as well 
as the resulting political order.  Hauser explains: 
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In an important sense, all rhetorical 
situations may be thought of as posing a 
question.  We are asked, ‘What shall we believe 
or feel about this problem or concern?’  In the 
same vein, rhetoric is an answer to the questions 
posed by the situation in which it arises.  
Rhetorical responses are not merely answers but, 
strategic answers and stylized answers (p. 167). 
 
Hauser goes on to suggest:  
Uses of language, patterns of argument, and 
methods of appeal guide our reasoning and 
responses in ways that lead to and reinforce a 
selected conclusion . . . Because all uses of 
language are necessarily structured; their 
strategies are implicitly present and waiting to 
be uncovered.  Whenever we communicate seriously 
with another person, in some way our language 
serves to induce an attitude, even if it is the 
counter attitude of rejection (p. 172). 
 
Finally, further examination of the ratification 
debates is warranted because the debates function as the 
foundational event in the development of the American 
Public.  While publics clearly had been called into 
existence before the ratification controversy, these 
publics were temporary and quickly disbanded often out of 
fear that they might become unwieldy and dangerous to the 
governments or institutions that called them into 
existence.  The public that was called into existence by 
the ratification controversy was unique, in that, in both 
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the language of the Constitution and that of the opposing 
sides in the debate, there are clear signs that this public 
was intended to be a permanent public.   
Moreover, the ratification debates themselves created 
a controversy that by its very nature would be continually 
played out, deliberated, and re-worked throughout American 
history.  James Jasinski (1992) explains the significance 
of this when he calls the ratification debates a 
“constitutive controversy” Jasinski suggests  that in a 
such a controversy, “partisan advocates in the process of 
advancing their own interested claims, establish an ‘inter-
referential’ or intertextual paradigm that shapes 
subsequent rhetorical transactions” (p. 198).  He further 
explains: 
In effect, then, the constitutive force of 
the ratification controversy perpetuates a 
paradigm of competing standards of judgment.  
Exploring the relationship of rhetoric and 
judgment in the ratification controversy and its 
trajectory can contribute to ongoing efforts at 
rehabilitating public life (p. 198).  
 
In 1787-88, the Federalists and Anti-Federalists, in 
speeches, sermons, songs, broadsides, and pamphlets, asked 
the people of the several states to decide how they wished 
to be governed.  While the debates themselves concluded 
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with the ratification of the federal constitution in 1788, 
the controversy they began continues to the present day in 
discussions, political campaigns, and court cases.  The 
issues and questions raised by ratification did not go 
away.  In fact, in many cases the authors of the 
Constitution choose to leave questions for another time by 
design.  In addition, the very design of the Constitution 
makes it malleable and interpretable; the framers designed 
it to survive the test of time.  Therefore, when issues 
arise courts, lawyers, politicians, and even the average 
citizen return to these early deliberations in an effort to 
determine the “framers’ intent.”  Herbert Storing (1987) 
called America a nation “born in consensus,” that “lives in 
controversy, and the main lines of that controversy are 
well worn paths leading back to the founding debate” (p. 
6).   
In essence, the debates for ratification of the 
federal constitution arguably constitute a unique event in 
the history of the world, at no other time in human history 
had a people been asked to decide the way in which they 
would be governed.  Storing (1987) explains that the 
founding generation viewed the Constitution as unique 
because it was a product of deliberation.  Despite the 
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historical and practical importance of this deliberation, 
Storing goes on to suggest that the majority of research 
examining the ratification debates ignores the complexity 
of the deliberative situation.  He indicates that most 
studies break the discourse down into simplistic terms in 
which the Anti-Federalists are “democratic farmers,” and 
the Federalists are “self-serving businessmen” (p. 5). In 
ignoring or understating the complexity of the ratification 
contest we fail to understand the complexity of the 
contested terminology, and the government that that 
terminology created.  As such, critical reengagement with 
the controversy should open additional areas of inquiry and 
understanding in an effort to broaden our understanding of 
both our government and the ideologies that underpin our 
government.   
 
LITERATURE 
Historical Interpretive Literature 
Even a cursory examination of the literature 
surrounding the debates for ratification of the federal 
constitution reveal a veritable mountain of material from 
songs, broadsides, newspaper articles, letters, speeches 
and pamphlets.  A closer examination of the literature, 
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however, indicates that scholarship exploring the discourse 
has developed along several major themes.  Considering 
this, this review of the literature proceeds from the above 
themes.  This review allows greater exploration of the 
various themes most central to the present study.   
Views and interpretations of the Constitution began to 
change in the late 19th century, beginning primarily with 
the dissertation written by Orin Libby in 1894.  Libby 
examined the ratification controversy through the lens of 
Fredrick Jackson Turner’s theory of class conflict.  
Specifically, Libby explored the social and economic 
conditions in late 18th century America and determined that 
there was a strong correlation between socio-economic 
conditions and election results in the ratification 
conventions in the several states.  Libby (1894) explained 
that:  
The factions in favor of paper money issues 
and tender laws and opposed to the enforcement of 
the British treaty of 1783 were to be found in 
the great interior agricultural region of the 
country, where the debtor class outnumbered the 
creditor, where taxes were unpopular and capitol 
scarce.  And finally, the conclusion has been 
reached that these factions of 1785-86 are 
closely related to the Anti-Federalist Party of 
1786 (p. 89). 
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In 1913, Historian Charles Beard expanded Libby’s 
hypothesis, writing An Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution of the United States.  Beard (1954) explains 
that while the debates should “not be viewed solely in 
terms of economics” (p. xvi); economics provide a powerful 
insight into the process and the results of the contest.   
In essence, the Beardian or economic view sees the 
opponents of the Constitution, Anti-Federalists, as 
representatives of a farming and debtor class; and 
proponents of the Constitution, Federalists, as 
representatives of the business and creditor class.  In the 
introduction to the 1935 edition of the book, Beard 
explains, “It supports the conclusion that in the main the 
men who favored the Constitution were affiliated with 
certain types of property and economic interests and that 
the men who opposed it were affiliated with other types” 
(Beard, 1954, p. x).  Beard takes the thinking a step 
farther when he argues that the framers themselves were 
motivated primarily by economics, and not by any sort of 
abstract ideology.   
Essentially, for Beard and those who followed him the 
reasons for support or lack of support for the Constitution 
were primarily based in social and economic factors.  The 
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debates themselves functioned as little more than a formal 
expression of class and economic divisions. 
Correspondingly, studies of the ratification from this 
period focused primarily on the social and economic issues 
leading up to ratification. The debates, under the economic 
view, functioned more as a treatise on government than an 
actual deliberative event.  Further, because the Anti-
Federalist position was not adopted, this portion of the 
debates was treated as little more than a footnote in 
history.  
For the next thirty years, the Bearden view dominated 
scholarly interpretive discourse surrounding the 
ratification period.  In fact, it was not until the end of 
World War II that scholars began to seriously rethink 
Beard’s hypothesis.  One of the most significant books 
written in this period was Forest McDonald’s, We the 
People: The economic origins of the Constitution.  
McDonald, like Beard, believed that economics were the most 
important factor in the outcome of the debates.  Unlike 
Beard, however, McDonald did not draw the same causal links 
with regard to the debates.  McDonald indicates that the 
discourse of the debates worked to polarize the population 
along economic lines.  As such, McDonald’s view is a 
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critical departure from the thinking of Beard because 
McDonald does not see the debates as mere ritual, but as a 
mechanism to rally support for each side.  Moreover, he 
argues that the debates were used by the disputants in the 
controversy to further exacerbate preexisting social 
cleavages.  The importance of this shift in constitutional 
scholarship cannot be overstated, because it opened the 
door to examining the debates as more than a treatise on 
government.  Increasingly, the debates are viewed as a 
mechanism for social change.   
In arriving at his conclusion, McDonald described 
three primary areas of shortcoming in the Bearden 
approach:  First, he explains that in the several states 
occupational and investment interests were often in 
conflict.  While there were clearly poor farmers, who 
opposed the Constitution because it carried the potential 
to streamline the process of debt collection, McDonald 
observes that not all farmers were either poor or in debt.  
He argues that, in fact, some farmers were actually 
creditors themselves who might welcome a more efficient 
means of collecting on debts. However, even for some of 
these creditor farmers the Constitution was seen as more 
than a tool for debt collection; it was a possible 
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harbinger of a potentially powerful government that would 
have the ability to interfere in their everyday affairs.  
Clearly, these farmers, less than a decade from the 
Revolutionary War, had reasons for having nothing to do 
with economics, to oppose a new and powerful central 
government.    
Additionally, according to McDonald, not all farmers 
opposed the Constitution.  Many, on grounds of finance, 
security, or even philosophy, supported the Constitution 
and lent their voices and weight to the Federalist’ cause.   
Given these factors, McDonald explains that when one 
examines the vote spread, one finds that economics 
certainly did play a large and important role in the 
preference of citizens, but there were other factors that 
contributed both to support and opposition to the 
Constitution that should not be ignored.   
In the final analysis, McDonald, argues that what 
Beard saw as causal, may actually have been more corollary.  
The chief opposition to the Constitution did tend to come 
from farmers in the rural parts of the several states and 
those farmers tended to be poor.  On the other hand, these 
rural areas of the states were also unaccustomed to any 
sort of governmental interference in their affairs.  
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Considering the above, one might reasonably make the 
argument that Shey’s Rebellion, in western Massachusetts, 
might have been as much about governmental interference as 
it was about economics.  Similarly, opposition to the 
Constitution might have followed the same lines of 
reasoning.   
Second, McDonald problematizes the Beardian notion 
that people voted in class blocks.  He explains that these 
so-called class blocks contained a high level of 
fragmentation.  Evidence shows that the people of the 
states were divided by a multitude of interests, certainly 
by economics, but also by religion, transportation, trade, 
and family, to name just a few (p. 332).  As such, the 
absence of clear cleavages along simple socio-economic 
lines makes it difficult to sustain the argument that 
simple class lines determined the outcome of the debates.   
Third, and perhaps most important from a rhetorical 
perspective, McDonald argues that certain groups had little 
or no economic stake in the outcome of the ratification 
contest.  He suggests that these people were largely 
neutral and voted with their friends and neighbors or as 
individuals.  They did not, according to McDonald, vote 
their economic class (p. 349-50). 
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Given these critiques of the Beardian economic view, 
it seems clear that while a portion of the population may 
have voted based on geography or economics, there was 
clearly a large part of society that was likely persuaded 
to support one side or the other in the deliberations.  It 
is at this segment of the population that the ratification 
debates were directed.  Given this view, it is difficult to 
reconcile the historical record with Beardian analysis.  
The historical record demonstrates that in some areas 
people who sent representatives to reject the Constitution, 
later allowed their representatives to vote to ratify, thus 
demonstrating at least some type of suasory influence for a 
change in disposition.   
In many states such as Virginia, Massachusetts and New 
York, the ratifying conventions opened with heavy 
opposition.  In order to achieve ratification in these 
states substantial portions of the population had to be 
convinced to change their position on the Constitution, and 
allow their delegates to vote for it.  Clearly, this leaves 
open a strong case for a new hypothesis regarding the 
ratification debates, one that sees them as suasory rather 
than simply informative.  
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Ten years after We the People, Robert Brown wrote 
Charles Beard and the Constitution: A critical analysis of 
“An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution”.  Brown, 
building upon McDonald’s earlier work, went even further 
and rejected the economic interpretation altogether.  Brown 
(1956) argues that, “certainly there is little correlation 
between ratification and personal property” (p. 151). 
 The importance of this statement to ratification 
scholarship cannot be over-stated.  If we can assume that 
the decisions to vote for ratification were based on a 
broad range of factors, then as scholars, our avenues of 
exploration are greatly expanded.   
While the 1950s saw significant decline in the 
progressive historiography view advocated by Beard, 
historians like Howard K. Beal, and C. Vann Woodward 
continued to see history at large, and the ratification 
period from the perspective of class warfare.  These 
advocates, however, have moved to the fringe of 
constitutional scholarship.  Increasingly, scholars are 
seeing that behind the ratification controversy was a 
complex web of social and political issues that guided 
people to favor one side over another, and that these 
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issues were highlighted and manipulated by the two sides of 
the ratification debates.   
In short, scholarship is beginning to suggest that the 
debates were not a mere ritualistic play preceding 
predetermined events, but rather a pivotal event in the 
governmental history of the United States. More 
specifically, current inquiry by historians such as Bailyn, 
McDonald, Morgan, et al. suggests that the debates actually 
had a strong affect on the ways in which people voted and, 
as such, bear much responsibility for the eventual success 
of the Constitution and the resulting governmental 
institutions.   
With this newfound openness in interpretive 
scholarship, several new works have taken up the task of 
examining the ratification debates.  The most important of 
these is a project begun by Herbert Storing in the early 
1980s.  In this project, Storing has attempted to compile a 
complete anthology of all significant works circulated by 
the Anti-Federalists.  Storing (1987) explains in the 
introduction to his groundbreaking work, The Complete Anti-
Federalist, that the deliberations had a clear and 
unmistakable impact on the government that emerged from the 
ratification debates.  He says, the “Constitution that came 
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out of the deliberations of 1787 and 1788 was not the same 
Constitution that went in” (p. 3).  Moreover, he argues 
that the impact of the debates went well beyond the 
document itself and continued to influence the government 
that resulted and the “American polity.”  In short, Storing 
adds to the justification for continued study by 
highlighting the impact of the ratification debates on 
present political policy and national discourse.   
Bernard Bailyn’s (1984) compilation of The Debate on 
the Constitution goes a step farther than does Storing’s 
work.  Bailyn compiles, in chronological order, the 
ratification discourse in context.  He places Federalist 
arguments alongside those of the Anti-Federalists in an 
attempt to allow the reader to see “on a scale unmatched by 
any previous collection, the extraordinary energy and 
eloquence of our first national political campaign” 
(cover). 
Bailyn and Storing have made important and valuable 
contributions to the extant scholarship examining the 
ratification, but they clearly leave room for more.  On one 
hand, while Bailyn places the arguments contextually, he 
does not attempt to add any analysis.  Storing’s work, on 
the other hand, is perhaps the first sustained discussion 
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of the rhetoricity of the ratification debates.  His choice 
to focus entirely on the Anti-Federalists however, leaves 
Storing’s analysis incomplete, and decontextualized.   
Gordon Wood in The Creation of the American Republic 
(1998) explores the ratification era from the perspective 
of the social and political forces at work in the new 
nation.  Wood’s work avoids the decontextualized analysis 
of Storing, but the examination does not explore the 
intricacies of the discourse itself.  Wood is primarily 
interested in building a picture of the citizenry, as a 
means of explaining who was persuaded and why.  He does not 
attempt a sustained analysis of the debates themselves, but 
he does recognize their critical importance in shaping the 
voting patterns, as well as the resulting government.  In 
other words, Wood clearly makes the case for the importance 
and impact of the debates in the ratification discourse.   
In addition to these works, the United States 
government has commissioned The Documentary History of the 
Ratification Debates; as part of the much larger 
Documentary History of the United States project.  This 
multi-volume work aspires to a complete documentation of 
the ratification debates in both public and private 
correspondence.  
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These projects all indicate a renewed scholarly 
interest in the means with which the participants of the 
ratification discourse advanced their claims, as well as in 
the people that they attempted to sway to one side or the 
other. In addition, the above works demonstrate continuing 
unanswered questions regarding the purpose and the mode of 
the discourse, and finally they suggest the need to open 
the examination of the discourse to other areas of inquiry.   
Rhetorical Literature 
Despite the plethora of extant literature from the 
ratification period (newspapers, speeches, pamphlets, etc.) 
there is very little in the way of rhetorical exploration 
of the period.  Bower Aly’s The Rhetoric of Alexander 
Hamilton (1965) is a notable exception. This study, 
however, is not so much an exploration of the debates, as 
it is an analysis of the work of Hamilton.  Given his 
focus, the only ratifying convention dealt with in any 
serious way is the New York ratifying convention.   
Much of the reason for the paucity of rhetorical 
analysis of the period stems from two erroneous views; 
first the belief that such studies belonged either in 
history or philosophy; and second, the barriers created by 
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the critical model that has dominated 20th century 
rhetorical scholarship.  
Until recently, the traditional or Neo-Aristotelian 
critical paradigm forced critics to explore rhetoric from 
the perspective of “great speakers.”  Brock (1990) explains 
that since rhetoric tended to focus on historical 
personages, criticism was largely descriptive and focused 
on effect (p. 25).  This view left many important events 
such as the ratification controversy with inadequate 
exploration.  While there has been much scholarship 
exploring individual speakers from the ratification period, 
like Aley’s study mentioned above, there has been 
surprisingly little in the way of scholarly exploration of 
the ratification controversy as a rhetorical event in and 
of itself.   
During the last 30 years, as rhetorical scholarship 
has expanded beyond the bounds created by the great speaker 
paradigm, scholars have begun to develop lines of inquiry 
into a multitude of different areas of social 
communication.  Specifically, rhetorical scholarship has 
begun to examine public discourse and public debates, thus 
creating a space for a more comprehensive inquiry of the 
ratification debates.   
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James Jasinski, for example, has written an 
interesting and important analysis of the lasting effects 
of the ratification debates on American political 
discourse.  William H. Riker developed an analysis of the 
discourse that proceeds from the perspective of campaign 
rhetoric.  Riker’s book, The Strategy of Rhetoric: 
Campaigning for the American Constitution, examines the 
ratification debates from the perspective of a political 
campaign.  Unlike Jasinski, however, Riker does not seek to 
increase understanding of the ratification controversy in 
and of itself; his goal is to increase understanding of 
political campaigns, using the ratification controversy as 
a model.  Additionally, while Riker’s study is a 
significant addition to the rhetorical scholarship 
examining the debates Riker limits his examination to the 
winning side of the debate, the Federalists. 
Ultimately, the goal of the current inquiry is to 
bridge some of the gaps mentioned in the above review of 
the literature.  Specifically, while the studies mentioned 
above have created multiple new spaces for exploration, 
this study will attempt to create a sustained exploration 
of the discourse between Federalists and Anti-Federalists, 
as a contextual event.   
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METHOD OF THE STUDY 
Evaluation of the ratification discourse provides the 
critic with multiple potential sites of inquiry.  Clearly, 
one could spend a lifetime reading the texts of newspapers, 
broadsides, pamphlets, and songs and produce volumes of 
scholarship on each.  This dissertation focuses on the oral 
discourse produced through the course of the controversy--
specifically, that discourse which occurred during the 
debates in the state ratifying conventions.   
In choosing this approach, I have examined the 
approaches taken by other scholars to this and similar 
material, as well as the reasons that they present for 
their choices.  For example, Jasinski argues that the most 
valid texts come from written sources such as newspapers 
and pamphlets.  The advantages of Jasinski’s approach are 
clear.  The critic avoids the problems inherent in 
depending upon the perceptions and recollections of those 
who recorded the oral discourse, thereby avoiding the issue 
of textual authenticity.    
Jonathan Elliot (1830), however, argues that it is 
clearly possible to critique the oral texts because, 
despite the potential of minor transcription errors, the 
texts create an accurate view of the ideas and strategies 
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of the disputants involved in the discourse.  Elliot 
explains that:   
The editor is sensible, from the daily 
experience of the newspaper reports of the 
present time, that the sentiments they contain 
may, in some instances, have been inaccurately 
taken down, and in others, probably, too faintly 
sketched, fully to gratify the inquisitive 
politician; but they nevertheless disclose the 
opinions of many of the most distinguished 
revolutionary patriots and statesmen, in relation 
to the powers intended to be granted to the 
congress of the United States under the 
Constitution, and certainly may form an excellent 
guide in expounding many doubtful points in that 
instrument (Elliot, preface).   
 
This view is further supported by the work of Bernard 
Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and Philip Kurland.  Each elected to 
examine the arguments of those “who agitated for, proposed, 
argued over, and ultimately voted for the Constitution of 
1787” (Kurland, 1987, 1:xi).  They believed that there were 
important insights to be gleaned from examining the oral 
arguments of the debaters themselves.   
Herbert Storing (1985) concurred with this approach 
when he chose to make a “sustained comprehensive attempt to 
examine the thought, the principles, the arguments of the 
anti-federalists,(sic) as they were understood by the anti-
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federalists (sic) themselves and by other men of the time” 
(p. 2). 
While the work by Storing is the most closely matched 
to the type of exploration this dissertation engages, the 
chief difference is that while Storing engages in a 
decontextualized analysis (he examines the debates from the 
perspective of the Anti-Federalists alone), this study 
places the arguments in the context in which they occurred. 
For example, I will examine Federalist positions alongside 
the Anti-Federalist arguments that rebutted them.  
Moreover, this dissertation will also build upon the work 
of both Bailyn and Storing by adding analysis to the 
contextualized positions.  In this way the study examines 
and explores the interaction and evolution of the positions 
and arguments advanced in the course of the debate.   
Such analysis allows examination of the ways in which 
contested terms are “recursively constituted and 
reconstituted” throughout the course of the debate (Kurland 
and Lerner, 1987, p. 2).  Moreover, this type of analysis 
will allow critical exploration of the demands of audience 
and situation during the ratification contest by focusing 
on the ways in which the participants adapted their 
arguments to the audiences and the situations.   
30 
 
 
 
Because the transformation and adaptation in 
participant positions throughout the course of the debates 
is an indication of rhetorical engagement consistent with 
classical conceptions of deliberation, critical inquiry 
which utilizes a methodology that does not incorporate an 
appreciation for the discursive, contentious, evolutionary 
processes which produced the Constitution, would be 
inadequate as a means of illuminating the critical role 
which deliberation played in the ratification process.  As 
such, rhetorical inquiry based in classically grounded 
concepts brings forth the salient features of the 
ratification debates.   
Through this exploration, analysis will seek to 
enhance understanding of the way in which rhetoric 
functioned in the discourse under examination.  This study 
of the resolution of a public controversy has application 
beyond simply increasing our understanding the specific 
controversy under question.  Such study should help us to 
understand public controversies themselves.  Additionally, 
such understandings will increase our ability to understand 
the ways in which public controversies are resolved, and 
will broaden our knowledge vis-à-vis the interaction 
between political campaigns and the public sphere.   
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Finally, a concentration on the discourse of the 
debate, which created and shaped the Constitution, is a 
precondition for a fuller understanding of the resulting 
document and the governmental institutions and philosophies 
it helped to create.  As is regularly demonstrated in 
politics and law, the constitution is not a simple 
document, and understanding its meaning and intent have 
been subject of deliberation as long as it has been in 
force.   
Michael Leff (1992) explains that rhetoric “is 
persuasive in two senses, since it has both an intentional 
and extensional dimension” (p. 223).  Since the work of 
Bailyn et.al, (1992) has already explored in some depth the 
extensional effects of the rhetoric of the period by 
focusing on the social and economic condition, this project 
will focus on the intentional dimension of the rhetorical 
exchanges.  As such, the focus is based in the evaluation 
of the rhetorical tools used by the disputants in the 
furtherance of their cause.   
In addition, the focus on the discourse of a public 
debate leads logically to a rhetorical methodology 
advocated by Leff and others, “close textual reading.”  
This choice is most appropriate because, as Leff (1992) 
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explains, “Textual criticism (or close reading) centers on 
the effort to interpret the intentional dynamics of a text” 
(p. 223).  Leff characterizes this approach as 
“formal/functional,” meaning that the texts can be seen 
“both as linguistic constructions and as efforts to 
exercise influence” (p. 228).  In addition, and with an eye 
on avoiding the pitfalls of Storing’s analysis, close 
textual reading encourages the critic to see the text not 
as a single unit, but “as a positioned response set within 
a constellation of other positioned responses” (p. 230).   
Considering the focus of the study, exploration of 
deliberative praxis will be of critical importance in the 
textual analysis.  Moreover, in order to maximize the 
benefits of a “close textual” analysis this study will 
excavate the classical concepts of prudence, and decorum as 
the lens through which the text will be viewed.  This will 
have the effect of both helping to answer the earlier 
questions regarding the actual effect of the ratification 
debates, as well as increasing our knowledge of the 
function of deliberation in political controversy.   
While I will explain the classical terms in more depth 
in a future chapter, it is important at this point to 
clarify the means by which the classical terms will be 
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employed.  One might reasonably argue that no speaker would 
create a text completely lacking in either prudence or 
decorum, for even the attempt to be imprudent or indecorous 
can be seen as both prudent and decorous if the context can 
be altered to allow such an act.  However, prudence and 
decorum are in fact contextual acts, and are judged not so 
much by the rhetors themselves, but by the intended 
audience.  Take, for example the protester who chooses to 
violate social norms in an effort to make a point, if the 
protestor manages to change the audience, then that 
protestor will be celebrated as a prudent rhetor, on the 
other hand, the failed protest is often seen as both 
imprudent and indecorous.  In fact, imprudent and 
indecorous discourse often is designed as a rhetorical 
strategy as in protest rhetoric. The goal, then, of the 
classical critic is not simply to say that decorum is or is 
not present, but to examine the ways in which prudence and 
decorum are created or employed by the rhetor or within the 
text.  If we understand correctly that rhetoric creates 
context, and that decorum is a matter of relating the 
rhetoric to the context, then it is clearly possible to 
examine rhetoric as a means of fashioning decorum and 
setting out the terms of prudence itself. Given the former, 
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then, it is instructive to understand that in the 
ratification debates prudence and decorum are employed both 
as procedure and as strategy. For example while the 
disputants followed the rules of discourse and worked to 
present themselves as the most prudent leaders in the 
debates, they also employed these strategies against the 
opposition in an attempt to define them out of the debates.  
This will be most clear in the analysis of the interchanges 
between Patrick Henry and James Madison.  Madison, for his 
part does not directly confront Henry’s claims, but subtly 
redefines Liberty in such a way as to invalidate Henry’s 
propositions entirely.   
Therefore, the critic looking for prudence and decorum 
is looking, on some level at both sides and judging both 
the adaptation of each side to a static context, as well as 
the attempts of each side to alter the context. The goal of 
this dissertation is to examine the texts of the debates in 
an effort to discern and explain the means by which the 
context is constituted and reconstituted throughout the 
course of the debates, and as such, to examine the shifting 
nature of prudence and decorum throughout the discourse.   
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SCOPE OF THE DISSERTATION 
As mentioned above, the depth and breadth of extant 
material from the ratification debates creates a situation 
in which the critic must create clear limits in order to 
allow a substantive discussion.  While discussion of the 
philosophies undergirding American government and democracy 
began before these debates and continue today, the focus of 
this study is the period from the presentation of the 
Constitution to the states in September 1787 to the end of 
the New York convention, the last major battle in the 
ratification contest, in 1788.  In addition, the study’s 
focus is primarily on the three state ratifying conventions 
identified and discussed below.    
The period indicated above is the period in which most 
of the significant Federalist and Anti-Federalist texts 
appeared.  This limit, however, will still provide a large 
volume of text for evaluation.  Additional limits will 
therefore, be necessary in an effort to create an 
appropriate examination.  Considering the former, the texts 
used in this analysis will be further limited to those 
texts which deal specifically with the conceptual 
development of democracy during the ratification debates.   
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Since the term democracy is never employed by the 
disputants, it is necessary to clarify how this study 
excavates the concept from the discourse in question.  
Three major areas of discussion come to define democracy in 
the ratification debates; rights, liberty, and 
representation.  As such only those texts or portions of 
texts that deal with one of more of these issues will be 
examined.   
The project is limited to an examination of the 
ratifying conventions in Massachusetts, Virginia and New 
York.  These conventions were chosen for several reasons.  
First, each of these states demonstrate the resolution of a 
deliberative controversy in, that in each state, the 
convention began in opposition to the Constitution, and 
through the course of the debate shifted to support.  
Second, these states were critical to the success of the 
Constitution.  One could argue that rejection by any of 
these three states would have proved fatal to the new 
government.  Third, because of the critical importance of 
ratification in these three states, both sides in the 
dispute brought their best minds and arguments to bear.  
For example in Massachusetts, the first serious challenge 
to ratification, the demand for a bill of rights forced 
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what Ralph Ketcham (1986) called a “long spirited debate, 
and some clever maneuvering by the Federalists” (p. 14).  
Moreover, Clinton Rossiter (1966) argues that the 
“Massachusetts formula” in which the state ratified 
unconditionally but with a strong recommendation that the 
Constitution be amended in order to quiet those who feared 
the usurpation of personal liberties, was a key moment in 
the ratification struggle (288).   
Virginia, according to Ketcham (1986) was “the most 
important of the ratification contests” (p. 14).  Clinton 
Rossiter (1966) explains that “in no convention were the 
opponents of the Constitution able to meet the friends on 
such equal terms” (p. 291).  Moreover, regarding Virginia, 
Rossiter praises the “rhetoric of Revolutionary 
liberty…[and] the rhetoric of union and the consummation of 
the revolution and the guardian of liberty” woven by 
Virginians Patrick Henry and James Madison respectively (p. 
291).   
Finally, New York has been included for several 
reasons.  First, as mentioned above, the inclusion of New 
York, due to its population and economic might, was 
critical to the survival of the new government.  With this 
in mind, the Anti-Federalists brought to bear some of their 
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strongest arguments.  New York’s ratification accompanied 
by sixteen declared rights, seven “impressions,” four 
“reservations,” thirty-two amendments, and a call for a 
second convention, reflected the contentious and sometimes 
acrimonious debate, which occurred (Rossiter 1966, p. 293).  
In addition, the publication of The Federalist Papers in 
New York and their impact on the debate makes this a 
critical stop for any examination of the discourse of 
ratification.  According to Rossiter (1961) The Federalist 
Papers are “the most important work in political science 
ever written or is likely ever to be written” (p. vii). 
Jefferson exclaims that within the Federalist one may find 
the “genuine meaning” of the Constitution (Rossiter 1961, 
pg vii).  In 1788 Washington wrote to Hamilton: “When the 
transient circumstances and fugitive performances which 
attended this crisis shall have disappeared, that work will 
merit the notice of posterity, because in it are candidly 
and ably discussed the principles of freedom and the topics 
of government” (Rossiter 1961, p. viii).  In New York, the 
Federalist, with The Federalist Papers, produced what 
Jefferson called the finest treatise on government ever 
produced by man.   
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Finally, even these limitations will produce a body of 
texts that is too large for a close critical examination. 
For this reason an additional limitation is introduced.  
Earlier in this chapter, in discussion of the critical 
method advocated by Leff (1992), the concept of paradigm 
texts was introduced.  This concept will be applied to the 
text selection of this dissertation.  Specifically, Ronald 
Reid (1995) argues that a “careful critic” will fail in the 
critical endeavor if the analysis attempts to cover too 
broad a range of texts.  To this end, Reid suggests 
reviewing the broad range of potential texts and then, 
confining the actual critical analysis to “a sample of 
relevant discourses” (p. 7).  The enactment of this second 
stage of limitation will be accomplished by establishing 
several criteria for evaluation.   
First, a text will be considered for inclusion if it 
articulates a relevant position.  As indicated above, those 
relevant positions will be those that further our 
understanding of democracy as it was to be enacted by the 
Constitution.  Second, a text will be considered if it 
comes from a significant participant in the debates.  These 
people should be relatively easy to identify through their 
roles in the debates, their roles in national politics, or 
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in the responses engendered by their positions.  Finally, a 
text will be considered for inclusion if it helps to 
illuminate an element of deliberative praxis.  These texts 
do not need to illuminate a fundamental position or come 
from a particular participant, but will be chosen for their 
contribution to the critical endeavor by the extent to 
which they illuminate the rhetorical concepts under 
consideration.  In this way, overlapping arguments and 
redundant positions can be eliminated.  This will allow the 
critic to assemble what Leff (1992) calls the “ensemble of 
paradigm texts constituting an embodied representation of 
the entire controversy” (p. 229).   
Finally the texts will be chosen primarily from four  
sources, Elliot’s Debates, Bernard Bailyn’s The Debates on 
the Constitution, Herbert Storing’s The Complete Anti-
Federalist, and the Documentary history of the United 
States.  These texts have been chosen in an effort to 
provide the optimal number of texts for evaluation, to 
provide for appropriate critical limits, and to insure 
textual authenticity.  With these limits in place the 
number of texts selected for examination can be 
significantly restricted.  Ideally, the texts in each of 
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the debates should not exceed 6 to 8 texts or portions of 
texts.   
PREVIEW 
In order to begin the analysis it is first be 
necessary to engage a discussion regarding the classical 
concepts being used in this analysis.  This study will 
begin by exploring the classical concepts of prudence and 
decorum and then will engage in a brief discussion of the 
founder’s familiarity with these concepts.  After 
establishing the groundwork for the analysis, the study 
will then examine key texts in each of the chosen ratifying 
conventions applying the methodology discussed above to the 
analysis.  Finally, the study will conclude with a brief 
discussion of what has been learned by from the analysis.   
Each of the chosen conventions brings very different 
issues to the analysis.  In Massachusetts, the primary 
issue was that of representation, and out of their fear 
that the representation created by the constitution would 
harm liberty, antifederalists demanded a Bill of Rights.  
In Virginia the analysis revolves largely around the 
discourse of James Madison and Patrick Henry.  Finally, New 
York is chosen due to its critical importance to the new 
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union, as well as the circulation of the Federalist Papers 
in an effort to build public support for the constitution.   
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CHAPTER 2  
METHOD 
CLASSICAL INFLUENCES ON THE FOUNDING GENERATION 
Classical Education 
As described in chapter one there are two reasons to 
look to Cicero and to a lesser extent, Aristotle for the 
theoretical framework for this investigation.  First, both 
developed insightful inquiries into the function of public 
deliberation.  Their works have survived beyond their time, 
have crossed generational boundaries, and even today remain 
important means of examining rhetorical artifacts (See 
Brock, Foss, Brockriede, et al.).  Second, the classical 
authors, specifically Cicero, were of particular interest 
to the founding generation of the United States.  Both 
grammar schools as well as universities, for example, 
relied heavily upon classical authors.  In addition, the 
libraries of the educated class in early America relied 
heavily on these writers.  The following chapter will 
examine the notion of classical influence, and then proceed 
to discuss in more depth the classical concepts of kairos, 
decorum, and prudence.   
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Classical Influence 
There are those who have problematized the above 
claims, largely because it is impossible to draw a direct 
line from the classical texts to the authors and disputants 
in the ratification debates.  In essence, this is so 
because it is rare to find authors who make a direct 
attribution to a classical author.  Meyer Reinhold (1984) 
argues that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
establish that any particular classical writer or text 
influenced any particular participant in the ratification 
debates.  Even if the book was in the library of the 
participant, it is difficult to establish whether the 
person actually read it(p, 35).  In essence, Reinhold 
claims that we cannot possible know what is any classical 
influence was exerted upon the American founders.  Carl 
Richard (1994), on the other hand, while praising 
Reinhold’s book as “the most thorough” work on the 
founders’ classical reading, argues that, in an effort to 
avoid overstatement, Reinhold arguably understates the 
impact of the classics on the founding generation (p. 4).  
In other words, as stated above, the classics were heavily 
relied upon in the educational system, they were a part of 
popular culture as evidenced by the use of classical 
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pseudonyms in pamphlets and newspaper editorials.  While 
direct attribution is absent, it cannot be accurate to say 
we cannot establish any influence.   
This argument aside, it will not be the focus of this 
dissertation to determine or debate the level of classical 
influence on individual participants in the debates.  
Rather, the focus of this dissertation is the function that 
familiarity with the classics played in the debates.  In 
essence, the focus concerns how the disputants utilized 
their knowledge of classical concepts throughout the course 
of the debate.  As such, it is necessary to generate a 
brief discussion of the classical grounding of the 
Constitutional generation.   
While classicists disagree about the level of 
influence the classics had on the Constitutional 
generation, there is agreement that the classics “supplied 
a large portion of the founders’ ’intellectual tools’” 
(Reinhold, 1994, p 148). Additionally, the classical texts 
were a core constituent of eighteenth-century development 
of American views on moral and political behavior. Gilbert 
Chinard (1949) explains, “[The classical tradition] was an 
essential part of the moral foundation of many of the men 
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who framed American institutions” (p. 24-25).  Reinhold 
(1994) explains that: 
Evidence abounds for an American cult of 
antiquity during the eighteenth century, 
particularly during the second half; the 
ubiquitous classical quotations and tags; the 
common use of classical pseudonyms; the revival 
of classical place names; the constant adducing 
of classical parallels; even the frequent use of 
classical names for slaves in the southern 
states.  Overshadowing all these was the tireless 
and purposeful reading by early Americans of the 
classics as a repository for timeless models for 
guidance in republicanism and private and civic 
virtue (p. 24).   
The means by which the classics became such an 
important part of the lives of the founding generation was 
through the educational system. For example, Reinhold, 
Richards, Bailyn, and even Rossiter explain that educated 
people began classical training in grammar school, and this 
education continued through university training.  In fact, 
according to Richard (1994), the men of the Constitutional 
generation equated merit and learning; and learning to this 
generation was “classical knowledge” (p. 51).  Moreover, we 
find that classical symbols, allusions, and theories are 
used as a means of claiming social status.  In other words, 
an education, particularly at the university level, was 
necessarily a classical education, and university education 
was available only to those of means, in this case middle 
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and upper class men. One way, therefore, for demonstrating 
one’s social status was to make use of the classics in both 
speech and writing (ibid.).  
The reason for the reliance on classical texts and 
authors has to do with the stated goals of education in the 
mid to late eighteenth century.  Reinhold (1994) argues 
that American leaders during the second half of the 
eighteenth century believed that education should “teach 
useful knowledge and inculcate virtue” (p. 146).  As 
evidence, Reinhold quotes from the New Jersey Monthly 
Advertiser, June 1787, explaining that classical texts were 
used because it was believed that these texts would aid in 
the effort to “make men virtuous” (p. 143).   
Although the curriculum varied between schools, the 
texts that were typically used included Cato’s Distichs (A 
collection of moral aphorisms), Cicero’s orations, letters, 
and De Officiis, and sections and selections from Aristotle 
and others (Reinhold, 1984, p. 26 & 149-150.).  At Harvard, 
Yale, and King’s College (Columbia), Cicero was a staple.  
Tully, for example, was required reading (Reinhold, 1975, 
p. 27).  Reinhold (1975) says that in the eyes of educated 
Americans: 
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Cicero took pride of place as orator, 
political theorist, stylist, and moralist.   
Especially popular for moral teaching was Tully’s 
Offices (De Officiis), which subsumed the essence 
of the moral heritage and humanistic values of 
the ancient world.  This comprehensive compendium 
of moral instruction, useful to both young and 
mature readers, offered enlightenment and 
guidance for both private and civic virtue (p. 
150).   
Finally, in addition to the impact of Cicero on the 
American educational system, there is also a measurable 
impact on several key players in the American political 
arena. John Adams “derived a sense of identity and purpose” 
from his lifelong relationship with Cicero’s works 
(Richard, 1994, p. 60). James Wilson claims to have 
idolized Cicero (ibid.). Gordon Wood (1988) explained the 
prevailing conception of the effect of antiquity upon this 
generation: “the Founding Fathers had not yet abandoned the 
classical tradition of civic humanism—the host of values 
transmitted from antiquity that dominate the thinking of 
nearly all members of the elite in eighteenth-century 
Anglo-American world” (p. XXXV).   
Considering the impact of Cicero on the eighteenth 
century educational system and on the founders in 
particular, his thoughts on morality and politics are 
valuable tools for analyzing the ratification debates.  As 
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such, this dissertation will proceed to examine Ciceronian 
conceptions of decorum and prudence and Aristotle’s views 
on phronesis and character.  In analyzing the discourse, 
and the development of the idea of democracy in the 
discourse, I will examine the interplay between prudence, 
propriety, and character, demonstrating their utility as a 
means of fostering critical analysis of portions of the 
ratification debate.  This focus upon practical application 
of these concepts in context is consonant with their 
theoretical grounding in the particular (Richard, 1994, p. 
8).   
THE CLASSICS AND DELIBERATIVE PRAXIS 
Kairos 
One of the most important aspects of a studying public 
debate is the notion of appropriateness and time.  The 
Greek philosopher Isocrates (1990) declared that kairos, or 
fitness for the occasion, was critical in the making of 
moral and rhetorical decisions (p. 8). In essence, public 
debate creates the need for public decisions; these 
decisions must be made in a situation in which the result 
of those decisions cannot be known with certainty. As such, 
the Greek notion of kairos (timing) becomes critical.  For 
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example, had the constitution been suggested immediately 
following the revolutionary war, it would likely have been 
rejected due to the powerful central government that it 
created.  The failings of the Articles of Confederation, as 
well as the upheavals in places like western Massachusetts 
created the potential for a new government.  Timing, as 
such, was critical.   
Propriety, on the other hand, is the ability to 
construct one’s discourse in order to meet the 
contingencies and exigencies of the particular situation.  
Thomas Farrell (1993) explains the relationship between 
kairos, propriety, and prudence:  “The central virtue of 
rhetoric is ‘perspicuity’ writ large: phronesis refigured 
as kairos—proper choices at propitious moments” (p. 39).  
Farrell later explains:  
But the fact remains that eloquence in 
conversation is realized in the mastery of the 
moment—what the Greeks called kairos.  In 
Rhetoric, which often begins with the urgency of 
the moment, eloquence moves beyond wit to the 
virtue of propriety—what the Greeks called 
phronesis (p. 236).   
As such, when we realize the interrelated nature of 
propriety, prudence, and the accommodation to the 
situation, as well as the importance of these concepts to 
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rhetorical decision making, we find them to be appropriate 
for analysis of a public debate.  
Decorum/Propriety 
External Decorum 
Cicero explained that in speech “as in life, nothing 
is harder than to determine what is appropriate, The Greeks 
call it prepon, let us call it decorum” (trans.1934, p. 
70).  In the Roman system of rhetoric, what the Greeks had 
previously termed prepon came to be treated under two 
headings of Decorum: “apte” or “accommodate dicere”, and 
“decree”. Elaine Fantham (1984) explains that “accommodate 
dicere” refers to the specific adaptations that an orator 
makes to accommodate the audience, situation, and subject 
(p. 124). Fantham goes on to explain, “decree assumes an 
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absolute standard of aesthetic merit at which the speaker 
should aim” (p. 124). Examination of the Ciceronian concept 
of decorum reveals the linkages Cicero saw between timing 
and appropriateness, or kairos. In this multifaceted view 
of decorum, Cicero explains that the orator must consider 
three factors: the subject of the oration, his own 
character, and the character of the audience.
1
  In Orator, 
Cicero explains that the speaker must adapt to both 
occasions and to persons (p. 123). Considering the above, 
Elaine Fantham (1984) explains that the ability to adapt to 
the external conditions of audience and circumstance, 
through which the speaker accommodated the address in order 
to speak in a way that was appropriate to both, was a 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 See Michael Leff, Decorum and Rhetorical 
Interpretation: The Latin Humanistic Tradition and 
Contemporary Critical Theory (Naples, Italy: Estrato da 
Vichiana, 1990). 
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necessary condition for eloquence in the Ciceronian model 
(p. 124). James Andrews and David Zarefsky (1989) explain 
that the notion that “the situation in which rhetoric 
occurs is a major determinant of what will be said, and how 
it will be said” is well established today (p. xx).  
Inasmuch as we understand the importance of the external 
factors today, we need also recognize that these factors 
were critical to Cicero’s conception of rhetoric and 
eloquence.   
Given the former, decorum requires adapting rhetoric 
to the external exigencies.  However, this alone will not 
make a rhetor decorous.  It is also necessary to construct 
a rhetorical artifact that is aesthetically acceptable.  
For Cicero, aesthetics was the realm of internal decorum.   
Internal Decorum 
As important as the accommodation of the speech to 
circumstance and audience may have been, it was clearly not 
sufficient in the Ciceronian view.  Propriety in this model 
was clearly not delimited to the functional concerns in the 
external sense of accommodating the speech to audience and 
the situation. As indicated above, decorum also has a 
critical internal component.  In Orator Cicero explained 
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that “the orator must have an eye to propriety not only in 
thought but in language” (Orator 69) He, the orator, must 
construct an artifact that employs appropriate language, as 
well as using language appropriately.  Elaine Fantham 
(1984) explained that this “requirement of Decere assumes 
an absolute standard of aesthetic merit” of grace and 
eloquence within the oration (p. 124).  Michael Leff 
expands upon this in explaining that Cicero’s notion of 
propriety linked the “proper treatment of a subject with 
the internal form, the coordination of style and argument, 
the particular circumstances informing the subject, and the 
magnitude of the subject itself” (Decorum, p 120).  As a 
result of Cicero’s discussion regarding the ability of the 
orator to equip, (ornare) the discourse in a manner 
designed to render it effective, Leff concludes that for 
Cicero a “rhetorical representation achieves its effect 
because it simultaneously blends practical utility with 
aesthetic pleasure” (ibid.). Richard Lanham (1991) offered 
a concurring view, describing decorum as the rhetorical 
concept establishing that “style should suit subject, 
audience, speaker and occasion” (p. 45).  In sum, the 
admonition here is that the speaker needs to speak in a way 
that is deemed appropriate for both the situation as well 
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as the audience.  The rhetor needs to meet the audience on 
terms that they will understand and identify with.   
In addition, though, Cicero, like Aristotle, believes 
that the character of the speaker is also critical to 
rhetorical success.  This leads to the third part of 
decorum, moral decorum.   
 
Moral Decorum 
In addition to external and internal decorum, Cicero 
speaks of a third type that is necessary for this analysis: 
moral decorum.  In this form of propriety, Cicero focuses 
on the moral character of the speaker.  In De Officiis, 
Cicero explains to his son the moral duties of a Roman. He 
explains that moral propriety constitutes a combination of 
other virtues including “steadfastness, temperance, self 
control, and consideration of others” (Cicero, De Officiis, 
1:98). In the Ciceronian model, steadfastness and 
temperance were of particular importance because they acted 
to prevent one from acting upon one’s impulses. Cicero 
explains that “all the appetites must be controlled and 
calmed and that we must take infinite pains not to do 
anything from mere impulse or at random, without due 
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consideration and care” (ibid. 103). Cicero explains that 
in every man, two forces are at work, appetite and reason.  
Propriety, in the Ciceronian ideal, represented reason’s 
control of the appetite (Ibid. 101).  As such, for the 
rhetor to be seen as morally decorus, he/she had to 
demonstrate that they were seeking good for the community 
at large, not merely for themselves.  They had to posess 
what Aristotle called ethos.    Robert Harriman (1992) 
argued, “Cicero places the rules of decorum against the 
natural forces of impulse and irrationality which threaten 
always to bring one to self destruction.  Thus the most 
important rule of decorum ‘is to keep impulse subservient 
to reason” (p.149).  Further, in De Officiis, Cicero 
maintains that propriety and moral goodness were 
inseparable (Cicero, De Officiis, 1:94).  Key to this 
understanding is the notion of reason.  Cicero argues that 
the morally decorous rhetor argues from the perspective of 
reason not passion or pathos.   
James May (1988), discussing the important function of 
character in republican Rome, maintained that the Romans’ 
reverence for authority was “rooted in their admiration of 
a person who exhibited wisdom gained through practical 
experience, expert knowledge, and a sense of responsibility 
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in both public and private life”(p. 6). Paul MacKendrick 
(1989) explains that power and prestige, arising from 
“talent, wealth, experience, age, knowledge, education, 
[and] public service,” were intimately related to the 
operation of character in oratory (p. 17). As such, the 
accommodation of the speaker’s moral character to the 
situation was a critical issue for Cicero.   
Consideration of one’s own moral character, though, 
was not sufficient. Cicero believed a speaker had to 
account for the character of several participants in the 
rhetorical situation: his own and that of the party he 
represented (if any), the opposition and its 
representative, and the audience.   Cicero also recognized 
that a potential problem existed when situational standards 
of propriety contradicted the demands of individual 
propriety. In such a case, the orator was to remain true to 
one’s own character (Cicero, De Officiis, 1:110). Moreover, 
in a situation in which one was called, due to 
circumstance, to act or speak in a way that was contrary to 
one’s own moral predisposition, the better course was to 
act in accordance with one’s “peculiar traits of 
character,” even if doing so prevented one from being 
eloquent (Cicero, De Officiis, 1:110).   
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It is perhaps important to note that moral propriety, 
as it was conceptualized by Cicero, and Aristotelian ethos 
are not the same things.  Aristotelian ethos is built 
during the speech, while moral propriety is, for Cicero, a 
pre-existing characteristic, existing before, during, and 
after the particular oration.
2
.  Aristotle postulated that 
the speaker entered the arena tabula rasa (a blank slate) 
and the speech itself was the event that filled the tablet 
and established the ethos of the speaker.  Cicero, on the 
other hand, believed that the speaker entered the arena 
with a pre-established ethos.  This understanding forms an 
important part of Cicero’s understanding of oratory.  Given 
this understanding, then, if a rhetors character can be 
imputed before they speak, then one might be able to lessen 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 See Aristotle, Rhetoric, Trans. W. Rhys Roberts (New 
York: Modern Library, 1984), 135a5-15, for a more in-depth 
conversation regarding the subject of ethos.   
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the effectiveness of the rhetorical engagement at large.  
Cicero maintains, in De Oratore, that an audience is 
persuaded “by a man’s merit, achievements or reputable 
life,” all of which exist before and outside the speaking 
situation (Cicero, De Oratore, 2:182).  In the final 
analysis, Cicero believed that the speaker had the power to 
alter the audience’s sense of his character through the 
discourse (Aristotle’s concept of ethos); this did not 
alter the fact that the speaker entered the speaking 
situation with some existing personal characteristics 
familiar to the audience. 
For the constitutional generation, the importance of 
the classics, and of Cicero in particular, cannot be 
overstated when it comes to their conceptions and 
understandings of morality.  MacKendrick (1989) explained: 
What Montesquieu and Cicero have centrally 
in common is a conviction that ethics and 
politics must be closely bound together: 
education in representative government must 
inculcate notions of self-denial, patriotism, and 
community of interests, but with recognition of 
the primacy of common over individual interests 
(p. 277).   
Throughout the debates, one of the central areas of 
conflict is the intersection between self and community.  
On the one hand, the opposition to the constitution focuses 
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on self and local interests, while the federalists, on the 
other, consistently call for a more national view that 
melds local and national interests.  Given this, the 
negotiation of the situational demands and moral propriety 
becomes a major concern for the participants of the 
discourse. 
Prudence 
A key component of phronesis (identification with 
circumstances) can best be seen in the emphasis upon the 
particular and action directed toward the public good.  The 
founders called frequently for the dissolution of faction, 
in so doing they indicate a belief in a single concept of 
public good that is to be sought at all times and at all 
costs.  For Aristotle, phronesis functioned as the supreme 
political virtue because he saw it as the ability to 
determine the course of action to be undertaken in “things 
human and things about which it is possible to 
deliberate.”(Farrell, Norms, 146; Aristotle, Nichomachen 
Ethics, trans. J. L. Ackrill (London: Faber & Faber, 1973), 
1141b10) 
In classical parlance, it is possible to interchange 
the concepts of prudential reasoning with the concept of 
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phronesis.  This is true because as Aristotle expands upon 
the concept in his Ethics he does not draw a clear 
distinction between the moral action associated with 
phronesis, and the normative action associated with the 
problem solving nature of practical reasoning.   Aristotle 
explains that there are ties between phronesis and decorum 
because both invoke practical judgment in situations that 
call for action and choice based upon probable rather than 
absolute truth (Kahn, 1985, p. 30).  In other words, there 
was little use in debating that which was not variable, or 
that which was predetermined in the manner that the 
conclusions of scientific knowledge were universal and 
necessary. As such, the interplay of rhetoric and prudence 
becomes visible when we understand that both are concerned 
with choice in specific circumstances.  Thomas Farrell 
(1993) observed that, “[R]hetoric is the only art which 
evokes the capacity for practical reason from a situated 
audience.”(Farrell, p 10.) 
Additionally, kairos and propriety are also related to 
phronesis because, according to Eugene Garver, (1987) the 
“chief appeal of prudence is in its appropriateness to 
circumstances” (Eugene Garver, Machiavelli and the History 
of Prudence (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 
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22.). Aristotle believed that the person possessing 
phronesis, meaning practical wisdom or prudence (the terms 
are interchangeable), was capable of determining the good 
end (to telos) and of determining which actions would 
promote the common good (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 
1140a 25-35.).   
In the Aristotelian conception, phronesis was a 
necessary but insufficient condition of civic virtue.  This 
is because in the classical understanding not all judgments 
were prudential.  As such, when 18th century Whig thinkers 
invoked the concept of civic virtue, they invoked a concept 
that was entirely consistent with the classical sense of 
prudence.  This was so because in the case of both 
concepts, there was a strong moral element combined with 
political decision-making.   
With the above in mind, it is important to understand 
that Aristotle saw clear cleavages between the concepts of 
prudential reasoning, and the idea of scientific knowledge.  
Science involved the demonstration of that which was 
necessarily true, while prudence was applicable only in 
situations of uncertainty where judgments could only be 
made on the basis of that which was, at best, probably 
true.  In this sense prudence is neither science, episteme, 
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nor is it art, techne.  Scientific reasoning was akin to 
algorithmic thinking, truth is derived from principle to 
consequences (Garver 20).  On the other hand, techne is “a 
reasoned capacity for making . . . things that have 
existence and value of their own, while prudence has no end 
outside of itself” (ibid).   
Nancy Sherman (1989) explains that distinguishing 
prudence from episteme, and techne brings to the fore a key 
quality.  She notes that Aristotle was “eager” to 
distinguish phronesis from episteme and techne because of 
the top down deductive” method of the former and the lack 
of focus upon the praxis of the later (Nancy Sherman, The 
Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), 3 n. 2.).  In this model it is the 
accumulation of experience not that creates practical 
wisdom. This was based in the notion that phronesis was 
intimately related to the particulars rather than to 
universals. Ronald Beiner (1983) explains that one gained 
knowledge of particulars only through the accumulation of 
experiences. More importantly, these experiences foster the 
development of mature judgment (gnome) necessary for 
prudence.  
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Aristotle further explains that the exercise of 
prudence in situations presenting choices required a man of 
both experience and character appropriate to the situation 
(Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1142a15.). He argues that 
to be able to exercise practical wisdom requires moral 
virtue.  As such, propriety itself becomes a prerequisite.  
Given this, we begin to understand that virtue requires 
practical wisdom, and practical wisdom requires virtue—the 
two are inseparable (Sherman, 5.).  The reason for this is 
the link between phronesis and action. Aristotle’s argument 
is essentially that practical wisdom is only applicable to 
those situations that require deliberated action.  The 
syllogisms pertaining to the acts to be done, necessarily 
involve a starting point, what is to be done?  Aristotle 
posits that “knowing how to discern the particulars” “is a 
mark of virtue” (Sherman 4). Moreover,only the morally good 
person is able to discern the proper end that will serve 
the common good. Thus, “it is not possible to be good in 
the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically 
wise without moral virtue” (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 
1140a30.). As such, the function of character is an 
essential part of prudence. Beiner (1993) explains the 
centrality of character in the Aristotelian concept of 
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prudence claiming that for Aristotle, the prudent person 
possessed a “something” which was available “only by 
character and habituation, never by rational argument as 
such” (Farrell, Norms, 149, quoting Beiner, 236.).   
For the experienced statesman, which is the focus of 
this study, prudence and propriety were necessary 
components for discernment and pursuance of public good.  
In this sense, Aristotle’s concept of prudence is closely 
related to that of Cicero. In De Officiis, Cicero defines 
decorum “in the political realm as prudence” (Kahn 1985 p. 
35).  Kahn (1985) explains that: 
In Cicero’s view, then, even more than in 
Aristotle’s, the faculty of prudence is 
inseparable from the ideal practice of the 
orator.  Both the orator and the prudent man are 
concerned with the domain by acting according to 
the rhetorical standard of decorum.  Just as the 
orator is guided by decorum in adapting speech to 
the exigencies of the moment, so the prudent man 
enacts decorum in the moral sphere by responding 
to the particular and contingent in human affairs 
(ibid) (citing Cicero, Orator, 71) 
As with Aristotle, a full understanding of Ciceronian 
prudence requires recognition of a distinction between two 
types of knowledge: sapientia and prudentia.  Sapientia is 
akin to philosophical or scientific knowledge, which by 
itself is not very useful in resolving practical political 
problems. This should not be taken to mean that this type 
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of knowledge had no value to the politician, but according 
to Cicero, philosophical/technical knowledge was 
insufficient to achieve eloquence (Cicero, De Oratore, 
3:142). Moreover, Cicero indicates that such knowledge 
might be a “necessary condition” to prudence in some 
circumstances, but it was never sufficient to produce it 
(Leff, Decorum, 124.).   
Cicero argues that the other type of knowledge, 
prudentia, is the means by which orators who are not 
“scholars” might achieve eloquence (Cicero, De Oratore, 
2:1). Here, echoing Aristotle, Cicero argues that prudentia 
allows the senator to become a statesman (Ibid. 1:8).  
Cicero wrote that “while the ability to do what is 
appropriate is a matter of trained skill and of natural 
talent, the knowledge of what is appropriate to a 
particular occasion is a matter of practical sagacity 
[prudentiae]” (Ibid. 3:212). Thus, the eloquent speaker 
possessed the practical wisdom necessary to ascertain what 
propriety dictated should be said and done in a particular 
situation: “the man of experience is qualified for judgment 
because he is so used to acting” (Beiner, 77).  In essence, 
prudence becomes a requirement of a statesman because his 
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wisdom and or experience make him or her a more thoughtful 
and discerning rhetor.   
Thomas Farrell and G. Thomas Goodnight (1981) 
distinguish the two types of knowledge sapientia and 
prudentia in a discussion concerning technical and social 
reason:   
By technical reasoning, we mean those modes 
of inference that are characteristic of 
specialized forums, wherein discourse is coded to 
fit functional demands of particular information 
fields….  Social reason employs inferences that 
are prompted through the pressing contingencies 
of ordinary life, wherein the claims of advocates 
are affiliated with the interests of related 
others and grounded in the generalizable 
convictions of a competent audience” (Thomas B. 
Farrell and G. Thomas Goodnight p. 273).   
For both Aristotle and Cicero the public spheres was 
the site in which the prudent orator applied practical 
wisdom gained through talent, virtue, and experience with 
the goal of resolving controversy for the public good.  
Moreover, prudence and propriety enabled the experienced 
statesman to discern and pursue the public good.  
Ultimately, the prudent orator applied practical wisdom 
which was gained through talent, virtue, and experience in 
the pursuit of resolution of controversy for the public 
good.   
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In the following chapters the concepts discussed above 
will be unpacked and applied as the debates themselves 
unfold.  The roles of prudence, propriety/decorum will be 
examined operationally throughout the debates in 
Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York.  In Massachusetts an 
examination is made of the linguistic tools used in an 
effort to achieve compromise, specifically with regard to 
the inclusion of a Bill of Rights.  During the course of 
these examinations one will find distinctions made between 
propriety, and the appearance of propriety.  In addition, 
emphasis will be placed on the distinctions offered between 
common good and personal gain.   
In Virginia, the interaction between Patrick Henry and 
James Madison will be the focus of the examination.  In 
this particular analysis the emphasis will be placed on the 
stresses between internal and external decorum.  In 
Madison’s rhetorical choices one can find examples of the 
dualities of decorum described by Leff.  Henry, on the 
other hand, struggles throughout the convention with his 
revolutionary character; he tries to find a space that 
allows him to be true to his character and contextually 
decorous as well.   
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In New York, the focus primarily rests on Alexander 
Hamilton.  Throughout the convention Hamilton struggles 
with both prudence and decorum.  While Hamilton shared many 
of the struggles of Henry, in terms of situational decorum, 
he overcame some through the use of accommodation and 
audacity.  On some level, this accommodation allowed New 
York federalists to snatch victory from the hands of 
defeat.   
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CHAPTER 3  
THE MASSACHUSETTS RATIFYING CONVENTION 
There is little doubt as to the political and 
historical significance of the Massachusetts ratification 
convention of 1788.  The convention represented the first 
real attack on the proposed constitution from the 
antifederalist opposition, as well as the first real 
compromise from the federalists in an effort to secure 
ratification.  In addition to these larger issues, 
Massachusetts was critical insofar as the concept of 
representation was debated and explored in the process of 
the state’s ratification debate.  While the debate for a 
Bill of Rights is important, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, the larger deliberative issue in 
Massachusetts is the growing question of appropriate 
representation.  Given the former, this chapter will 
explore the debates and discourse surrounding the concept 
of representation in Massachusetts.   
In many ways, the model of Massachusetts came to be 
the model of ratification in every other hostile 
convention.  Before Massachusetts; Delaware, Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey, and Connecticut had all ratified, and not one 
of these states suggested any alteration to the 
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Constitution.  Their choice had been simply to accept or to 
reject.  According to Harding (1896 p. 116), the 
Massachusetts example suggested an entirely new way to 
ratify, to accept and suggest amendment.  This became such 
a successful formula for ratification that in the seven 
states yet to ratify, only one, Maryland, did not offer 
amendment to the document.   
In addition to the afore mentioned ratification 
formula, Massachusetts was, in other ways, a turning point 
for the ratification process.  Gordon Wood (1969) indicates 
that there could be no union without Massachusetts, as a 
result of this much of the opposition to the constitution 
in other parts of the country pinned its hopes on failure 
in Massachusetts.  When this failure did not occur, an 
important pillar was removed from the structure of 
antifederalist opposition, thereby making Massachusetts’ 
ratification itself a further argument in favor of 
ratification at large.   
From a rhetorical standpoint, however, the debate in 
Massachusetts brings additional insights into the 
deliberative process that created the union that resulted 
from ratification of the constitution.  Specifically, the 
debates in Massachusetts brought focused attention to the 
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mechanism of representation.  That is to say, before the 
Massachusetts ratification convention opened, and before 
the delegates began to consider the specific components of 
the constitution itself, important decisions had to be made 
that would, in the end, have profound effects on the 
convention, the ratification process, and on the resulting 
federal government.  As such, the discourse surrounding the 
form and method of representation will provide important 
insights into the deliberative processes in Massachusetts, 
as well as revealing important insights regarding the 
construction of American Democracy.  This chapter will 
explore the afore mentioned discourse in an effort to shed 
greater light on this instantiation of public deliberation 
and the tools employed in that deliberation.   
The American Revolution united disparate peoples into 
a single cause and created for the first time some sense of 
unity and nationalism.  This unity was based largely on the 
common threat and is probably best represented by the 
iconic dictum, “join or die.”  This nationalism however, 
dissipated very quickly after the revolution.  The weak 
national government that guided the war effort had very 
little power to preserve the peace, leaving the several 
states to manage their own affairs with little regard for 
73 
 
 
 
one another.  This factionalism and discord left the 
Continental Congress unable to repay war debts, manage 
international affairs, or even mediate conflicts between 
states.  In addition within the states there were different 
problems; government control seldom extended beyond the 
capitol and other urban areas.  Rural citizens were used to 
managing their own affairs, and did not easily surrender 
authority to government officials.  At every level of 
governance, discord and chaos were rapidly replacing order.  
Wood (1998) explains that the result of the slow 
disintegration of government control left the former 
colonies ripe for re-colonization.  On August 29, 1786, 
Daniel Shay and a group of rebels took over a courthouse in 
Western Massachusetts to prevent the trial of debtors by a 
court system that they (the rebels) refused to recognize.  
The rebellion spread to other states, and culminated in an 
attempt to seize a federal arsenal.  For many the rebellion 
and chaos in New England demonstrated that if liberty was 
to be preserved for all, it would only be preserved with a 
more effective national government.  That more effective 
government was crafted by the 55 delegates who met in the 
summer of 1787 in Philadelphia.  In crafting this document 
the Federalists had created a government that radically 
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resituated the locus of political sovereignty.  Gordon Wood 
(1998) explains that this constitution premised upon 
participatory politics created a need for a “Clarification 
of the nature of representation” (p. 383).  The 
constitution, then, created important questions regarding 
the relationship between the people and their 
representatives; as well as the nature of political 
deliberation itself. 
In a “Memorial Discourse” eulogizing Massachusetts 
ratification convention delegate William Symmes, Nathan 
Hazen (1862) expounded the key questions of the debate: 
[Symmes] had heard the discourses made in 
debate.  He had learned what were the exigencies 
of the nation.  He saw its perils.  The scheme 
before them animated his hopes.  Was he to decide 
upon his own knowledge and convictions, or upon 
those of his constituents?  Why had he listened 
to the debates which must not influence his 
decision?  Why indeed to men meet and discuss, if 
each man must inevitably hold the same opinions 
he had before meeting and discussion. (p. 13) 
In essence, Symmes asks the quintessential question of 
ratification debates, should the delegates be a part of a 
larger community of discourse designed to find the best way 
to govern the new country, or should they simply attend the 
conventions as the mirrors of their constituents?    
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This chapter will first, briefly, examine the theories 
of political sovereignty and leadership that informed the 
ratification debates at large, and then engage an 
examination of the debates in Massachusetts focusing 
specifically upon the issue of representation as it plays 
out in the Massachusetts ratification discourse.   This 
focus is important not only because it provides important 
insights into the deliberative process, but also because 
the issue of representation is a cornerstone in the 
American concept of democracy.    
POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY   
At the time of the ratification debates, the concept 
of political sovereignty, independent authority over a 
designated territory, was in a state of transition.  Gordon 
Wood explains that the concept of sovereignty was 
transformed by the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688.  
Sovereignty was transferred from the king, the 
representative of God, to parliament the representative of 
the people.  The result of this is what Edmund Burke (1774) 
called a “government by discussion” in which parliament 
acted as “a deliberative assembly of one nation with one 
interest, that of the whole; where not local purposes, not 
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local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, 
resulting from the general reason of the whole” (p. 392).   
In his criticism of Bristol’s attempt at binding him 
with instructions Burke admonished “you choose a member 
indeed: but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of 
Bristol, but he is a member of parliament” (p. 392).  
Steven Browne (1993) explains that it was not Burke’s 
intention to reject totally the views of the electorate.  
Burke thought that these views should be of “great weight” 
in a representative’s deliberations.  However, local views 
should not automatically prevail.  Rather the 
representative must always use his “unbiased opinion, his 
mature judgment, his enlightened conscience” which, when 
exercised from the enlarged perspective that physical 
distance from the constituency provided, would tend toward 
fostering the common, not local, good and long term, not 
transient, benefits.  Proper judgment was exercised in the 
“space of virtue … a deliberative realm between the press 
of popular sentiment—which is volatile, shifting, and 
immediate—and the cold abstractions of reason—which are 
aloof, unsituated and irrelevant to the demands of public 
life” (p. 69-70).   
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In essence, what Burke argues is that proper 
representation should listen to all voices, and then judge 
what is best for the whole.  Burke believed that the 
“legislator must operate in a free space where reflective 
principles can mediate and shape the response to particular 
situations.  In assuming this ground, the judging subject 
is not alienated from the particular, since distance in 
space creates a perspective from which an enlarged view of 
things can emerge” (Browne 1993 p. 81-82).  In other words, 
Burke argues that the representative must engage the 
deliberative process in order to discern the common good.   
In colonial America, this view of Parliament as the 
ultimate governmental authority could be seen as a 
foundational cause of the American Revolution.  The dispute 
resulted in large part from two competing theories of 
representation—virtual and actual (Wood, 1969, p. 188).  
Virtual representation, the view held by Parliament, and 
articulated previously by Burke, held that every citizen of 
the British Empire was represented by Parliament.  Patrick 
Henry and other American colonists rejected this form of 
representation, arguing that the virtual representation was 
both implausible as well as logistically impossible.  In 
effect, it was the view of many in the colonies that the 
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sheer distance between Britain and America made this kind 
of representation impossible.  They insisted that there 
were important differences in the needs, and expectations 
of colonists and citizens at home in Britain.  Moreover, 
they held that Parliament did not understand the colonies 
and as such was incapable of rendering adequate 
representation.  In short, the colonists challenged virtual 
representation as illustrated in the iconic slogan of the 
revolution, often attributed to James Otis "taxation 
without representation is tyranny."
 
(Smith, 1998, p. 21) 
The resulting political doctrine, popular sovereignty, 
held that governmental authority rested with the people and 
not with a King or Parliament.  Samuel Beer (1993) explains 
that “The conflict [between Britain and America] was 
between the idea that the many must look to the few for 
instruction in and direction toward the common good and the 
idea that the many can themselves determine the common good 
and direct the polity toward its realization” (p. 28).  
Wood (1998) concurs noting that American politics 
immediately before the Constitution’s formulation saw the 
“actualization of representation through the growing use of 
instructions” (p 376).  He argues that the reason for the 
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insistence on actual representation stemmed from the 
public’s mistrust of their representatives: 
Indeed, it was this breakdown in the sense of 
mutuality of interests, this mistrust of the 
representational system, which gave meaning to the notion 
of actual representation, most clearly seen in the expanded 
use of instructions by the constituents to their delegates 
in the legislatures. (p. 189) 
Given the above, the framers in Philadelphia attempted 
to construct a new kind of representational body that 
recognized the fear and mistrust of government, as well as 
the need for a deliberative body focused on the national 
interest.  Thus the balance between personal liberty and 
governmental authority, which characterized so much of the 
American experience, was manifest.  These features were in 
many ways revolutionary.  Captain Jeremiah Pierce (1788) 
described the representative qualities of Congress under 
the constitution, explaining that the House of 
Representatives was the “democratical” part of congress 
because it was elected by popular vote.  The Senate, 
elected by the state legislatures, represented the 
“sovereignty of the individual states” (p. 120).  Here 
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Pierce clearly articulates the balance being sought by the 
framers.   
In New England, however, the composition of Congress 
coupled with broad wording of the enumerated powers in 
Article 1 section 8, specifically the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the General Welfare 
Clause, fanned governmental mistrust, and generated a high 
level of suspicion.  New England was a region in which 
citizens traditionally exercised very close constituent 
control of elected representatives, where state 
constitutions codified restrictions on representatives, and 
where distrust of politicians was an article of faith.  
This was particularly true in rural areas where tensions 
predicated on distrust of wealth and education and 
specifically lawyers had already fomented rebellion 
(Rutland 1983 p. 66-70).  Silas Lee (1788), writing to his 
Uncle George Thatcher, a congressman in the Continental 
Congress, articulated this mistrust of representative 
government: 
You will say most if not all [doubts] 
proceed from an unreasonable distrust of our 
rulers and idea that Congress want only an 
opportunity to oppress, & tyrannize over the 
people—experience has taught mankind that there 
is danger in giving up too much power to rulers—
indeed if there was not danger of their misusing 
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their powers, there would be no need of any 
restraint at all, or limitation to their conduct. 
. . . If it is impossible for them to do 
otherwise than right, or than to make the true 
happiness of their constituents, their only study 
aim, there is no need of a constitution at all. . 
. . but I confess I have not so good an opinion 
of mankind as thus unlimitedly to give up all my 
rights--& cheerfully to submit to whatever their 
humor or caprice should happen to suggest (p. 
268).  
Given the tension already extant in New England, Lee’s 
comments seem particularly apt.  He concedes the 
possibility of an honest government, but prefers 
constraints to protect against the dishonest; these 
constraints particularly in New England, were reflected in 
their control of representatives. 
In Massachusetts, for example, distrust of government 
was reflected in statutory checks on representatives: these 
checks ranged from annual elections and the right of recall 
to mandatory rotation in office.  In addition, communities 
frequently used binding instructions as a mechanism for 
dictating representative’s actions in the state 
legislature.  Gordon Wood (1998) explains that, “in 
colonial politics, particularly in New England, the use of 
instructions did not raise a problem so long as the 
instructions were limited to local concerns” (p. 190).  The 
line however, between local and regional or even national 
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concerns was not always easy to demarcate.  As Wood goes on 
to explain, real problems arose when decisions had to be 
made concerning issues that affected multiple localities 
such as road building, or even war debts.  Given the above, 
the Constitution represented a revolutionary shift in the 
concept and practice of representation.   
While the evidence seems to weigh heavily in favor of 
town meetings and binding instructions, the arguments for a 
convention are compelling and bound in the political theory 
of the day.  Writing in the Massachusetts Gazette James 
Iredell writing as “Marcus” challenges the town of 
Sandwich’s decision to send and instructed delegate.  He 
explains that such a decision is predicated on the fear 
that a delegate will not honor the wishes of his 
constituents.  He argues that “as some men are open to 
conviction, the political creed of their delegates might be 
shaken by the triumph of reason and truth over sophistry 
and error” (Bailyn, 1992, 1:889)?   
While the conversion of some anti-federalists confirms 
the fears of the opposing towns, “Marcus” stresses the 
importance of moving the debate from the over-heated public 
space into the more formal assembly setting.  Marcus 
affirms the already accepted notion that in the public 
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space “sophistry and emotion take the place of reasoned 
argument and the application of Phronesis” (Harding, 1896, 
p. 50-53).  This notion of a public space and a more 
venerated legislative space comes directly from the Cato’s 
Letters, a text revered by the constitutional generation.  
According to Bailyn (1992) “the writing of Trenchard and 
Gordon ranked with the treatises of Locke as the most 
authoritative statement of the nature of political liberty 
and above Locke as an exposition of the social sources of 
the threats it faced” (p. 36).  Trenchard and Gordon (1733) 
in discussing public debate argue, 
Much greater latitude is allowed; and 
vehemence of tone and action, a hurry of pomp and 
words, strong figures, tours of fancy, ardent 
expression, and throwing fire into their 
imaginations, have always been reckoned proper 
ways to gain assent and affections (p. 318). 
In a parliament, Congress, Senate, or any other 
legislative body, such "flattering and deceiving" language 
was seen as inappropriate. In such settings "theatrical 
action, and ostentation of language, prejudice both [speech 
and speaker], as they both break in upon propriety; and, 
disguise it with show and sound" (ibid.).  
Ultimately, the argument is that in the public space 
has competing interests attempted to set the public's mind 
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a fire dispassionate reasoning was impossible. As such, 
most considered the deliberative power of the assembly to 
be superior to that of the public square. For true 
phronesis to occur, it was necessary for the representative 
body to filter out the passions of the public. Kessler 
(1987) writes: 
The virtue of the man who is adept at 
deciding what is the best thing to be done under 
the circumstances, and to determine what is the 
best way to get from here to there (and who 
therefore must know where he's going, the goal 
for which to strive), who could instruct public 
opinion without either scorning its backwardness 
or flattering its vanity or inflaming its 
passions. This is prudence in the traditional 
sense. (p. 13) 
 Correspondingly the towns who instruct their 
delegates to employ their independent judgment highlight 
the importance of the exercise of Phronesis in such 
instructions. North Hampton Massachusetts issued resolution 
similar to many of these towns. 
The object of your mission, Gentlemen, is of 
the highest magnitude in human affairs -- every 
step we take in the progress of our examination 
evinces, that is too important, complicated, and 
extensive, to be hastily decided upon -- much 
time, and unwearied application, are requisite in 
order thoroughly investigate it; the civil 
dignity and prosperity of this state, of the 
United States, and perhaps of humanity, are 
suspended upon the decision of this momentous 
question. And we with you, gentlemen, patiently 
to hear, and attentively to examine, every 
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argument, that shall be offered for and against 
its adoption -- be not unduly influenced by any 
local consideration -- let your mind be impressed 
by the necessity of having an equal energetic 
federal government. . . 
But, gentlemen, we mean not to give you 
positive instructions relative to your voting for 
or against a reported Constitution -- when 
assembled you will have the collected wisdom of 
the state before you.... having the fullest 
confidence in your political wisdom, integrity, 
and patriotism, we cheerfully, on our part, 
submit the all-important question your decision 
(Bourne, 1875, p. 540). 
Ultimately, the choice to submit the Constitution to 
ratifying convention was a first step in altering the 
political calculus in Massachusetts. The second step is in 
the progressive unbinding of Massachusetts delegates. These 
two steps are taken together signify a shift in the locus 
of argument from local to national, and an affirmation of 
the importance of prudence and substance over local 
preference. All these concepts will become critical as 
Massachusetts opens the debate on the role of 
representation in the new constitution. 
As the Massachusetts convention opens, in many ways, 
one of the primary arguments has already percolated through 
the public mind: the question of the appropriate role of 
the representative.  While this question was largely 
answered for the convention in that only a few towns 
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actually instructed their delegates, specifically the 
Massachusetts towns of Harvard, Lancaster, and Shereborn 
and the Maine towns of Brunswick and Harpswell (Wood, 1969, 
p. 89).  This was not, immediately, a general shift in 
political theory.  While binding instructions were only 
issued in a few localities, many towns publicly instructed 
their delegates and expected these instructions to be 
honored. The Resolutions of the Tradesmen of Boston, 
published in the Massachusetts Gazette, typified the 
control some constituencies sought to place upon delegates 
short of issuing binding instructions: 
THAT, in the late election of delegates to 
represent this town in Convention, it was our 
design and the opinion of this body, the design 
of every good man in town, to elect such men, and 
such only, as would exert their utmost ability to 
promote the adoption of the proposed frame of 
government in all parts, without any conditions, 
pretended amendments or alterations whatever; and 
that such, and only such, will truly represent 
the feelings, wishes, and desires of their 
constituents; and if any of the delegates of this 
town should oppose the adoption of the frame of 
government in gross, or under pretense of making 
amendments, or alterations of any kind, or of 
annexing conditions to their acceptance, such 
delegate or delegates will act contrary to their 
best interest, the strongest feelings and warmest 
wishes of the Tradesmen of the will town of 
Boston. (Massachusetts Gazette January 9, 1788)   
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The importance of this can be seen in the 
understanding that while many towns did not formally charge 
their representatives to vote as the town expected, there 
was an informal expectation that delegates would vote as 
the town wished.  In several cases, as will be noted later, 
delegates who violated these expectations suffered when 
they returned home.   
While history remembers the Massachusetts convention 
because Massachusetts proposed the Bill of Rights, and 
created the mechanism by which the constitution would be 
ratified in the remaining states, one must not overlook the 
critical decisions that preceded the discussion of the Bill 
of Rights; the choice to allow representatives to debate 
the proposed scheme of government, as well as the growing 
shift from classical republicanism to the theory of 
representative government.   
Gordon Wood (1969) explains that in Massachusetts two 
different theories of government held sway. One theory 
based largely on the English conception assumes the 
electorate consists of a homogenous mass with united 
interests the other system, or that which seem to hold more 
sway in America, assumes  the existence of multiple classes 
and independent interests. Federalist 57 explains: 
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The aim of every political Constitution is 
or ought to be first to obtain for rulers men who 
possess the most wisdom to discern in the most 
virtue to pursue the common good of society; in 
the next place, to take the most effectual 
precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst 
they continue to hold their public trust (Bailyn, 
1993, p. 2:213). 
Ultimately, the aim of a political constitution, by 
this standard, relies upon the exercise of phronesis by its 
representatives. In other words, what the federalists 
expected was that those chosen as representatives would not 
only discern, but pursue the common good. As such, the 
Federalists believed that success of the constitution 
required what Carl Richard (1994), calls a "natural 
aristocracy" (p. 131).  James Monroe explains that the 
constitution is designed to “give the system all the 
advantages of an aristocracy -- wisdom, experience, and the 
consistency of measures" (ibid. p. 144). It was hoped, that 
by relying on this "natural aristocracy" some of the more 
dangerous impulses of democracy might be avoided. They, the 
founders, saw the public as impulsive, unwieldy, and 
ultimately dangerous. They feared, the public could be 
convinced by skilled orators to move in ways that were 
ultimately counter to the common good. Given this, they saw 
representatives as a natural buffer between the impulses of 
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the people, and the common good. The Federal Farmer John 
Dickinson explained, 
The Senate should consist of the most 
distinguished characters, distinguished for their 
rank in life and their way to a property, and the 
Bering as strong a likeness to the House of Lords 
as possible, I said that would combine the 
families and wealth of the aristocracy in order 
to establish a balance that will check democracy 
(Richard p. 142-143). 
While the Federalists were seeking to create a 
democratic system, they also saw the need to account for 
and control the “imprudence” of democracy (Richard p 131).  
They saw in people the danger of excess, the overwhelming 
of individual interests, the difficulty of maintaining the 
common good.  As such, they attempted to devise in the 
constitution a stabilizing force; this force is what is 
referred to above at the “natural aristocracy.”  It is not 
a landed aristocracy in the European model, but one based 
on gifts of education, character, prudence, and wisdom.  
This mixed government allowed the people to be protected 
from themselves, but it also created the checks necessary 
for the people to protect themselves for the elites.  John 
Adams explained:  
Single assembly governments, which would 
inevitably be dominated by a natural aristocracy 
of wealth, birth, and talent. Hence the natural 
aristocracy should be segregated in a Senate, 
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where their talent could benefit the country, 
while their ambition could be checked by the one 
executive and the representatives of the many" 
(Richard, p. 134). 
As indicated above, key to this mixed government 
theory is the idea that representatives have to be both men 
of character, and men of reason, ultimately they must 
possess prudence. Stephen Brown (1993) writing about Edmund 
Burke, noted the centrality of prudence in 18th-century 
politics. "Virtue is an expression of enlightened public 
action, or political will tempered by such values as 
prudence, right reason, forbearance, magnanimity, order and 
collective commitment" (p. 12). In addition, these values 
can be found throughout the Federalist papers. For example, 
in defending the need for a standing army, "Publius" 
explained: 
On any scale, [a standing army] is an object 
of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise 
nation will combine all these considerations; and 
whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from 
any resource which may be essential to its 
safety, will exert all his prudence and 
diminishing both the necessity and the danger of 
resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its 
liberties (The Federalist 41). 
As mixed government theory coalesces in America, 
prudence becomes a critical part of American politics. This 
happens largely because power is shared between the people, 
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the states, and the national government.  This power 
sharing arrangement required all parties to engage in 
decision making in which multiple ethical positions might 
be supportable and as such prudential or “wise judgments” 
had to be made.  One might see this more clearly by 
examining the shift in the discourse in the Massachusetts 
ratifying convention.  While the classical republican side, 
represented by the antifederalists, argues for a high 
degree of constituent control over representatives; 
federalists in Massachusetts are arguing just the opposite; 
they want the representatives of the people to listen to 
the arguments and engage in prudential judgment regarding 
what is best for the nation.  The dilemma they face, 
though, is that in arguing for the careful deliberation of 
the chosen representatives, they actually feed into the ad 
personam argument being advanced against them. Every 
argument for reasoned discourse further impels the position 
that the Federalists through their talents are attempting 
to manipulate the outcome in their favor.   
The antifederalists, fear the dangers inherent in 
relinquishing power to the so-called natural aristocracy, 
while the federalists argue that this is the only way to 
protect the liberties of the people at large. Samuel Brian, 
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writing as Centinel, explains that there "can be no 
question that this feeling [against an aristocracy] 
underlay most of the opposition in the Massachusetts 
convention.  Quotations in proof of this might be 
multiplied indefinitely" (Harding 1896 p, 75-76). Rufus 
King in a letter to James Madison expands on the 
antifederalists jealousies: 
the opposition complains that the Lawyers, 
Judges, Clergymen, Merchants and men of education 
are all in favor of the Constitution -- and that 
for that reason they appear to be able to make 
the worse appear the better cause. Let's say 
they, if we had men of this description on our 
side, we should alarm the people with the 
imperfections of the Constitution and be able to 
refute the defense set up in his favor.... these 
objections are not directed against any part of 
the Constitution, but their opposition seems to 
arise from an opinion that is immovable, that 
some injury is plotted against him -- that the 
system is the production of the rich and 
ambitious, but they discover its operations and 
that's the consequence will be the establishment 
of two orders in the society, one comprehending 
the opulent and great, the other poor and 
illiterate. The extraordinary Union in favor of 
the Constitution in this State of the Wealthy and 
sensible part of it, is in the confirmation of 
these opinions and every exertion hitherto made 
to eradicate it, has been in vain (King, 
1894,1:316-17). 
As this letter makes clear, the federalists are in a 
difficult position, in defending the constitution they 
simply confirm their breeding and education, thus 
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reinforcing the antifederalist positions, and if they do 
not defend, then the constitution will surely fail.  Given 
this stance, the antifederalists see as their best hope for 
success continued efforts to demonstrate that the 
federalists are in essence rich men trying to steal the 
rights of the common people. 
The federalists, seeing themselves as men of practical 
wisdom and civic virtue need a venue in which they can 
offer reasoned arguments that will demonstrate that the 
constitution is in the common interest.  Thus, one side 
needs to prevent debate and in so doing focuses on Ad 
Personaum attacks, while the other side needed an audience 
willing to listen in order to have any hope of advancing 
its cause.   
Fowler (1980) explains that the first salvo of the 
antifederal attack was an attempt to stop the debate before 
it ever began.  They recognized the potential power of 
allowing the federalists to make their case, and as such, 
they [the anti-federalists] attempted to bring the 
constitution to an immediate vote when the convention 
opened (p. 269).  The federalist, recognizing that the 
numbers were not on their side, argued that the very 
formation of a convention demanded a fair consideration of 
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the document and a paragraph by paragraph analysis.  The 
federalist approach ultimately carried the day (ibid.).   
As the debate began, the antifederalists continued 
their previous line of attack.  They argued that the real 
issue was not so much the constitution as the character of 
the men who would be called upon to execute the power 
contained within the constitution.  Rufus King (1894) 
observed: 
An apprehension that the liberties of the people are 
in danger and a distrust of men of property or education 
have a more powerful effect upon the minds of our opponents 
than any specific objections against the Constitution. If 
the opposition was grounded on any precise points, I am 
persuaded that it might be weakened, if not entirely 
overcome. But every attempt remove their fixed and violent 
jealousies seem hitherto to operate as a confirmation of 
that baneful passion. (papers of James Madison, 10:437) 
With this as the context, the tactic that came to be 
the primary position of the antifederalists, was to attack 
the wealth, education, and ultimately the character of the 
federalists. They used this tactic before the convention to 
try to bind the representatives that were being sent, they 
used the tactic to try to force an early vote at the 
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convention, and ultimately they used the tactic to try to 
invalidate the Constitution because of its lack of a Bill 
of Rights. Samuel Nason writes in the "Pathetick 
Apostrophe" that within the Constitution "not one right" 
was secured. He went on to question provisions for 
elections, representatives, terms of office, and the 
language used in the powers granted to Congress. Finally, 
he said that he feared that the Constitution would allow 
"artful, and designing men" to gain unlimited power which 
they could then use to usurp the people's rights (Bailyn, 
1993, 1:925). Amos Singletary, in what Kenyon (1966) calls 
"class antagonism and overt anti-intellectualism" echoes 
Nason's concerns. He reminds the delegates of the causes of 
the revolution, and the unchecked power of the British 
Parliament. He claims that the Constitution poses similar 
threats. Specifically he says: 
these lawyers, and men of learning, and 
moneyed man, the talk so finely and gloss over 
matters so smoothly, to make us poor illiterate 
people swallow the pill, expect to get into 
Congress themselves; they expect to be the 
managers of this Constitution and get all the 
power and all the money into their own hands 
(Bailyn, 1993, 1:906).  
Ultimately, the antifederalists, created charges that 
amounted to a conspiracy. The antifederalists argued that 
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the wealthy and educated support the constitution because 
the government it creates will allow them to usurp the 
rights of the poor and uneducated. This conspiracy argument 
put the federalists in a difficult position. On one hand, 
the federalists clearly believed that the "natural 
aristocracy" was in the best position to lead the new 
government, and was best positioned to protect the rights 
of the people. Their argument was that the wealthy and 
educated were generally the best leaders precisely because 
of the gifts afforded by wealth and education.  
Unfortunately, this is not really a defense against the 
argument that the wealthy and educated are trying to secure 
power under the new constitution.  In addition, because 
many, though not all, of the federalists came from the 
monied and educated class the arguments themselves 
reinforced the conspiracy.  The federalists needed to shift 
the debate away from this conspiracy in order to move the 
discourse to a debate on the merits of the constitution 
itself.  
In dealing with the antifederalist attacks, the 
federalists shifted tactics.  The tactic the federalists 
adopted is a tactic which David Zarefsky identifies as 
characterizing the Lincoln Douglas debates (Zarefsky, 
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1990). During the Lincoln Douglas debates, both Lincoln and 
Douglas alternately claimed the other was involved in the 
conspiracy against the public interest. Zarefsky explains 
that these arguments created a situation in which the 
burden of proof for their defense was placed upon the 
defender (ibid. page 103). Essentially Zarefsky argues, as 
the target of a conspiracy charge there is little use in 
denying the charge, as any defense reinforces the original 
charge of conspiracy. As such, the best defense is to offer 
a counter charge of conspiracy (ibid.). 
This view is precisely the position in which the 
federalists found themselves in Massachusetts. The charge 
that the wealthy and educated were involved in a conspiracy 
to steal the rights of the people is only reinforced by the 
defenses of the wealthy and educated. In other words, while 
the antifederalists charge that the wealthy are attempting 
to use the Constitution to seize power, the federalists 
argue that the best way to defend liberty is to give over 
power to the wealthy and educated. To overcome the bind 
created by this position, the federalists enjoined a two-
pronged approach. First, they limited their argumentation 
strictly to the benefits of the Constitution. Second, the 
federalists issued a counter conspiracy charge against the 
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antifederalists claiming that their rejection of the 
constitution was a matter of their own self-interest. In 
other words, the federalists claimed that the 
antifederalists opposition to the Constitution is meant to 
secure local power and lucrative political position. They 
[federalists] further claimed that the antifederalists 
position; that they were merely defending the liberty of 
the people was merely a smokescreen to hide their true 
motivations. The effect of this argument does not 
necessarily clear the federalists of any doubt regarding 
their motives, it's not an argument they need to win. As 
Zarefsky notes, "if both the original claim and 
counterclaim are credible, one can at least hope for a 
wash" (ibid. 109). 
The effect of the above strategies did not win the 
debate for the federalists, but it did allow the 
federalists to focus more fully on the Constitution itself 
and remove some focus from the conspiracy.  The strategy 
created the “wash” the federalists needed in order to shift 
the focus of the debates, and to engage the antifederalists 
in a discourse regarding the merits of the new government. 
While the counter conspiracy charge was not the most 
effective argument technique, in the early days of the 
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convention, this argument allowed the federalist to shift 
attention from their weakening position. However, this 
changes when Jonathan Smith responded to the charges 
leveled by Singletary.  
Smith’s response is notable because it has the effect 
of shifting the ground of the debate in a way that will be 
difficult for the antifederalists to overcome. Smith used 
his speech to turn the tables on the antifederalists, and 
reinforced the conspiracy charge leveled by the 
federalists.  He pointed out the danger of anarchy, loss of 
property, and ultimately personal harm that was visited 
upon the citizens of western Massachusetts by Shey’s 
rebellion.  He told of children being taken away at gun 
point, of prisoners being lined up and shot, and generally 
brought the horrors of the rebellion to the floor of the 
convention.  He pled the need of a government that could 
protect people from the horrors he had witnessed, and he 
saw in the proposed constitution, the kind of protection 
for which he and so many others longed.  While the speech 
is powerful and passionate in its own right, the real power 
of this appeal, in terms of the convention, comes from the 
character of the speaker.  Smith was completely immune to 
the conspiracy charges and the Ad Personam attacks that the 
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antifederalists had lodged against other proponents of the 
constitution.  He was, by his own description a “plain man” 
who made his “living by the plough” (Bailyn, 1:907).  
Moreover, Smith insisted that he was not aided in the 
drafting of his remarks; he had had no lawyer to consult.  
In fact, Smith exclaimed that “we have no lawyers in our 
town, and we do well enough without” (Bailyn 1:908).  Had 
this been the extent of Smith’s defense, it would have been 
powerful.  Smith, however, went farther; he defended the 
character of the federalist in general.   
I don’t think the worse of the Constitution 
because lawyers, and men of learning and monied 
men, are fond of it.  I don’t suspect that they 
want to get into Congress and abuse their power…. 
Some gentlemen think that our liberty and 
property is not safe in the hands of monied men, 
and men of learning, I am not of that mind 
(Bailyn 1:908). 
In his address to the convention Smith positioned 
himself as an average person with needs shared by all 
people whether they had money or education, or not.  He 
said that social class was not a determiner of need or 
interest, and that at some level everyone shared basic 
needs.  Specifically, he saw in the constitution one such 
interest that was shared by all.  He said, “these lawyers, 
these monied men, these men of learning, are all embarked 
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in the same cause with us, and we must all sink or swim 
together” (Bailyn 1:908).   
Smith’s speech combined the ethos of a farmer from 
Western Massachusetts with the classical principle of 
“common good” and a faith in the force of reason and good 
argument.  In so doing, he cracked the antifederalist 
conspiracy argument, and opened the door for the 
deliberative engagement that the federalist had sought from 
the beginning.   
CONCILIATORY PROPOSITIONS 
As the preceding analysis indicates, the chief 
strategy of the antifederalist was to attack the character 
of the supporters of the constitution.  However, after 
Smith’s speech, that thrust was blunted.  While the 
antifederalists consistently argued that the Constitution 
was unacceptable because of the character of the men who 
drafted it, they used as proof of this position, the lack 
of the Bill of Rights. Once Smith had spoken, and the ad 
personam attacks blunted, the Bill of Rights argument 
became critical. Moreover, as the argument shifted, the 
balance of the convention began to shift. Storing (1981) 
explains that "when the ratified convention met, there was, 
from all accounts, a majority opposed ratification; it 
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after close to a month of debate a sufficient number of 
delegates changed their minds to give the federalists a 
small majority" (p. 3). Despite the evidence of the shift, 
the federals remained unsure of the potential for victory. 
In order to widen their margin, the federalists formulated 
a plan that would come to be the linchpin strategy for 
ratification. While the federalists consistently argued 
against the need for a Bill of Rights, they found in this 
proposition a way to fundamentally alter the debate. The 
plan then, called for the convention to ratify the 
Constitution but recommend a Bill of Rights in the form of 
amendments to the ratified document. While this plan was 
risky, the federalists felt that if the right person were 
to recommend it, it might sway the convention. That's right 
person, was John Hancock. 
Hancock had several advantages for the federalists; he 
had not indicated support for either side of the debates, 
he was very popular as a renowned patriot and the first 
signer of the Declaration of Independence, he was a 
longtime state politician, a president of the Continental 
Congress, and was famously generous in giving to the poor 
and needy (Richard, 1994, p. 66). With Hancock on the 
federalist side, the federalists had a "People's Champion" 
103 
 
 
 
as a proponent of the Constitution, and their method of 
ratification. Additionally, while Hancock was not held in 
esteem by all federalists, and was specifically criticized 
by Madison, Jefferson, and Rufus King, his position in the 
eyes of the masses, made him immune to the kind of personal 
and character attacks that had been successfully leveled at 
others (Main, 1974 pg. 205). Ultimately, this made Hancock 
the ideal candidate to present, what came to be called, the 
conciliatory propositions. 
On January 30, 1787 Hancock spoke to the convention. 
In his speech, Hancock invoked key terms of classical 
republicanism. He called on the assembled representatives 
to consider his "sincere" proposals as they were designed 
to "promote the spirit of union" (Elliott, 1836, p. 123). 
The propositions were debated for a week, and according to 
Jackson Turner Main (1974) "a decisive shift occurred in 
the delegate count" (p. 206). 
The conciliatory propositions proved to be a middle 
ground for both sides in the debates. These propositions 
allowed the federalists to shift the ground, creating 
opportunity for wavering antifederalists to approve the 
Constitution while remaining faithful to their 
constituents. Storing (1981), explains: 
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Hancock's and Adams actions were of the 
utmost importance in securing ratification in the 
crucial state of Massachusetts and in introducing 
recommendatory amendments. This proved to be the 
compromise used to secure ratification,... (sic) 
tempering the opposition of the antifederalists 
while maintaining the integrity of the 
Constitution (p. 4).  
In the end, in many ways, Massachusetts comes full 
circle in these debates, moving from binding instructions 
to ratification based on a trust that their amendments 
would be seriously considered later. The importance of 
Hancock to this formula cannot be overstated. It was 
Hancock's character and reputation that truly shifted the 
ground in the debate, and ultimately political theory in 
Massachusetts. In so far as Hancock, by his person, creates 
a crossable bridge that inspires at least tacit belief not 
only in the natural aristocracy, of which Hancock is 
clearly a part, but his support for the protective 
amendments gives a measure of confidence in federalist 
character at large.   
Antifederalists shift 
While Hancock was critical in creating the foundation 
for the shift in the ratification debates, William Symmes, 
a lawyer from Andover Massachusetts, and a respected 
antifederalists, ultimately broke the resolve of the 
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antifederalists when he shifted sides on February 5, 1787, 
defying the instructions of his constituents (Bowen, 1966, 
p. 289-290).  
Williams Symmes was described by town historian from 
Andover as a man "distinguished for his prudence, his sound 
moral principles, his unshaken integrity, and his 
irreproachable conduct" (Hazan, 1862, p. 2). Additionally 
Symmes expressed to Peter Osgood, in November 1787, his 
serious reservations about the proposed constitution (ibid. 
p. 6-7). Despite his opposition though, Symmes indicated 
the importance of remaining open-minded: 
Let us equally shun a hasty acceptance or 
precipitate rejection of this all-important 
scheme. And if our final judgment be the effect 
of true wisdom, let us never doubt that the end 
will be happy (ibid. p. 7). 
While Andover did not explicitly bind its 
representatives, the town's position was clear in its 
opposition to the constitution. Moreover, the town voted 
again on January 31, 1787, the day after Hancock delivered 
his conciliatory propositions (ibid. p. 13). Nevertheless, 
the town still did not bind or instruct its delegates 
(ibid.). Despite the lack of instructions, the town's 
position was clear leaving Symmes with a difficult problem. 
Hazan (1862) describes this problem: 
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the town meeting and informed him of the 
opinions and sentiments of the majority of his 
townsman.... he had notice that his vote in favor 
of the union, as proposed, would be in direct 
hostility to the wishes of a majority of 
electors.... but he heard the disclosures made in 
debate.... was he to decide upon his own 
knowledge and convictions, or upon those of his 
constituents? Why had he listened to debates 
which must not influence his decisions? Why, 
indeed, demand meet and discuss, if each man must 
inevitably hold the same opinions he had before 
meeting and discussion (p. 13). 
Despite these difficulties, on February 6, William 
Symmes announced his intention, based on Hancock's 
propositions, to vote to ratify the Constitution and 
propose amendments. He said "in so doing I stand acquitted 
to my own conscience, I hope and trust I shall to my 
constituents (and [laying his hand on his breast] I know I 
shall before God" (Elliott, 1836, 2.174). Following the 
convention, Symmes went home to find he was not welcome -- 
he had violated the expectations of his town and was forced 
to move to another town (Harding, 1896, p. 108-109). 
This incident highlights the shift in the concept of 
representation even as the disputants of the convention 
debated the proposed constitution. The very fact that 
Massachusetts held ratifying convention acted to alter the 
conceptions of the proper role of representatives as well 
as the nature public deliberation a large. These changes 
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altered the decorum of the debates, and would have a 
profound effect not only in Massachusetts but on American 
democracy at large. This is made clear by Symmes statement 
in defense of his shift in position. In his announcement, 
he praised Hancock, indicated the need for a strong 
national government to address the nation's problem, but 
also highlighted the necessity and importance of the 
amendments in securing his vote. In short, Symmes indicates 
that he was swayed by the debates (Elliott, 1836, 2:172-
174). 
Like Symmes, Nathaniel Barrell, from York, Maine, 
initially opposed the Constitution. Bailyn (1992) writes, 
"the attitudes of the Barrell Brothers to the Constitution 
and to ratification were typical of those of many 
Americans. Nathaniel Barrell initially opposed the 
Constitution but then, as he explained in the Massachusetts 
ratifying convention, “he changed his mind" (1.47). Prior 
to the convention Barrell was described by David Sewell as 
a "flaming anti-federalite" (historical magazine, 1869, p. 
342). Samuel Phillips Savage wrote to George Thatcher 
saying: 
it is said your friend N. Barrell, who is 
one of the two chosen for York, behaved so 
indecently before the choice, as exhorted a 
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severe reprimand from Judge Sewall, Edwin chosen 
modestly told his constituents, he was either 
lose his arm and put his assent to the new 
proposed constitution. It is to be feared many of 
his brethren are of his mind (ibid. p. 264). 
During the convention Barrell reiterated his 
opposition in a letter to Thatcher in which he said he held 
too many objections that the "learned arguments" and 
"Wilsonian oratory" of the Federalists had not overcome 
(ibid.). Barrell further argued that the powers granted by 
the Constitution to the new Congress were such that the 
people’s liberties would be destroyed. He said assent was 
akin to assenting to "slavery on my children" (ibid.). He 
challenged the very notion that men can be trusted to 
protect the liberties of the people. While he accepted that 
in the beginning there might be men of such character, men 
like Washington, for example, there is no guarantee that 
such qualities could be counted on in the future. In the 
close of his letter though, Barrell did make a concession. 
He said if there were amendments to secure the peoples 
liberties, he would approve the constitution (ibid.). 
It seems clear that York, like Andover, elected 
Barrell, and his fellow delegate to Esaias Preble because 
of their clear opposition to the constitution. The 
directions that the town issued to the delegates were "to 
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take into consideration the proposed constitution for the 
United States, and to act thereon as they see fit" (records 
of York Maine, microfilm). In other words, the delegates 
were not bound, but there is reason to believe that the 
town did not expect the delegates to change their position, 
and likely elected them because of the same. 
Jackson Turner Main (1974) posits that there were 
several arguments that seem to have been effective in 
altering Barrell's position. (Page 205) He explains that 
Barrell received a great deal of Federalist pressure to 
exercise judgment. In addition, Barrell received 
encouragement from George Thatcher, as well as his own 
brother, to adopt a constitution (Bailyn, 1993, 1.999). 
Joseph Barrell, a wealthy shipbuilder and merchant who 
pioneered trade in the Pacific Northwest, in attempting to 
convert his brother, argued that the anti-federalist 
leaders were acting out of self-interest and partiality. He 
said: 
If you are Federal you will be pleased, but 
the anti-Federalist, the men of enterprise must 
be disgusting, nor can he wish him success, not 
upon his principles to success needful, for what 
is property without good government (ibid. 
1.588). 
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While the effect of the pressure exerted upon 
Nathaniel Barrell by George Thatcher and Nathaniel's 
brother Joseph, cannot be known, his declaration of support 
contain elements of the positions of his brother, 
specifically the inadequacies of amending the articles of 
Confederation (Ibid. 1.938).  Explaining his decision to 
vote for the Constitution, Barrell explained that he was a 
"plain husbandman with no pretensions to talents above the 
simple language adapted to the line of my calling" (ibid. 
1.938). He invoked himself the image of the average anti-
Federalist but he also praised the Federalist orators 
comparing them to "the Giants of rhetorick." He noted in 
them the "pleasing eloquence of Cicero [and] the blaze of 
Demonsthenian oratory" (Ibid).  By contrast, he was 
inferior in both language and ability. However, rhetorical 
skill, education and reading are  not grounds for rejection 
of the constitution. He explains that he rejected the 
threat to liberty that might be posed by future "Neros" 
choosing instead, to keep faith with Hancock's amendments, 
and the promise that they would be added. 
Barrell presented himself, in much the same manner as 
Jonathan Smith, as a prudent statesman. He argued that the 
Federalists had presented sound arguments, engaged in "cool 
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deliberation," and ultimately demonstrated that the 
Constitution, coupled with recommended amendments, was "the 
greatest good [he] could do his country at present" (ibid. 
1.938). He went on, as one of the converted, to reject the 
Eddie Federalists as "the most unprincipled of men," 
lumping them in with Tories, debtors unwilling to pay their 
debts, and insurgents who favored anarchy (ibid.). Further, 
in addition to the unprincipled, Barrell also saw in the 
antifederalists the group he calls "honest ignorant minds." 
These were men who were "dupes" to the above group, who 
persuaded them that their "liberties are in danger and they 
will be made slaves of others" (ibid.). 
The defections of men like Barrell and Symmes from the 
ranks of the antifederalists are significant specifically 
because they represented the average person and were immune 
to the ad person attacks that originally made the 
antifederalists position so successful. These defections 
however, are also significant because they reflect a shift 
in political theory and the shift in the grounds of the 
discourse occurring in Massachusetts. Finally, they are 
significant because in the end they voted on the basis of 
character not on the basis of their fears. 
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The significance of Massachusetts is clear, while 
Main’s (1974) assessment that the Constitution would not 
have been ratified without Massachusetts may be an 
overreach, it is at least plausible (p. 200). While other 
states may have ratified without Massachusetts, the 
Massachusetts model became the mode by which other states 
ratified. Gordon Wood (1988) explains that in the 
Massachusetts debates we can see the shift from classical 
politics to modernity. In this shift, we see the transition 
from classical republicanism as common good to the 
protection of individual rights instead. Wood says: 
In place of the high ideals of the ancients 
that sought to compel men to transcend his lowly 
passions and interests, modern governments were 
now to be founded on these very passions and 
interests. Modern man became obsessed with his 
particular private pursuits of happiness in his 
individual desires, which he calls rights (page 
3). 
As a result of this shift, there is a corresponding 
shift in public deliberation. Wood explains that in 
Massachusetts we see a shift from quote older classical 
republicanism to a new Democratic, individualistic, 
commercial world" (ibid. 11-12). 
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Conclusion 
Massachusetts provided the first real hurdle to 
ratification of the federal constitution, and it also 
provided the first, and perhaps, most important solution to 
that hurdle.  While Main (1974) makes clear the 
significance of Massachusetts to overall ratification may 
be a bit overstated by historians, he does believe that the 
“Massachusetts solution” provided the federalists with a 
critical tool that they employed throughout the remaining 
ratification process (p. 200).  This process of 
ratification with recommendatory amendments provided a 
middle ground that allowed both sides to reach compromise 
in Massachusetts, as well as other states, and ultimately 
aided in the securing of ratification overall. 
Gordon Wood (1988) saw in the Massachusetts contest a 
shift from classical politics to the politics of modernity.  
Wood explains that: 
In place of the high ideals of the ancients 
that sought to compel man to transcend his lowly 
passions and interests, modern governments were 
now to be founded on these very passions and 
interests. Modern man became obsessed with his 
particular private pursuits of happiness and his 
individual desires, which he calls rights (p. 3) 
This shift occurred both in the mistrust of the 
natural aristocracy, as well as in the call for a Bill of 
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Rights.  Moreover, this shift altered the very landscape of 
public discourse.  As wood goes on to explain, “reason was 
dethroned, civic participation was reduced to periodic 
voting, and the public good was lost in the scramble for 
private interests” (Ibid).  He adds, “the end of the 
eighteenth century in America [can be seen as a point of 
transition between an older classical republican world and 
a new democratic, individualistic, commercial world” (Ibid. 
pg 11-12).   
 Moreover, the antifederalists were not alone in 
advancing this shift.  The founding fathers did not pursue 
a selfless agenda devoted purely to the common good.  Adair 
(1974 explains that:  
the greatest and the most effective leaders 
of 1787-no angels they, but passionately selfish 
and self-interested men--were giants in part 
because the Revolution had led them to redefine 
their notions of interest and given them, through 
the concept of fame, a personal stake in creating 
a national system dedicated to liberty, to 
justice, and to the general welfare (p. 24).   
As such we find in the founding generation a shift to 
a system of government focused on individual rights, and 
personal self interest, as well as a shift away from the 
classical republican ideals of prudence and character.  
Kessler (1987) explains,  “phronesis is not a virtue that 
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is especially needful in a regime of interest–group 
politics, where sobriety, calculating realism, and skill in 
maneuver suffice” (p. 18).   
 In essence, the real question in Massachusetts is 
the proper pole of the representative.  Must one, as with 
the notion of binding instructions, simply stand by and 
vote without regard for reason and judgment, the will of 
one’s constituents; or, should the representative attempt 
through reason and discourse attempt to discern the best 
interests of the polity at large, even in violation of the 
interests of one’s constituents? 
 While Massachusetts does not definitively answer 
the above question, the tension over the proper role of the 
representative highlights both the tension and the 
transition from a classical republic to a representative 
democracy.    
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CHAPTER 4 
THE VIRGINIA RATIFYING CONVENTION 
THE RHETORICAL SITUATION 
After the constitution was ratified in Massachusetts, 
the next big contest was Virginia.  While Massachusetts is 
remembered for the challenges that the Federalists faced, 
and for the creation of the Bill of Rights, in the form of 
recommended amendments, Virginia is most remembered because 
of the interaction between Patrick Henry and James Madison.   
 This chapter will analyze the Virginia 
ratification convention, looking at the rhetorical problems 
faced by federalists and anti-federalists, specifically 
Henry and Madison.  It will also bring light to many of the 
rhetorical tools employed by both in their efforts to 
secure victory for their respective positions.   
Antifederalist advantages 
As the Virginia ratifying convention opened, 
antifederalists enjoyed benefits perhaps stronger than 
anywhere else in the union. Of the three delegates who 
refused to sign the Constitution in Philadelphia, two were 
from Virginia, Edmund Randolph and George Mason. Edmund 
Randolph explained, at the Philadelphia Convention, that he 
felt that the Constitution offered insufficient protections 
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of rights, he suggests a second meeting, but his suggestion 
was rejected. George Mason, wanted the Bill of Rights to 
begin the Constitution, but his plan was rejected. Most of 
the delegates felt that existing state protections were 
already sufficient. Main (1974) points out, that in 
Virginia, Masons "well-publicized refusal to sign the 
Constitution was welcome evidence to the antifederalists 
that not all members of the drafting convention supported" 
the constitution (P. 223-224). 
In addition to Randolph and Mason, Virginia's most 
influential politician, and perhaps the states greatest 
speaker, Patrick Henry, was also reputed to be opposed to 
the Constitution. (Rossiter (1966) P. 291) Henry had been 
invited to attend the Constitutional convention in 
Philadelphia, but declined. Some say Henry declined because 
of finances, but others indicated that Henry did not wish 
to be implicated in the project. Mayer (1986) explained 
that "Henry’s straightened circumstances underlay his 
peremptory refusal to attend the Philadelphia convention, 
as Gov. Randolph reported to Madison, yet both men 
suspected that there was something more" (P. 373). While 
the federalists would have liked to have the support of a 
populist like Henry at the Philadelphia convention, his 
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well known distrust for strong central government meant 
that it was unlikely that Henry would have ever approved 
the plan.  Nevertheless, Henry’s absence made him a wild 
card as the Virginia convention opened.   
In Massachusetts, many of the greatest antifederalists 
were kept from the convention because they were not elected 
in their community.  For example, Elbridge Gerry came from 
an area where federalist held an advantage, and as such, 
was not elected as a convention delegate.  Virginia did not 
require residency as a condition of election.  As a result, 
a community could choose as it’s delegate any 
representative it liked.  In this way, the antifederalists 
were able to secure election for their best and brightest.  
This list include those mentioned above as well as James 
Monroe, Benjamin Harrison and John Tyler.  As such, while 
Virginia antifederalists did not have the numerical 
advantage of Massachusetts or New York, they made up in 
skill, what they lacked in numbers.   
Because of Virginia’s election rules Federalists did 
not have the advantage of the rhetorical and intellectual 
skill they enjoyed in Massachusetts, in Virginia the two 
sides were relatively well matched.  Rossiter (1966) 
described the Virginia ratification debates as “the most 
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searching, exciting, and well reported of any convention” 
(P. 291). Ketchum (1986) "calls Virginia the most important 
of the ratification contests" (P. 14). McCants (1990) wrote 
of Virginia that, "it's star-studded roster analyzed the 
Constitution thoroughly and keenly, expanded Virginia's 
anthology of deliberative address, and skillfully exploited 
strategies in parliamentary sessions before an overflow 
audience" (P. 75). In addition, both sides tended to be 
similar in terms of influence, wealth, and talent. The 
social barriers that existed in Massachusetts were not a 
factor in Virginia. In Virginia, as noted above, the 
"natural aristocracy" represented both sides.  Finally, 
unlike Massachusetts, Virginia had the advantage of 
important national advocates on both sides of the issue, 
specifically Madison and Mason respectively. 
Divisions in Virginia, according to Main (1974), were 
based more on geography than on social class.  Main writes, 
“it is clear that a division along lines of wealth does not 
account for the alignment in Virginia… sectional, not 
class, lines were of primary importance” (p. 233).  George 
Washington, in a letter to Benjamin Lincoln, notes that the 
northern neck of Virginia was a federalist stronghold 
(Documentary History 1991, 9:636-637).  Morris (1985) 
120 
 
 
 
indicates that the antifederal strongholds were primarily 
the southern and western parts of the state.  Additionally, 
the federalists and antifederalists in Virginia seem to 
have been relatively equally divided.  Rossiter (1966) 
estimates that the “antifederalists accounted for just 
about half of the delegates” (p. 291).  While others 
indicate that the federalist might have even held a slight 
majority.  David Henly’s account of the convention, noted 
in the Documentary History of the Unites States (1990), 
claimed that 85 delegates favored the constitution, 66 were 
opposed, and three were undecided (p. 9:629-631).  While 
there are some problems with this count, specifically, the 
exclusion of the 16 delegates from Kentucky, it does offer 
a contemporary perspective of the convention.  Incidentally 
of the sixteen uncounted delegates six voted for 
ratification, nine opposed, and one abstained (Documentary 
History, p. 9:629-631).  Given the quality of the 
antifederal position in terms of famous delegates, the 
education and social position of the opposition, and the 
relative parity in numbers, the antifederalists in Virginia 
had some very strong rhetorical advantages as the 
convention opened.   
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Antifederalist disadvantages 
While the antifederalists in Virginia had many 
advantages, listed above, they also faced some serious 
difficulties.  In New England in general, and Massachusetts 
in particular, there was a general distrust of powerful 
government, and a deep-seated unwillingness to place ones 
fate in the hands of representatives.  Given this general 
suspicion, New England state constitutions provided 
safeguards designed to shield the people from their 
representatives; the most obvious of these safeguards can 
be seen in the use of binding instructions.   
In Virginia, the use of instructions was rare, and 
when they were used, they tended to favor the 
representative.  For example, Spotsylvania instructed its 
delegates that in considering the constitution and the 
objections that the people might have to the plan, they 
were to use their “prudence and judgment confiding in their 
integrity to do the best [they could] for the common good” 
(Documentary History, p. 9:612).  Given the difference in 
the regard of government in Virginia, the antifederalists 
were not able, with the same force, to make arguments 
regarding the danger of empowering a national government.   
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Coinciding with the above issue is the issue of 
representative election.  Virginians did not see their 
interests with the same degree of locality as did those in 
Massachusetts.  Massachusetts delegates had to be from the 
same towns and demonstrate connection to the people they 
were chosen to represent.  This meant that many of the best 
antifederal spokesmen from Massachusetts were not elected 
to the convention.  Elbridge Gerry, for example, was 
excluded from the Massachusetts convention because his 
views were not representative of the area from which he 
came.  This absence cost the Massachusetts antifederalists 
their strongest voice.   
In Virginia, there was no such problem.  
Representatives did not have to reside in the county that 
elected them.  In this way Virginia Antifederalists were 
able to insure that their best and brightest were 
convention representatives.  On the other hand, though, it 
also allowed the Federalists to do the same.  James Madison 
and other influential Virginia Federalists were offered 
“secure counties” in the event that their home constituents 
elected others.  This practice presented an additional 
disadvantage for the Virginia antifederalists; in 
separating the delegates from local interests it left the 
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delegates free to choose, not based on a particular 
localities’ leanings, but on the basis of their own 
judgment.  The delegates were thus allowed to listen to and 
debate the merits of the proposed constitution; creating a 
ratification forum that was freer than that of 
Massachusetts.  William Wirt (1891), lamenting the 
antifederal loss in Virginia blamed the delegates who 
“voted against the wishes of their constituents” for the 
inability of the antifederalists to claim victory in 
Virginia (p. 2:377).   
In addition to the above, George Mason, on the first 
day of the convention, moved for a clause by clause 
analysis of the constitution.   This motion was, according 
to Madison, “contrary to his [Mason’s] expectations 
concurred to by the other side” (Documentary History, 
10:1574).  Morris (1985) explains that while Mason’s motion 
was entirely consistent with a prudential conception of 
deliberation, and suggested a desire for thoughtful 
consideration on the part of antifederal leaders, it also 
“played right into [the federalist] hands” (p. 260).  As 
indicated in the previous chapter the federalist believed 
that time was their ally, and saw in deliberation 
advantage.  Because of Mason’s motion, Madison indicates, 
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the federalists were, presented, on the first day of the 
convention in Virginia, with an advantage, it also 
demonstrates the value placed by Mason and other 
antifederalists on a prudential conception of deliberation. 
Given the general absence of instructions, delegates in 
Virginia were free to exercise phronesis and decision-
making power allowing federalists to capitalize on their 
strengths in deliberative argumentation.  
In addition, while it seems clear that Mason’s motion 
was designed to unleash Patrick Henry's rhetorical skills 
by creating a forum of appropriate depth, Henry's orations 
generally seem to encompass wider ranging themes rather 
than specific minutia.  As such, while Henry might have 
been a great motivational speaker, or delivered a great 
sermon, as the discourse shifted to the specifics of the 
plan, Henry’s far reaching orations on the necessity of 
liberty began to lose their relevance.   
An additional problem faced by the antifederalists in 
Virginia was the very person of George Washington.  Ketcham 
(1986) observes that "the figure of General Washington 
looming in the background was to many the basic argument 
for ratification.... his presence and universally admired 
patriotism is the plans and debates of 1787 in 1788 a 
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specific, personal quality that had an immense influence on 
the results.... more than anything else this vitiated 
antifederal specters of rampant corruption and tyranny 
under the new constitution" (P. 268). In short, the 
presence of Washington remained throughout the convention 
one of the strongest arguments for ratification; the 
character of Washington placed him beyond attack. 
Added to the above, and perhaps the biggest hurdle the 
antifederalists faced in Virginia, was ratification in 
Massachusetts. Massachusetts posed a problem on two fronts. 
On one front, Massachusetts represented a defeat of the 
strong antifederal contingent, and a win for the 
Federalists. On the other front, Massachusetts presented an 
additional convention option; ratification with 
recommendatory amendments. In other words, the choices were 
no longer accept, reject, or call for a second convention. 
Massachusetts offers the delegates a chance to accept as 
well as recommend fixes. George Nicholas told James 
Madison, "our friend E. R. Talks of a compromise between 
the friends of the Union, but I know of but one that can 
safely take place; and that is on the plan of the 
Massachusetts convention" (Documentary History 9:704). 
Madison in discussing amendments says, "I think entirely 
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with you on the subject of amendments. The plan of Massts. 
It is unquestionably the Ultimatum of the Federalists. 
Conditional amendments or a second general convention will 
be fatal" (ibid. 10:707). 
Finally, the antifederalists in Virginia faced a 
ticking clock. By the time the Virginia convention had 
opened seven states had already ratified. Mayer (1986) 
indicates that on the second day of the Virginia convention 
"the afternoon stage brought news that South Carolina had 
ratified and, following the stratagem first developed in 
Massachusetts, have placated the opposition by recommending 
a series of amendments to the attention of the new 
Congress" (P. 404). In addition, on June 21, the second New 
Hampshire convention ratified.  
While Virginia continued to represent a critical state 
both in terms of economics, and geography, momentum for 
unconditional ratification clearly hampered calls for 
rejection.  This shifting momentum can be seen, for 
example, in instructions Spotsylvania voters sent to their 
delegates: 
although we've expressly required your 
concurrence to certain propositions for amendment 
yet we mean not thereby to break the union which 
it is our determination to preserve and you 
hereby authorize you in case nine states shall 
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have adopted the government before the decision 
takes place in our convention that you agree to 
accept and ratify (Documentary History 9:612).  
On June 21, 1788, New Hampshire ratified, making it 
the ninth state, word did not reach Virginia until after 
the vote on June 25. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the 
number of ratifying states pose a problem for anti-
Federalists arguing against ratification, particularly 
since the threshold was being crossed as Virginia debated. 
All the above notwithstanding, Virginia’s ratification 
was critical for several reasons. McCants (1990) explains 
that "the real question was whether a union could work 
without Virginia or without George Washington as president" 
(P. 74). Moreover, Washington is not the only figure the 
new union would be deprived of without Virginia, both 
Jefferson and Madison were also residents of Virginia.  
In terms of geography, Virginia sat right in the 
middle of the new country, therefore practical union is 
undermined without the presence of Virginia.  There would 
have been, in effect, two countries north and south.  While 
this was legally possible, it was not practical, and 
Virginia antifederalists understood the power of their 
geography.  Finally, even though the required number of 
states and already ratified, if Virginia had failed to 
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ratify this would have bolstered the antifederalists 
position in New York.  No matter how many states ratified, 
successful union was not possible without Virginia and New 
York.  Given the oversized clout of Virginia, and despite 
what appeared to be serious federalist advantages, Virginia 
antifederalists still hoped to prevent ratification. 
Rossiter (1966) explains that "even at this late hour the 
antifederalists hope to prevent the new government from 
coming into being, either by withholding approval of this 
essential state or by insisting that other states join with 
it in a second convention" (P. 291).  As such, the 
advantages possessed by the Virginia antifederalists cannot 
be overstated.  They held the keys to geographical union, 
they were an important bulwark against ratification in New 
York, and they possessed some of the keenest minds in the 
country calling for a new convention to fix the problems 
with the constitution.   
VIRGINIA RATIFICATION CONVENTION 
Locke (1940) writing on civil government reflected 
that the purpose of government was to protect the rights of 
man.  To attain this protection, Locke argued that people 
transitioned from a “state of nature” to that of civil 
society (p. 118-125).  Peter Knupher (1991) explains that 
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despite the differences in approach and philosophy, both 
sides in the ratification debates wanted the same outcome, 
“ordered liberty” (p. 315).  The problem arises, however, 
in attempting to define what ordered liberty is. In 
examining the arguments and positions of this particular 
convention, the focus of this section will be on 
understanding order and liberty within the discourse of 
Patrick Henry and James Madison, focusing most specifically 
on Henry’s opening address and Madison’s response to that 
address.   
While clearly both sides in the ratification debates 
wish to preserve the liberty of the people, their views on 
how to do that are quite different. The Federalists 
believe, and argue throughout the debates, a strong 
national government is critical to ensuring the liberties 
of the people. Jasinski (1994) explains that "Madison's 
discussion of stability and order as resulting from an 
energized central government reflected a theory of 
government grounded in classical conceptions of prudence. 
He (Jasinski) pointed to federalist 14 and 40 as evidencing 
the federalist linking of energy and stability"(NCA paper 
November, 1994).  Antifederalists, by contrast, contend 
that the only way to protect people's liberty is to protect 
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people from over extending government. In examining the 
positions, one can see a federalist emphasis on order, and 
then antifederalists emphasis on liberty. Throughout the 
course of the discourse the tension between these two terms 
will be highlighted along with the constraints placed by 
the demands of decorum. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1991), in The New 
Rhetoric, devote significant discussion to the relationship 
between argument and values. They explain, that in every 
level of argumentation, values are implicated. For example, 
"in the fields of law, politics, and philosophy, values 
intervene as a basis of argument at all stages of the 
development" (P. 75).  Moreover, the values may be concrete 
or abstract, but the point is argument does not really 
exist absent the values that inform it. Additionally 
though, Perelman points out that not all arguments are 
equal. As indicated above, while both Federalists and 
antifederalists share the value of ordered liberty, their 
emphasis is quite different. Given this, Perelman explains 
that hierarchies "are, no doubt, more important to the 
structure of argument than the actual values [for most] 
values are indeed shared by a great number of audiences, 
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any particular audience is characterized less by which 
values it accepts them by the way it grades them" (P. 79). 
In other words, as indicated above, order and liberty 
are important values to both sides in the ratification 
discourse.  However, they are not of equal importance.  For 
the Federalists, the hierarchical value is order while the 
opposite is true for the antifederalists.  In the 
ratification debates, these two terms, order and liberty, 
are placed in conflict.  This conflict is highlighted by 
the speeches delivered by Patrick Henry and James Madison.  
In Henry’s discourse, he lauds the importance of the 
preservation of liberty, while Madison will highlight the 
importance of order.  Ultimately, Henry will posit that 
restrictions of liberty inherent in the plan will make the 
promised order untenable, while Madison will point out that 
the surrender of some liberty for the greater good will 
guarantee the greater enjoyment of the same.     
Patrick Henry 
The notion that Patrick Henry, famed for the statement 
“give me liberty or give me death”, would hold as a value 
hierarchy, liberty over order, is not notable.  Henry 
became famous during discourse leading to the revolutionary 
war, for just such a position.  Looking back at the 
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“Liberty or Death” Speech in March 1775, one finds the 
creation of the value dichotomies that will propel Henry 
into the history of the period.  He reminds the colonists 
that they must choose between “freedom or slavery”, he 
called on the colonists to choose truth over peace, by 
admonishing “Let us not deceive ourselves… we must fight” 
(Reid, 1995 p. 113). Even in calling for war against 
Britain, Henry placed liberty above order, and his 
character and position as a revolutionary was without peer.  
Morgan (1929) writes that “once more, in revolutionary 
ideas, Patrick Henry was one full step in advance of his 
contemporaries” (p. 185).  Louis Einhorn (1981) argues that 
“liberty ranked at the top of [Henry’s} hierarchy of 
values” (p. 327).   
As an advocate of change, specifically revolution 
against the King, it is incumbent upon Henry to establish a 
value hierarchy that propels the audience in the direction 
of this change.  Perelman (1969) explains that: 
The arguer advocating change, especially 
change that is fundamental in nature, will find a 
need for reliance on abstract values… 
[specifically] values essentially connected to 
change… [for they] seem to provide the criteria 
for one wishing to change the established order…. 
[w]here change is not wanted, there is not reason 
to raise incompatibilities(p. 79).   
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Examination of Henry’s revolutionary rhetorical 
artifacts reveals an agitative, or revolutionary ethos, as 
well as value hierarchies that seem to conform to the 
expectations highlighted by Perelman above.  Perelman 
posits that the advocate of fundamental change my take on 
the role of a solitary social critic, one willing to stand 
alone and speak the truth.  Einhorn (1981) also points out 
the link between “revolutionary character and solitary, 
unrelenting defense of the truth” (p. 336), but he also 
find in Henry’s pre-revolutionary rhetoric, additional 
hallmarks, specifically the use of rhetorical questions in 
his speeches.  Einhorn explains that these devices are 
consistent with revolutionary ethos for two reasons; they 
assume a truth the audience must accept, and they challenge 
those in opposition to the revolutionary.  These are the 
tools and the ethos Henry brings to the ratification debate 
in Virginia in opposing the constitution.   
While the ratification of the constitution is seen in 
a historical context as the culmination of the 
revolutionary war, there are some significant differences 
within the rhetorical situations of the two events.  
Kenneth Burke (1969) explains the differences between the 
revolution and the ratification as a “majority division” 
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and “division centered upon the rights of the minority”(p. 
372).  Moreover, in the revolutionary war, the enemy was a 
distant king and parliament, in the ratification debates 
the opposition is friend, neighbor, and, or, fellow 
citizen.  The revolution was a call for bloody conflict in 
which the “lives and sacred honor” of all were at stake, 
while the ratification debates, while seeking to maintain 
order and stability, did not carry the risk of armed 
conflict.    
In examining the discourse of Henry during the course 
of the ratification debates, one will find that the 
revolutionary character visible thirteen years earlier is 
still present.  In describing himself Henry says “[O]ld as 
I am, it is probable that I may yet have the appellation of 
a rebel”(Mayer, 1986, p. 435).   Rossiter (1966) says that 
during the Virginia convention, “the rhetoric of 
Revolutionary liberty burst forth from Henry in passage 
after passage” (p. 291).   
Ultimately, while the rest of the country seemed to be 
looking for a way to govern, Henry, it seems was still 
fighting the revolution, or at least still grounding his 
rhetorical stance in the same values.  He said, of his 
opposition to the proposed constitution, “even if twelve 
135 
 
 
 
and one-half states voted to ratify”, he would oppose the 
constitution “with manly firmness and in spite of an erring 
world” (Documentary History  9:95).  Morris (1985) says 
that one participant described Henry’s “oratorical skills, 
melodious voice, and charisma” (p. 259).  Rossiter (1966) 
says that Henry was “mighty of voice and influence”(p. 
291).  Henry, at the Virginia ratifying convention was 
clearly in his element, Mayer (1986) writes that “while 
other men declaimed, Henry dramatized” (p. 405).  Without 
doubt, Henry saw the debates as a final battle in the war 
for liberty, and he intended to oppose this assault to the 
fullest.   
In his opening speech, June 4, 1788, Patrick Henry 
listed the dangers posed by the proposed constitution.  He 
insisted that while the Articles of Confederation were 
imperfect, there was no need for a new form of government.  
Unlike his 1775 “Liberty or Death” speech, Henry cast 
himself, According to Einhorn (1990), as a defender of the 
status quo.  While this is true on one level, as Einhorn 
goes on to point out, this is also problematic because the 
presumption shifts throughout the course of the debates (p. 
144-161).  In September of 1787 as the new constitution was 
being distributed, the burden for its defense was fully on 
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the shoulders of the federalists.  The shift in 
presumption, however, occurs as an ever increasing number 
of states vote to ratify, and as a result of the 
Massachusetts ratification plan.  Specifically, in the 
early days of the debates, the presumption favored the 
status quo.  James Wilson attempted to shift the 
presumptive burden in his “State House” speech by 
highlighting the value of order and specifically pointing 
to some of the threats to order.   
As indicated above, the changing nature of the 
rhetorical situation made the status quo position seriously 
untenable, despite the initial position of the Virginia 
antifederalist, the status quo was no longer a serious 
antifederalist option.  McCants (1990) explains that 
Virginia antifederalist had four “rhetorical stances” open 
to them: direct refutation, defense of the Articles of 
Confederation, amendments to the constitution, or an 
alternative plan (p. 80).  Henry, began initially with a 
direct refutation of the plan, and defended the Articles of 
Confederation.  From this perspective, Henry, and others, 
argued that the problems in the country were not such that 
the Articles could not manage them, and if they were, then 
the solution was to alter the Articles, not abandon them 
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for a new form of government that was much more restrictive 
than the Articles (ibid).  McCants explains that this 
refutational stance was a core part of Henry’s oppositional 
strategy and that, as such, it represents a weak position 
given the rhetorical situation (ibid).  Einhorn (1990) 
explains, however, that Henry uses the defense of the 
status quo merely as a starting position, a position from 
which he shifts strategically in order to suggest 
amendments (146).  While this position, as a matter of 
strategy, may seem effective, it will become clear, in 
examination of Henry’s speech, that the strategy conflicts 
with the revolutionary ethos with which Henry enters the 
debates.  In other words, it is always a difficult position 
for a revolutionary to be placed in the position of 
defending the status quo.   
Mayer (1986) points out that the major problem Henry 
faced in choice of argument was that it “saddled [Henry] 
with and unappealing persona” (p. 83).   Henry began the 
speech by arguing that there was no need for a new plan of 
government.  He exclaimed that Virginia was at peace, and 
enjoying prosperity.  As a result of this condition, there 
was no need for change.  However, more importantly, Henry 
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points out that the absence of danger justified a vigorous 
response in defense of liberty (Bailyn, 1993, 2:595).   
Henry admonished the delegates “to be extremely 
cautious, watchful, [and] jealous of our liberty” (ibid).  
And while he believed that the framers exceeded their 
authority in drafting a new constitution, he also 
recognized the danger in attacking the convention delegates 
too vigorously.  Any attack on the federalists might be 
seen as an attack on James Madison, and more importantly, 
George Washington.  Henry explained: 
 I have the highest respect for those 
Gentlemen who formed the convention, and were 
some of them not here, I would express some 
testimonial of my esteem for them.   America had 
on a former occasion, with the utmost confidence 
in them: A confidence which was well placed: And 
I'm sure, Sir, I would give up anything to them; 
I would cheerfully confide in them as my 
Representatives. But, Sir, on this great 
occasion, I would demand the cause of their 
conduct (Bailyn, 1993, 1:597). 
In issuing his call for the federalists to explain 
their actions, Henry, wisely, choose a day that Washington 
was absent. As such, Henry was able to avoid making such 
demands upon "that illustrious man, who saved us by his 
valor" (Ibid.). But Henry’s position could not be more 
clear, he admonished the Federalists and  Washington, for 
betraying the values of the revolution.   
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On the second day of the convention, June 5, Patrick 
Henry, began his attack on the Constitution in earnest, in 
a speech, which according to McCants (1990), exceeded three 
hours (P. 76). While there is no written record of the 
speech, one historian said Henry, "orated so, 
grandiloquently that the shorthand reporter, overcome by 
the torrent of words and the magnificently effective 
grimaces and gestures," was unable to record Henry's 
precise words (ibid., P. 255). What we do know about the 
speech, though, is that Henry included elements of his 
"prerevolutionary tirades against British measures," and 
the comparison of the battles against Parliament and the 
King to the battle against the Constitution, which 
similarly threatened the liberty of the people (ibid., P. 
256). Additionally, Ketcham (1986) notes that Henry paid 
particular attention to the broad powers of the presidency 
and the tyranny those powers threatened (P. 255). In the 
end, speaking like a true revolutionary, Henry spoke of the 
disunion that might result from ratification. While he, 
"disclaimed any thoughts of disunion himself, he asserted. 
Such was ‘the language of thousands’" (ibid.).  As 
indicated above, Henry’s grand revolutionary themes are 
here evidenced, the tone is soaring, and the message is 
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powerful, but it is difficult to separate this speech from 
any number of speeches given by Henry prior to the 
revolution.   
James Madison 
Answering Patrick Henry's call for explanation was 
Virginia governor Edmund Randolph.  On June 4, 1788, 
Randolph essentially “takes the stand” to explain why he 
now supports the constitution.  While Randolph was a 
participant of the Philadelphia convention, he refused to 
sign the Constitution. This refusal left both federalists 
and antifederalists unsure of Randolph's position. This 
uncertainty, though, was clarified by Randolph's response 
to Henry.  
Randolph explained that the Articles, while sufficient 
during the Revolutionary war, in the years following the 
war, made the government into a "political farce" (Bailyn, 
(1993). 2:598). He went on to explain that, since the war, 
the government under the Articles of Confederation was 
largely ignored. Quotas were not paid, foreign debts remain 
unanswered, commerce was not increasing, and America was an 
object of contempt in the eyes of foreign nations. In his 
response to Henry, Randolph clearly invokes the value of 
order by highlighting the dangers that the nation faced 
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under the Articles due to the weakness of its government.  
Randolph indicates, necessity required a response, and that 
response was embodied in the Constitution. 
The decision to have Randolph, rather than Madison, 
respond to Henry was a strategic choice based upon 
Randolph's skill as a speaker. Ketchum (1986) explains 
that: 
The federalists were convinced that 
ultimately they would have to rely on Madison's 
unrivaled command of the issues, but the contrast 
in lung power and histrionics between him and 
Henry seemed too stark to follow Henry's speech 
with Madison's. Seeking also to capitalize 
further on Randolph's recent conversion to their 
cause, the federalists decided that he -- -- big, 
eloquent, and prestigeful -- -- could best 
counteract the impression as well as the argument 
of Henry's speech (p. 256). 
In other words, while federalists relied upon Madison 
for his intellectual skill, he was not a match for the 
powerful rhetorical skill of Henry.  They needed a speaker 
who could rouse the audience, and a speech of conversion 
did just that. 
Two days later, Madison finally replied to Henry. 
While Madison was a brilliant thinker, his skill as a 
public speaker left much to be desired. The convention 
reporter frequently noted that segments of Madison speech 
could not be recorded because they were inaudible. He said, 
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for example, that Madison. "Spoke so low that his exordium 
could not be heard distinctly." (Bailyn (1993). 2:611). 
McCants (1990) writes that: 
Madison was such a timid speaker, but he 
could not be heard throughout the hall. He was so 
tight that he could express excitement only by a 
somewhat rapid rocking of his body. He was so 
short that he could not be seen by all the 
delegates (P. 83). 
Bernard Bailyn (1992) describing the fundamental 
difference in the oratory of Henry and Madison says: 
Patrick Henry declared in one of his vast 
speeches in the Virginia convention -- -- one of 
those thieving oceans of antifederalist passion, 
whose thundering waves threatened to drown 
Madison’s small, tight cogencies (P. 335). 
The federalist feared that despite the reason 
presented by Madison, the convention would be swayed by 
passion.  It was; therefore, critical that the federalists 
move the convention away from passionate orations, and 
firmly into the deliberative ground into which Madison was 
a power player.  Despite Madison's deficiencies as a 
speaker, the federalists hoped that Madison's grasp of the 
issues would allow him to return the convention to the 
clause by clause analysis that they believed was critical 
to victory. Realizing that he was speaking against the 
"forest born Demosthenes" Madison quickly suggested the 
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value of rational deliberation over oratorical acumen.  
Madison says: 
In this pursuit, we ought not to address our 
arguments to the feelings and passions, but to 
those understandings and judgments which were 
selected by the people of this country, to decide 
this great question, by a calm and rational 
investigation.  I hope that Gentleman, in 
displaying their abilities, on this occasion, 
instead of giving opinions, and making 
assertions, will condescend to prove and 
demonstrate, fight fair and regular discussion 
(Bailyn, 1993, 2:611). 
Madison then began a line-by-line rebuttal of Henry's 
attacks.  In this rebuttal, Madison discussed taxation, 
standing armies, control the federal district, in the 
process of amendments.  In addition, he criticized Henry 
for failing to outline any specific dangers posed by the 
Constitution.  Madison said: 
Let the dangers which this system is 
supposed to be replete with, be clearly pointed 
out.  If any dangerous and unnecessary powers 
begin to the general Legislature, but to me 
plainly demonstrated, and let us not rest 
satisfied with general assertions of dangers, 
without examination (ibid. 2:612). 
In discussing the danger to liberty by the proposed 
Constitution, Madison echoed the federalist’s position 
that, liberty is protected as long as people are vigilant.  
However, even if vigilance failed, the system of checks and 
balances placed within the Constitution were sufficient to 
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safeguard the people's liberty.  Moreover, Madison 
indicated the protections contained within the Constitution 
were greater than those protections afforded by the 
articles Confederation. 
Prior to the convention, Madison indicated, in a 
letter to Thomas Jefferson, that some sort of amendments to 
the Constitution would probably be necessary after 
ratification.  The real question, according to Madison, was 
"whether previous alterations shall be insisted or not" 
(Documentary History, 9:744)?  In Virginia, the mechanism 
of amendment was clearly important.  Prior to Virginia 
eight states had ratified without conditioning ratification 
upon amendment.  If Virginia were to depart from this model 
it would create a problem that could probably not be 
resolved.  This fact was not lost on either the federalists 
or the antifederalists.  Antifederalists realized that the 
clout of Virginia might allow them to call for a second 
convention altogether.  Madison argued that this strategy 
of argumentation was indecorous and that antifederalists 
failed to speak a "language of respect" to those states 
that had already ratified (ibid. 10:1498).  Specifically, 
Madison argued that, for Virginia to demand a new 
convention would be akin to denigrating the deliberations 
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and considerations of those states who had ratified.  He 
called this type of argumentation "flattery" in that rather 
than engaging in rational discourse the antifederalists 
were attempting to inflame the passions of the delegates.  
Ultimately, this response was a signal that the strategies 
employed by Henry were not appropriate for a deliberative 
convention. 
In examining Madison's opening speech one finds, not 
the fiery passionate rhetoric of Henry, but instead, the 
theoretical analysis delivered by an expert in government, 
an architect of the Constitution, and one trained in the 
tools of classical deliberation.  Ketchum (1986) posits 
that Madison was probably: 
Listening with apprehension and perhaps even 
despair, Madison knew the gauntlet had been 
thrown down.  If he was forced to argue 
abstractly for the authority of government with 
opposing Henry's denunciations, the federalists 
cause was doomed.  Madison saw that his task was 
to bring Henry down to particulars, to engage him 
in a point-by-point examination....though Henry 
had often overwhelmed such reason efforts in the 
past, the attempt nevertheless had to be made (P.  
256).   
In defending the Constitution against Henry, Madison 
explained that the Constitution was an effective and 
reasoned response to the faction increasingly present in 
the country.  In offering this defense Madison’s speech 
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stood in sharp contrast to the passionate denunciations 
offered by Henry.  Madison offered an oratory of 
"moderation, prudence, and candor." Bushrod Washington 
writing to his uncle George Washington said that Madison 
spoke "with such force of reasoning, and the display of 
such irresistible truths, that the opposition seems to have 
quitted the field" (quoted in Ketchum, P.  258). Moreover, 
Madison's rhetorical choices reflect a larger federalist 
strategy in arguing for ratification: 
[the federalists'] rhetoric of conciliation 
sought the development of concurrent majorities 
over time while also attempting to defuse 
extremist, emotional, and dogmatic criticisms of 
the Constitution by stressing a moderate 
temperament as the necessary prelude to making 
important policy decisions (Knupfer, 1991, P.  
317). 
The federalist position was that any successful 
government required compromise.  They argued in order to 
create the necessary compromise each person had to set 
aside individual and local interests in the pursuit of the 
common good.  By engaging this compromise, federalists 
argued that unity could be created out of diversity (ibid. 
324).   
The moderation and wisdom of the convention, 
as one of Washington's correspondence called it, 
must carry over into the new government.  The 
federalists softened the old demand for a 'power 
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of coercing the states' and claim that 'much 
prudence, much moderation, and much liberality' 
should characterize future federal-state 
relations (ibid., 331).   
Given this view, federalists argued that the 
antifederalists were by contrast self-interested and 
"disunionist" because they were unwilling to compromise 
state and local interests to save the union.  To add 
strength to their position federalists contrasted the 
"obstinate behavior" of the opposition to the "cool, 
compromising, tempered character" of the participants of 
the Philadelphia convention (ibid., 331). 
While the federalist tended to paint all opposition 
with broad brush strokes, there are antifederalists who are 
simply not guilty of the charges leveled by the 
federalists.  George Mason, for example, indicated: 
When such arguments, as shall, from the best 
information, secure the great essential rights of 
the people, shall be agreed to by Gentlemen, I 
shall most heartily make the greatest 
concessions, and concur in any reasonable measure 
to obtain the desirable end of conciliation and 
unanimity (Documentary History, 9:940). 
In essence, Mason is willing to compromise, and 
ratify, if the federalists will agree to amend the 
Constitution and add a Bill of Rights. 
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 The federalist position created a clear 
relationship between prudence and accommodation 
"moderation, the parent of compromise, was basic to 
constitutional liberty because it was the nucleus of 
personal and public constitutions" (Knupfer, 1991, 325).  
Given this view, federalist argued that the 
antifederalist’s positions and arguments were dangerous 
because they functioned contrary to the common good (ibid. 
331).  In other words, an argument that did not accept the 
need for compromise and moderation was not simply an 
opposition, but an invalid response to the exigencies in 
the country.  In this way the federalists hoped to 
disqualify antifederalists discourse by naming it both 
imprudent and indecorous.  This strategy was effective in 
that it either defined the antifederalists position as 
outside of the debate, or forced the antifederalists to 
concede the need for at least some form of alteration to 
the government.  Once the second route was taken, the 
federalist advantage was clear.  If it could be agreed that 
some alteration was necessary then the only plan for 
alteration on the table was the federalist plan.  Knupfer, 
examining Federalist 37, explains how Madison combined: 
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The images of civility, common sense, 
compromise, and ambiguity that federalists in 
general hoped to parade before the ratifiers.  He 
prefaced his discussion of compromise with a long 
appeal to the good citizen who, Madison hoped, 
would investigate the positives and negatives of 
the proposed constitution in "that spirit of 
moderation" so essential to a just evaluation of 
public measures (ibid. 334) 
Edmund Pendleton, when opening, the convention 
admonished all participants that,  
Order & Decorum in the deliberations of all 
public bodies, is absolutely necessary, not only 
to preserve their Dignity, but that reason and 
Argument may have their proper affect in 
decision, & not be lost in confusion & disorder 
(Documentary History, 9:911).  
Pendleton went on to caution that deliberation 
required participants to avoid:  
all heats, Intemperance & Personal 
Altercations, which always impede, but never 
Assist Fair Investigation.  Let us probe the Plan 
to the Bottom, but let us do it with Candor, 
temper & mutual Forbearance: & finally decide as 
our Judgment may direct (ibid.).   
Pendleton’s goal in the above discussion was to set 
the terms for the debates themselves.  In other words, the 
federalists were not simply calling for decorum, the 
federalists were themselves defining what would be 
considered decorum within the debates. 
After establishing the terms of debate, the 
federalists argue that the constitution is entirely 
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consistent with the decorum for which they previously 
argued.  In this way, the constitution is not to be seen as 
extreme reaction to the exigencies within the country, but 
a moderate accommodation that creates stability and thwarts 
the dangers of passion and self-interest.  It is important 
to note here that even in defining the constitution as a 
moderate response, the federalists are reinforcing the 
terms of the debate.  If the Constitution is, in fact, a 
moderate response to the country's problems then moderation 
is called for in the discussion of that response.  This 
particular position will be especially troublesome for 
Patrick Henry whose skill lies in his ability to rouse the 
passions of his audience.  Henry Lee confirms this in 
acknowledging the importance of inoculating the audience 
against Patrick Henry's rhetorical strengths.  While he 
acknowledges Henry’s “é·clat and brilliancy... and the 
brilliant talent which he is often displayed," he chastises 
Henry for appealing to people's fears rather than "coolly 
and calmly" examining the Constitution (ibid. 949).  In 
essence, the federalists are defining decorum in such a way 
as to leave Henry outside the bounds of the discourse. 
As the debate progressed Madison continued his 
practice of reasonable and deliberative responses to 
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Henry’s fiery oratory.   Archibald Stuart wrote that 
Madison "came boldly forward & supported the Constitution 
with the soundest reason & most manly Eloquence I have ever 
heard" (ibid. 10:1651).  James Breckenridge said that 
Madison responded to Henry with "plain, ingenious, & 
elegant reasoning" (ibid. 1621).  However, Breckenridge 
also noted that Madison's arguments were "entirely thrown 
away and lost" among the "ignorant" delegates who had 
fallen prey to Henry's passion.  Governor Morris writing to 
Alexander Hamilton acknowledges Henry's strengths, but 
argues that they fall short in their attempt to defeat 
Madison’s argumentation.  He explains: 
Mr. Henry is most warm and powerful in 
Declamation being perfectly Master of "Action 
Utterance and the Power Of Speech to stir Men's 
Blood ["] Yet the Weight Of Argument is so strong 
on the Side Of Truth as Wholly to destroy even on 
weak Minds the Effects of his Eloquence (ibid. 
1622).   
Cicero (1968) explained that decorum requires 
moderation in both actions and speech (1:93-99).  
Moderation however is not a universal concept, is dependent 
upon the rhetorical situation.  As such, what might be seen 
as moderation in one context could be seen as extremism in 
another.  As noted previously, Henry's passionate 
revolutionary rhetoric may not be defined as indecorous in 
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the context of a revolutionary war.  The question becomes 
though, what is appropriate in the context of the ratifying 
convention?  Cicero's guidance on the matter continues in 
Cato's letters.  Cicero explains that in a body such as a 
Senate, "theatrical action and an ostentation of language, 
prejudice [speech and speaker], as they both break in upon 
propriety, and instead of adorning the scene, disguise it 
was show and sound" (ibid.).  On the other hand, when 
addressing the public,  
much greater latitude is allowed; in 
vehemence of tone and action, a hurry and pomp of 
words, strong figures, tours of fancy, ardent 
expression, and throwing fire into their 
imaginations, have always been reckoned proper 
ways to gain their assent and affections (ibid.).  
As such, Cicero gives us two kinds of eloquence, 
"good sense, put into good words" and "fine 
figures and beautiful sounds, artfully and warmly 
applied to the passions" (ibid. 320).   
Applying these standards to Madison and Henry one 
finds that Madison is eloquent clearly articulating a 
position of decorus moderation.  Madison’s response to 
Henry demonstrates a practical grasp of the problems that 
the country is experiencing, combined with practical 
solutions.  Henry, on the other hand, while disavowing the 
need for the solution presented by the constitution, 
presents no other solution to the problems being 
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experienced by the states.  While Madison admits that the 
new government will be more powerful than the government 
under the Articles, he intimates that this is a moderate 
solution to growing discord.  Henry simply ignores real 
conflict occurring throughout the country, because it is 
not happening in Virginia, and as a result disavows any and 
all solutions.  Henry seems to be campaigning while Madison 
is trying to find solutions.   
It is difficult to ascertain the reasons behind 
Madison's and Henry's rhetorical choices in the 
ratification debates.  While it is clear, at least in 
hindsight, that Madison's rhetorical choices demonstrated 
an eloquence consistent with a deliberative body and with 
his morals and character; it is not clear that Madison 
choices are conscious.  Einhorn (1981) explains that: 
"Henry's and Madison's structures, styles, and strategies 
may, of course, have been the results of habit, accident, 
or chance"(P. 328).  What does seem clear however, is that 
the rhetorical choices made by the two men are clearly 
augmented by their views of the rhetorical situation.  
Einhorn (1981) notes "there was no need to reason 
logically" under Patrick Henry's thinking for he saw the 
controversy as a question of absolutes in which the correct 
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choice was obvious (ibid. 335).  Madison, on the other 
hand, seemed to view the debates as a discourse in which 
reason was critical to good decision-making. 
In the final analysis, while Madison’s style may not 
have been as passionate, uplifting, or exciting as Henry's; 
this style was entirely consistent with the general 
federalist position in the debates.  They, [federalists] 
did not believe that they could use the people's passions 
to secure ratification, they needed the people's reason.  
This is not to say that all antifederalists argued with the 
same passion as Henry, or that they all saw the debate in 
terms of absolutes, this would clearly be an 
oversimplification of the discourse.  What is true of the 
antifederalists side is that throughout the debate they 
searched for the proper level of compromise with an eye on 
both individual and states’ rights (Knupfer, 1991, P.  327-
328). 
The Antifederalists Change Tactics 
At the end of the first week of the convention the two 
sides appeared to be at an impasse.  McCants (1990) 
explains that the antifederalists clearly needed a new 
tactic (P.  77). This new tactic, in part, began with the 
arrival of Philadelphia antifederalists publisher Eleazer 
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Oswald.  Oswald came to the convention bearing a personal 
message from New York antifederalists, General John Lamb, 
to Henry, Mason, and the rest of the Virginia anti-
Federalist leadership (Documentary History, 10:1589).  The 
importance of this visit was significant enough, even to 
the federalists, to be noted by James Madison and Alexander 
Hamilton (ibid.).  The letter that Lamb delivered, 
suggested that New York and Virginia should establish 
correspondence with which to coordinate their efforts to 
defeat the constitution (ibid. 9:814).  Lamb implored 
Virginia antifederalists to secure the public liberty by 
using their "best Endeavors to procure Amendments to the 
System previous to its Adoption" (ibid.). 
On June 8, 1788, Patrick Henry shifted his tactics.  
As indicated above, Henry began the convention by arguing 
that the peace and prosperity of Virginia did not 
necessitate a governmental change.  On June 8, Patrick 
Henry moved away from the position of absolute rejection 
and began to argue for prior amendments.  This shift had a 
profound effect on Virginia antifederalists.  On June 9, 
Patrick Henry, writing to John Lamb, indicated that 
securing amendments to the plan was "the only remaining 
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Chance for securing a Remnant of those invaluable Rights 
which are yielded by the new Plan" (ibid. 818). 
Henry believed that four-fifths of Virginia residents 
opposed the constitution; he further believed this number 
was even higher south of the James River.  However, the 
close division of convention delegates made rejection 
unlikely.  In addition, he expressed the view that the 
federalists were behaving and arguing inappropriately.  He 
said that: 
The Friends and Seekers of Power have with 
their usual Subtlety wriggled themselves into the 
Choice of the People by assuming Shapes as 
various as the Faces of the Men they address on 
such Occasions (ibid.). 
In sum, Henry argued that the Federalists were not 
worthy of trust when it came to protecting the liberty of 
the people.  However, as discussed previously, Henry does 
not offer a practical solution to this issue.  Instead, 
seeing that the convention numbers may not favor him, Henry 
argues that the best solution is to require amendments as a 
condition of ratification.  While Henry clearly indicated 
the belief that previous amendments were the only way to 
protect liberty, as in other areas, Henry did very little 
to make such a case, maintaining his revolutionary attack 
against government in general.   
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On June 9, Patrick Henry initially seemed to continue 
his direct refutation of the Constitution explaining again 
the dangers to liberty.  He argued that it was the 
constitution, and not the present situation, that 
endangered liberties of the people.  Moreover, he saidthe 
country's present situation did not warrant ratification.  
He said, it was "not sufficient to feign mere imaginary 
dangers: There must be a dreadful reality.  The great 
question between us, is, does that reality exists" (ibid. 
1091)?  Despite federalist claims to the contrary, Henry 
argued that the people "do not wish to change their 
government" (ibid.).  Then, Henry changed course.  Henry 
said, "four fifths of the people of Virginia must have 
amendments to the new plan, to reconcile them to a change 
of their government" (ibid.).  Edmund Randolph, hearing the 
shift in Henry's argumentation, excitedly said that the 
question before the convention was no longer to ratify or 
not to ratify, but whether there should be "previous or 
subsequent amendments" (ibid. 1092).   
With the above noted shift, Henry lined himself up 
with a position Mason had taken at the beginning of the 
convention.  From this point forward Virginia 
antifederalists and Henry in particular no longer argued in 
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favor of the Articles of Confederation, but instead argued 
to secure previous amendments before ratification. 
The problem that this shift created, particularly for 
Henry, cannot be overstated.  Up to this point, in the 
debates, Henry presented himself as a revolutionary, as a 
lone voice speaking in defense of the liberties of the 
people, and as a solid opponent of the constitution.  On 
the other hand, while his shifting position allowed Henry 
to shed what McCants previously referred to as his 
“unappealing persona”, it also created problems in terms of 
Henry’s ethos.  If the constitution is bad, if a strong 
central government is bad, how will amendments ameliorate 
that bad?  This is a question that Henry never answers.   
For Henry, as well as the rest of the antifederalist 
delegation, the question ceased to be; ratify or not, and 
became; what amendments, when would they be offered, and 
how would they be applied (McCants, 1990, p.74).  While the 
antifederalist shift opened the door for prudential 
deliberation and accommodation, it also created character 
problems for Patrick Henry, specifically, how to reconcile 
compromise with his previous character as an agitator and 
revolutionary.   
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Cicero says that discourse that is to be considered 
decorous must be appropriate to the situation, audience and 
the character of the speaker.  Cicero further argues that 
when the situation changes such that its demands are 
inconsistent with the character of the speaker, then the 
speaker should maintain faithfulness to his character 
rather than try to adjust his ethos to fit the new 
situation.  This maintenance of character is what Cicero 
calls “poetic decorum” (Cicero 1968, 96-97).   While Henry 
clearly had to adjust his argumentative approach to meet 
the new situational exigencies, he also clearly attempted 
to maintain his revolutionary ethos, thereby maintaining 
“poetic decorum.”  This problem with this shift, though, 
was that it raised the specter of a lack of moral decorum.   
Prior to June 9
th
 Patrick rejected the constitution at 
every level.  He claimed that the national situation did 
not warrant such a change, and that the situation in 
Virginia warranted it even less.   After June 9
th
 Patrick 
Henry vowed to require previous amendments to the 
constitution to protect the liberties of the people as the 
price for his ascent (Documentary History 9:745).  The 
significant part of all of this is that Patrick Henry can 
no longer be said to be making a purely principled stance, 
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his vote has a price.  As a matter of ethos this is 
problematic.  While it seems clear that Henry advocated 
this position largely to stop ratification, not because he 
has undergone an actual change, the effect casted doubt on 
all of Henry’s arguments due to the inconsistency of his 
positions.   
By the end of the third week of the convention, 
Madison began to worry that the convention might be 
adjourned without a vote, this scenario was particularly 
troublesome because it was feared that in this time 
Virginia antifederalists might solidify ties to their 
counterparts in New York.  Madison, discussing the 
situation with Alexander Hamilton, said antifederalists: 
May Hear from the Convention of N. York, 
they may work on some of the least decided 
friends of the Constitution; in a weary out the 
patience of the House, and prepared for 
adjournment.... previous amendments will either 
be tried or give place to an effort to adjourn 
(Documentary History, 10:1637). 
While federalists believed they might have a small 
majority, they were not yet comfortable about possibly 
victory.  As such, although Madison opposed weakening the 
new government was amendments, he agreed that amendments 
along the line of the Massachusetts formula were preferable 
to continued delay (ibid. 1665).  Additionally, Madison 
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hoped that by preemptively agreeing to a compromise, such 
as the Massachusetts formula, might prevent the 
antifederalists from proposing a Bill of Rights as a 
condition to ratification (ibid.).   
On June 23 the federalists presented a prefatory 
statement of "plain and general truths that cannot affect 
the validity of the Act: & to subjoin a recommendation 
which may hold up amendments as objects to be pursued in a 
constitutional mode" (ibid. 1669).  In other words, 
federalists believed that it was time to move toward a 
vote.   
RATIFICATION 
On June 24, 1788, a resolution for ratification was 
entertained.  The federalists presented a "conciliatory 
declaration of certain fundamental principles in favor of 
liberty" (ibid. 1670).  While Madison had hoped for 
unconditional approval, a position he maintained throughout 
the debates, George Wythe moved for ratification with 
recommended amendments (ibid. 1473).  In what has come to 
be known as the "Thunderstorm Address" Patrick Henry 
immediately attacked Wythe's motion.   
Henry argued that by guaranteeing some rights and not 
others, the other rights by implication might be denied.  
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In making this argument Henry was co-opting an argument 
made by Federalist James Wilson delivered nine months 
earlier.  Henry said: “what is the inference, when you 
enumerate the rights which you are to enjoy?  That those 
not enumerated are relinquished" (ibid. 1474).  Once again 
Henry was defining the debate in absolutist terms.  It was 
his position that the federalists offer would force people 
to choose between government or rights, and for Henry, this 
is not a valid choice. 
In response to Wythe, Henry again strongly condemned 
the constitution.  He offered his own amendments that he 
argued would substantially limit the power of the national 
government; he expanded his support for previous amendments 
and advocated approximately 40 changes to the constitution 
(ibid. 1504).  In addition to amendments focused on liberty 
Henry specifically called for language to ban implied 
powers.  Henry said, responding to Madison’s logical 
defense of implied powers, that "nations who have trusted 
to logical deduction have lost their liberty" (ibid. 1505).  
Henry indicated that the separations of power, the checks 
and balances, the guarantees and promises contained within 
the constitution provided only theoretical protection.  He 
explained though, that theory and reality often bore little 
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relation to one another, and that liberty was too important 
to be trusted to theoretical protections.  On the other 
hand, Henry suffers from the same violation of which he 
charged the federalists.  His objections lied not in actual 
premises, but in theoretical possibilities. 
Expounding upon the dangers and the plan, Henry 
painted himself as a visionary predicting the dangers 
inherent within the Constitution.  He moved from the 
immediate "horrison(sic)" to the vantage of "those 
intelligent beings which inhabit the aetherial(sic) 
mansions" as he pointed skyward (ibid. 1506, 1511).  He 
indicated that from this heaven bound perspective one could 
see the future a future that was dependent upon the 
upcoming vote, a future that affected not only Virginia, 
not only the several states, but "one half of the human 
race" (ibid.). 
Almost prophetically, a reporter notes that "a violent 
storm rose, which put the House in such disorder, that Mr. 
Henry was obliged to conclude" (ibid. 1506).  The 
confluence of the imagery of the speech with the natural 
fireworks, was said to provoke the delegates to awe and 
disorder.  Spencer Rowan later wrote: 
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By the joint effect of these two faculties, 
I mean of the power of his tone or voice in the 
greatness of his conceptions, he had a wonderful 
effect upon the feelings of his audience.  Both 
of these concurred in the famous speech in the 
Convention which was interrupted by a storm.... 
He presented such an awful picture, and in such 
feeling colors, as to interest the feelings of 
the audience to the highest pitch.... it seemed 
as if he indeed the faculty of calling up spirits 
from the vasty deep (ibid. 1512). 
On June 25, 1788 after defeating Patrick 
Henry's previous amendment motion by a vote of 
88-80, Virginia voted to ratify by a vote of 89-
79.  The form of ratification was published days 
later the declaration of rights composed by 
George Mason and other anti-federalist leaders, 
on June 8, became the amendments the convention 
recommended (ibid. 1514-1515). 
CONCLUSION 
The Virginia ratification convention is notable for 
many reasons, not the least of which is the exchanges 
between James Madison and Patrick Henry.  Madison delivered 
a reasoned logo-centric defense of the Constitution, while 
Henry delivered transcendent, vivid, passionate orations 
that were enhanced by his revolutionary character.  
However, while Henry's hierarchical defense of liberty over 
order continues to inspire, it is clearly out of place in a 
rhetorical situation which calls for deliberation. Henry 
motivates and inspires, but in the end, it is impractical.  
He offers theory and passion, and ultimately is outmatched 
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by the practical defense offered by Madison.  Ultimately, 
federalists successfully made the argument that the country 
needed a more vigorous government, and as such, focused the 
convention on practical discourse surrounding the 
appropriate functions of such government.  Henry, on the 
other hand, argued for most of the convention that a new 
government was not necessary, that a convention was not 
necessary, and that ultimately there was really no problem 
for which the existing government was ill-suited.  While 
Henry created many rallying cries, his speeches did little 
to further the discourse.  Ultimately, as an independent 
actor, Henry vindicated himself by maintain his own 
position, and as such maintaining his own decorum, both and 
moral.  However, his absolutist positions, is 
inflexibility, and his revolutionary ethos rendered him 
indecorous within the context of the ratification 
convention which came to see its goal as that of fixing and 
ailing union. 
John Marshall summarized the difference between James 
Madison and Patrick Henry: 
If I were called upon to say who of all men 
I have known that the greatest power to convince, 
I should perhaps say Mr. Madison, while Mr. Henry 
had without doubt the greatest power to persuade 
(Henry, 1891, P.  376). 
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After reading Marshall, one might credibly ask if 
Henry were the more persuasive why then did the federalists 
win?  In reality, the answer to this question problematizes 
the very concept of effectiveness.  Without doubt, Henry’s 
plea to protect liberty persuaded the convention of the 
need for a Bill of Rights.  However, it is important to 
remember that this was not Henry’s position in the 
convention.  Henry rejected the constitution out of hand, 
and argued that the absence of a Bill of Rights was an 
important proof of the constitution’s many failings.  
Madison, on the other hand, carefully and logically 
defended the constitution as a moderate solution to serious 
problems being experienced in the several states. Henry’s 
refusal to seriously engage this line of argumentation made 
is positions untenable and indecorous.    
Clearly throughout the convention several delegates 
switched positions.  There is no historical data regarding 
the starting point for delegates from Kentucky.  As such, 
it is impossible to know whether they came prepared to vote 
for against the Constitution.  Finally, while some 
delegates indicated that they were persuaded for one side 
or the other, there is no dependable historical data to 
ascertain precisely the success or failure of either 
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speaker, or to establish the effect of private persuasion, 
constituent opinion, or a host of other influences that 
might have affected the delegates. 
Given the former, rating effectiveness purely in terms 
of who won and who lost may not be the best measure of the 
term.  For example, as previously noted, while Henry may 
not have secured rejection of the constitution, or even 
previous amendments, it seems clear that he did force the 
federalists to concede to the need for a Bill of Rights.  
Similarly, while Madison secured ratification, it was not 
ratification in the terms which Madison might've preferred.  
Ultimately, to measure effectiveness purely on the grounds 
of who won or who lost misses the point of the deliberative 
engagement.  Prudential deliberative engagement is marked 
by moderation, conciliation, and compromise. 
Einhorn (1981) explains that if "the outcome of the 
convention is used to judge effectiveness, the rhetoric of 
revolutionary agitation was inadequate to meet the needs of 
public deliberation" (P.  332). By this standard then, 
Einhorn goes on to explain that Henry's revolutionary 
rhetoric, and his absolutist positions, are better suited 
to battles of an either/or nature.  The kind of absolutism 
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seen in the "liberty or death" speech was not well-suited 
to the ratification convention.  Arnold wrote: 
Such rhetoric had served well to intensify 
the spirit of protest and revolt against a 
distant enemy in a daze Revolution, but it was, I 
suggest, inadequate to meet the constructive 
needs of society and to give form and method to 
political deliberation.  Argument by symbol, by 
expletive, from a remembered or imagined 
instance, or from the general topos that power 
corrupts invariably had won action in the days 
when Lord North and George III were the symbols 
of frustrating regimentation.  But in the 
ratifying conventions, the problem was no longer 
how to become free, but how to balance freedoms 
plainly attained against a further, and equally 
desirable, social good -- efficient orderliness 
(Einhorn, 1990, quoting Carol Arnolds unpublished 
teaching notes). 
Cicero (1988) says the "universal rule, in oratory as 
in life, is to consider propriety" (P.  71). While the 
rules seem simple, examination of Henry's speeches in 
Virginia demonstrate its complexity.  Henry, a 
revolutionary at heart, struggles throughout the debates 
with the tension between his own character, and the 
rhetorical situation.  Harriman (1992) points out such 
choices often create "problems of praxis”, for example, 
“Quintilian recognized how Socrates made the less effective 
defense at his trial for impiety by choosing to be 
appropriate to his character rather than appropriate to the 
situation" (P.  154).  
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Madison, by contrast, found in the ratification debate 
a situation that was consistent with both his character and 
his abilities.  As a result, Madison's speeches exhibit 
both moral and poetic decorum.  Barbara Warnick (1993), 
quoting Hugh Blair, writes: 
no one should ever rise to speak in public, 
without forming himself adjust and strict idea of 
what suits his own age and character, what suits 
the subject, the hearers, the place, the 
occasion; and adjusting the whole train and 
manner of his speaking on the idea (P.  70). 
Examining the speeches of Patrick Henry and James 
Madison one finds the difficulty in establishing and 
maintaining a decorum, achieving desired results, and 
measuring success.  On the other hand, the speeches 
delivered by these two men develop a wealth of rhetorical 
promise, in vivid imagery, rich ideas, and powerful 
deliberative engagement. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE NEW YORK RATIFYING CONVENTION 
 During the course of the ratification debates for 
the federal Constitution, New York stands out for several 
reasons.  Unlike early conventions both sides had a wealth 
of arguments upon which to build.  In addition, New York 
federalists, and anti-federalists alike, had to contend 
with the momentum of ratification that was occurring, but 
also with the significant ratifications that were lacking; 
notably Virginia and New Hampshire.  As such, despite the 
fact that New York was the last convention to ratify, it 
was by no means a rubberstamp.  Moreover, as in the case of 
Virginia, union without New York was certainly unlikely, if 
not impossible. 
 New York, unlike Virginia, was not a convention 
dominated by two giant voices.  The most prominent voice in 
New York, Alexander Hamilton, was mixed in with a series of 
notables; John Jay (who along with Hamilton co-wrote the 
Federalist papers), Chancellor Livingston, Melancton Smith, 
John Lansing, and George Clinton (editor of the Cato 
letters and president of the convention).  Given this, 
this chapter will focus on the interplay of prudence, 
decorum and the shifting rhetorical situation in New York. 
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It will examine the ways in which the speakers attempted to 
accommodate themselves to the situational needs of the 
rhetorical engagement. 
RHETORICAL SITUATION 
 In beginning an examination of the New York 
ratifying convention is important that we put the 
convention in context.  In New Hampshire, it was estimated 
that the delegate split was approximately 52-52; in 
Virginia most estimates place the delegate count at 
approximately 89-80, Federalists held a slight lead.  New 
York, by contrast, has a delegate estimate of 19-46, in 
favor of the antifederalists.  If the antifederalists had 
an opportunity to win anywhere, it was clearly going to be 
New York.  Numbers aside though, New York was a divided 
state.  Most of the state was antifederalists with the 
important exception of New York City (Main, 1974, P.  240-
242). In addition to the geographic division in New York, 
the state was also divided economically.  Federalist tended 
to represent the interests of the wealthy merchant 
dominated counties where "impost was favored, and paper 
money disliked" (ibid.).  The Antifederalists came largely 
from rural areas of the state.  Main (1974) explains: 
172 
 
 
 
it is significant, moreover, that those 
antifederalists who finally change sides were 
among the more we well-to-do, including one 
merchant, one large landowner, and three lawyers 
who were also large landowners, while four 
lawyers or large landowner refrained from voting.  
The alignment on the final vote therefore shows a 
more categorical difference between Federalists 
and antifederalists.  Although the number of 
lawyers and judges who voted on either side was 
equal, all the merchants, most of the landowners 
and men of wealth were Federal.  Among the 
college graduates, Federalists outnumber 
antifederalists at the beginning seven to three 
and at the end eight to one.... it seems clear 
that most of the wealthy landowners and 
merchants, and out of the convention, or 
Federalists and that the antifederalists while 
drawing some of their leaders for this class, 
were on the whole, men of lesser means (P.  241-
242). 
Regarding the delegate elections themselves, Hamilton 
quickly recognized they were not a positive sign for the 
Federalists.  He worried that the delegate selections might 
result in a "harsh verdict" against the Constitution, and 
that they did not bode well for the convention's 
deliberations (Miner, 1921, P.  87). Writing to Gov. 
Morris, Hamilton complained that the elections “have gone 
wrong,” and that “violence, rather than moderation, is to 
be looked from the opposite party” (Hamilton, 1962, P.  
4:650).   
 Given the serious imbalance in the delegate 
count, as indicated above, almost three to one opposition, 
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New York antifederalists believed they had a serious 
opportunity to defeat the Constitution.  However, as has 
already been seen in Virginia, timing is going to play a 
role in New York. 
The Constitution required ratification by nine states 
in order to go into effect.  By the time the New York 
convention opened seven states already ratified.  In 
addition, Virginia was holding its ratifying convention, 
and New Hampshire was reconvening.  Hamilton, writing to 
Madison, indicated his belief that the best chance of 
Federalist victory in New York rested on nine earlier 
ratifications (ibid. P.  5:2). Moreover, it is clear that 
Hamilton was not alone in this view.  As noted in the 
previous chapter, New York antifederalists sought out their 
Virginia counterparts in order to aid in the shoring up of 
opposition to the constitution. 
As the New York ratifying convention opens, both sides 
look to New Hampshire and Virginia.  For the 
antifederalists, Virginia offers the last best chance for a 
new convention, for the federalists, Virginia and New 
Hampshire represent the hope of nine ratifying states.  
Hamilton himself offered to pay for express riders from 
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Richmond or Portsmouth to announce ratification in either 
state (ibid. 4:650). 
While antifederalists in New York hold the clear 
numerical advantage, this advantage does have some 
drawbacks.  As noted above, it is very likely that nine 
states will ratify before New York votes.  In addition, 
Hamilton indicates that: 
The Leaders of the party hostile to the 
Constitution are equally hostile to the union.  
They are however afraid to reject the 
constitution at once because that step would 
bring matters to a crisis between this state and 
the states which had adopted the Constitution and 
between the parties in the state.  A separation 
of the Southern District from the other part of 
the state is perceived would become the object of 
the Federalist and the two neighboring states.  
They therefore resolve upon an adjournment as the 
safest and most artful course to affect their 
final purpose (ibid. 4:649). 
As such, in attempt to protect the geographic 
integrity the state of New York, and to avert political 
crisis, antifederalists in New York begin the convention 
with the hope of forcing adjournment and postponement of a 
final vote, this is a strategy Federalists are determined 
to avert.  As the convention opens, both Federalists and 
antifederalists support a motion to begin clause by clause 
consideration of the Constitution.  Antifederalists, led by 
Melancton Smith, support the resolution largely because of 
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its ability to delay a potential vote; Federalists, led by 
Livingston, employ the tactic, as they have before, in 
order to extol the benefits of the proposed system and 
encourage prudential deliberation (Elliott, 1836, 2:222). 
It is important to note, at this point, that 
antifederalists at the New York convention were not a 
monolithic voting bloc.  Some antifederalists, particularly 
those led by Clinton, were willing to reject the 
constitution and be excluded from any potential union, 
others like Smith, preferred amendments, and were not 
willing to remain outside the union.  Jay, writing to 
George Washington, indicated that: 
Many in the opposition are friends to union, 
and mean well; but their principal leaders are 
very far from being solicitous about the fate of 
the Union; they wish and mean, if possible, to 
reject the Constitution with little debate and as 
much speed as possible (Jay, 1949, 3:334-335). 
Given these cleavages, Hughes saw potential for 
Federalists to create and exploit any Federalist divisions, 
he said, this created a "shadow of hope," for the 
Federalists (Miner, 1921, P.  98). Hamilton argued, that 
the Federalists should focus their efforts on converting 
those antifederalists who "have their scruples in an air of 
moderation" (Hamilton, 1962, 5:10). 
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Moderation as rhetorical strategy 
Due to the numerical advantage held by the 
antifederalists, it was critical for the Federalists to 
persuade moderate antifederalists to vote for ratification.  
In order to accomplish this, the Federalists realized that 
Hamilton himself would be required to make some changes in 
effort to present himself as less objectionable to the 
opposition.  Smith (1993) explains that "Hamilton's 
effectiveness was hampered by his arrogance and the fact 
that he often insulted delegates during the debate" (P.  
111).  
Rhetorically, this change is problematic.  Plato, in 
the Gorgias, argues that the problem with rhetoric is that 
it makes the weak case appear strong and the strong case 
appear weak.  Because many saw in Hamilton strategy rather 
than sincerity, they questioned his character, and argued 
that Hamilton was misleading or manipulating the delegates.  
This points to one of the perennial problems of rhetoric, 
how does the rhetor adjust to the rhetorical situation 
without compromising character?  This problem is not 
dissimilar from the problem faced by Henry in Virginia.  
Keeping this problem in mind, Garver (1987) explains that 
prudence requires the rhetor to demonstrate an ability to 
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use both appearance and reality in an effective 
combination.  Leading to the question is Hamilton’s 
behavior misleading, or “virtuous adaptation” (p.7). 
Hamilton is not alone in his adaptations to the 
rhetorical situation in New York.  Federalists believed 
that the convention itself had to be a model of prudence 
and decorum in order to create the space for moderate 
antifederalists to be persuaded.  In one of his early 
addresses at the New York convention, Alexander Hamilton 
reminded the delegates of the collegiality and the spirit 
of compromise that existed in the Philadelphia drafting 
convention (Elliott, 1836, 2:234).  Hamilton explained that 
the Philadelphia convention reflected an example of both 
wisdom and prudence, pointing out that the framers, in 
order to reach accommodation with one another, resolve 
disputes, and protect the interests of all states, created 
a "committee of accommodation" (ibid. 2:236).  In so 
arguing, Hamilton sets the tone for the debates to follow.  
He repeatedly calls, not just in his initial address, but 
throughout the convention, for the delegates to exercise 
the “principle” or “spirit” of accommodation (ibid. p. 251, 
268).  
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James Jasinski (1994) explains that the invocation of 
terms like compromise, adjustment, and conciliation are 
signals terms for prudential accommodation (p. 197).  He 
explains that “prudential principle” became a regulative 
ideal for the constitutional generation at large, but for 
the federalists in particular (ibid. p. `173).  Given this 
view, it seems clear the federalists in Poughkeepsie saw in 
prudential accommodation a rhetorical tool that might be 
used to overcome the numerical disadvantages that they 
faced.   
In examining the speeches themselves, one finds the 
concept of accommodation to be a major theme of federalist 
discourse and argumentation.  Echoing Hamilton, John Jay 
admonishes the delegates to allow a spirit of moderation 
and conciliation to prevail.  Jay exclaims: 
We are endeavoring to agree.  Cannot the 
conditional amendments be paired down so that we 
may agree?  We honestly think Congress must 
reject such an adoption.  Cannot we endeavor 
further to Accommodate?  The Gentlemen have 
advanced for Accommodation.  We have now advanced 
for Accommodation (Schwartz, 1971, p. 880). 
Federalist James Duane, criticized those 
antifederalists who refused to end their call for 
conditional amendments because in so doing they were 
179 
 
 
 
ignoring the federalist attempts at conciliation and 
compromise.  He said of these holdouts,  
“Gent. Say they have condescended—made 
advances—to accommodate—to my mind a conditional 
amendment is a rejection—then where is the spirit 
of accommodation” (ibid. p. 888)? 
As previously indicated, in his initial address to the 
New York convention, Hamilton points to the conciliatory 
nature of the Philadelphia drafting convention.  
Specifically, he points out the compromise reached 
regarding the issue of slavery.  Hamilton indicates that 
this compromise represents a victory of reason over passion 
(Elliot, 1836, 2:237).   
The constitution was designed as a mechanism to 
control faction and promote those leaders who were willing 
and able to seek out the common good.  Insofar as the 
constitution accomplishes this task, it confers on the new 
government the ability or the tools to maintain 
order/reason over passion.  As such, given that the 
federalists consistently argue that the constitution 
represents a moderate solution to the problems faced by the 
several states, lack of moderation in the ratification 
discourse represents imprudence, and the absence of 
decorum.  Given this understanding, the federalists, and 
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Hamilton, in particular, challenge the antifederalists to 
maintain reason over declamation in there debate discourse 
(ibid. 2:237).   
In the above context, declamation is synonymous with 
irrationality.  One can see this relationship in a 
statement made by Melancton Smith in which he, both, 
highlighted the above sense of declamation, and also 
demonstrated the incompatibility of reason and passion, in 
his discussion regarding the potential of the constitution 
to support a natural aristocracy.   
I do not mean to declaim against the great, 
and charge them indiscriminately with want of 
principle and honesty.  The same passion and 
prejudices govern all men (ibid. 247). 
Hamilton responded that Smith’s argument was “directed 
to the passions and prejudices” (Ibid. 256), and Livingston 
indicted Smith for having “so copiously declaimed against 
declamation” (ibid. 276).  The style of argument preferred 
and advanced by the federalists is clearly one of 
moderation.  One commentator wrote, of the Federalist 
Papers: 
These essays are written in a style simple, 
clear, and straightforward.  Abstruse as are the 
topics discussed, there is no ambiguity, no 
faltering, no juggling after the manner of 
demagogues (McLaughlin, 1905, p. 308).   
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As such, federalists not only define the terms of 
moderation, in so doing, they also define that discourse 
which will be considered decorous in the context of the 
convention.  Ultimately, the substantive claims made 
throughout the convention discourse particularly by the 
leading federalist disputants, Smith, Jay, and Hamilton, 
consistently demonstrate moderation in the grounding of the 
substantive claims.   
In addition, to defining the debate in comparison to 
the drafting convention, the Federalists also worked to 
invalidate that discourse that exceeded their predetermined 
bounds of reason in other ways.  Specifically, federalists 
invoked the use of metaphor in critiquing antifederalist 
arguments.  In this mode, reason was considered “cool” and 
moderate, while passion is described as, “hot and 
intemperate”.  John Jay (1788), writing to Thomas Jefferson 
about the factions opposing the constitution said that such 
discourse gave rise to “heats and parties” (3:326).  In 
Federalist No. 2 Jay lauded the Philadelphia convention for 
its “cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultations; and 
finally, without having been awed by power, or influenced 
by any passions except love for their Country” (Federalist 
No. 2).  Hamilton challenged delegates to refrain from the 
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“heat of argument” and to debate with “cool conviction” 
(Elliot, 1836, 2:396).  It is important to note, 
Federalists were not the only ones to warn against the heat 
of passion.  John Lansing an antifederalist cautioned 
against arguments that would put the country “in a flame” 
while calling for cool deliberation (Schwartz, 1971, 887).  
Thomas Tredwell, another antifederalist, pointed to the 
“necessity of proceeding, in our deliberations on this 
important subject, coolly and dispassionately” (Elliot, 
1836, 2:396).   
As the debate continued, Hamilton continued to 
chastise antifederalists for relying on passion and vitriol 
rather than reason, in their opposition to the 
constitution.  He said that the “talk of tyranny, and the 
subversion of our liberties, is to speak the language of 
enthusiasm” (ibid. 257).  The importance of this position 
cannot be overstated.  In effect, Hamilton and other 
federalist are disqualifying, as indecorous, most 
antifederal argumentation.  The reason for this is simple, 
in opposing the constitution, and calling for a Bill of 
Rights, Antifederalist pointed to the potential for dire 
consequences contained within the constitution.  In 
discrediting these types of emotional appeals, the 
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federalists are essentially removing from the 
antifederalist arsenal, their chief line of attack (Ibid).   
The federalists, on the other hand, did not hold that 
all passion was invalid.  For example, Franklin’s speech 
was treated with respect despite the fact that Franklin 
evoked patriotic passion in his presentation.  This 
passion, according to the federalists, differed from the 
kind of emotionalism used by antifederalists because 
Franklins patriotic passion was consistent with a 
conception of the “public good” while antifederal 
emotionalism was seen as incompatible with reason, and 
focused on local and individual interests, and as such, 
factional.  
In addition to the above, federalists charged that the 
afore mentioned types of factionalism were specifically the 
types of factionalism that the constitution was designed to 
overcome.  They (federalists) pointed again to the 
Philadelphia drafting convention as an example of 
appropriate\decorous debate.   
ESTABLISHING PRUDENCE 
Throughout the ratification process federalists work 
to establish decorum in the conventions.  It might be said 
that the ratification of the terms of decorum is critical 
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to the ratification of the constitution itself.  New York 
is no different.   
Federalists saw in their antifederal counterparts, men 
of intemperate self-interest.  In order to secure 
ratification in New York, it became critical to channel and 
control those interests.  The tool that was employed for 
this purpose was accommodation or prudence.  Madison in 
Federalist 10 argued that Faction was a critical danger to 
the country and that had to work to suppress faction by 
encouraging the “common good.”  Hamilton, understanding 
differing needs and interests in a large and diverse 
country argued the critical need for accommodation 
Moreover, Hamilton pointed to the Philadelphia convention 
as an appropriate example of accommodation.  He said, “the 
truth is, the plan, in all its parts, was a plan of 
accommodation” it was meant to address the needs and 
interests of all representatives of the convention 
(Hamilton, 1836 p. 274).  Insofar as prudence is connected 
to decorum in terms of appropriateness of discourse, 
federalists are now able to, on some level, establish the 
terms of the debates.  In this way they created the 
position in which they can argue that all disputants must 
be willing to sacrifice some of their interests in an 
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effort to ratify a plan that might be beneficial to all.  
One can see the issue of accommodation played out in the 
dispute regarding the constitutional provisions regarding 
representation.   
Antifederalists argued that the system of 
representation in the constitution did not provide 
sufficient numbers to adequately represent the people or to 
protect their liberties.  Federalist argued that this 
argument, in particular, evinced the antifederalist’s self-
interest.  Hamilton explained that the goal of the 
representational system was to insure that all voters were 
uniformly represented.  He explained that the 
representatives should have a “strong and uniform” 
relationship with voters (ibid. p. 226).  Increasing 
numbers, according to Hamilton, would not create this 
relationship but would instead allow for representatives 
that were deeply tied to local, rather than national 
interests.  Hamilton indicated that this level of 
representation would “give birth to an unaccommodating 
spirit of party, which has frequently embarrassed the best 
measures” (ibid.).  In addition Hamilton indicted their 
argument of “probability and chance” saying that it was: 
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One that would render useless all reasoning 
upon the probable operation of things, and defeat 
the established principal of natural and moral 
causes.  It is a species of reasoning sometimes 
used to excite popular jealousies, but it 
generally discarded by wise and discerning men.  
I do not suppose that the honorable member 
[Governor Clinton] who advanced the idea had any 
such design.  He undoubtedly would not wish to 
extend his arguments to the destruction of union 
or government; but this, sir, is its real 
tendency (ibid. 267).   
Ultimately, the federalists argued that the only 
appropriate form for a new government was also the only 
form of appropriate argumentation.  Discourse that depended 
upon arousing the passions was discourse that detracted 
from strength and stability, a core constituent of the new 
government.  One can see this highlighted in the argument 
revolving around the power of makeup of the senate.  
Antifederalists argued that the Senate was not constructed 
as a body designed to protect the liberty of the people.  
They believed that the Senate might devolve into an 
aristocratic body.  As such, antifederalists argued for 
term limits, and the right of state legislatures to recall 
senators (ibid. 289).  Hamilton responded to this argument 
by pointing out that the Senate was designed to be a body 
that would provide maturity and stability to the national 
government.  He further explained that because of the 
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structure of the House of Representatives, the government 
would require “some permanent body to correct the 
prejudices, check the intemperate passions, and regulate 
the fluctuations of a popular assembly” (ibid. p. 301).  He 
further pointed out that the people did not have “the 
discernment and stability necessary for systematic 
government” (ibid. p. 302).   
While Hamilton was criticized for advocating an 
aristocratic form of government, careful examination of the 
argument suggests something more nuanced.  Hamilton seems 
clearly to making the point that balance is a critical 
component of government.  He does not argue against the 
existence of the democratically elected house, but rather 
argues for the need of a Senate to balance the passions of 
the popular assembly.  In other words, the legislature 
requires the mutual control of both houses in order to 
achieve balance.  Similarly, as Hamilton criticized the 
self interest of the antifederalists, he also criticized 
the lack of balance in their positions.  Moreover, while 
the charge of self interest might be leveled at Hamilton it 
seems clear that his argument is not that there is no room 
for self interest in prudential discourse, but merely that 
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such discourse cannot be based solely on uninterested of 
self-interested.   
James Jasinski points out that in considering prudence 
it is necessary to understand the interplay of 
accommodation and audacity.  Audacity, according to 
Jasinski, “is the process of using traditions, even as they 
are being destabilized, as a means of crafting political 
innovation” (Jasinski, forms and limits, p. 43).  In 
explaining the relationship of these two concepts, Jasinski 
interposes Garver’s “reconstruction of Machiavellian 
prudence” which links prudence and audacity in an 
“antagonistic yet symbiotic” relationship (ibid.).  The 
tension that Jasinski highlights is what he calls the 
foundation on the “prudential heritage inherited by the 
nation’s founders and [that] the discursive play between 
these alternative conceptualizations of prudence can be 
found in the central controversies of the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth century (ibid. 29).  Jasinski explains that 
for the constitutional generation audacity was key because 
through its use they “prudentially destabilized the 
Confederation in order to preserve the Union” (ibid p. 33-
34).   
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This dual understanding of prudence and audacity is 
critical to understanding the rhetorical strategies of the 
ratification discourse.  However, while Jasinski highlights 
the tension between accommodation and audacity, he pays 
inadequate attention to the symbiotic nature of the two 
concepts, and the ways in which this symbiotic relationship 
is critical to the federalist’s arguments in favor of the 
constitution.  In other words, Hamilton et al. essentially 
argue that while the constitution might represent 
destabilization of the order (audacity), this 
destabilization is balanced by the accommodation of varied 
social influences and needs, as well as invocation of 
“classical prudential discourse of accommodation” (ibid. p. 
43).   
In applying the above understanding to the discourse 
surrounding representation one finds Hamilton praising both 
the strength and stability or “firmness” of the system of 
representation while also extolling the energizing virtues 
that will reinforce national prosperity (Elliot, 1836 p 
2:258).  Throughout the debates, Hamilton consistently and 
frequently invoked terms like “strength and safety”, 
“stability and energy” and even “strength and confidence” 
in defending the audacity represented by the departure from 
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the articles of confederation (ibid. p. 258).  Ultimately 
Hamilton explained that while the system of representation 
under the new constitution represented change, it was 
change coupled with stability.  Moreover, he [Hamilton] 
indicated that the coupling of the Senate with the popular 
House of Representatives would help ameliorate the 
“instability that would arise from the prejudices that 
govern the public deliberation and the passions that rage 
in the councils of the Union” (ibid).   
In essence, Hamilton’s argument is that past 
republican governments failed because of the flaws in human 
nature itself.  In order to correct for the passions of the 
people the constitution sets out to create a representative 
body that will combat the excesses of human nature, the 
Senate.  While the Antifederalists were hard presses to 
argue against the wisdom of a more moderate body, give the 
strictures the federalists attempted to place on the debate 
itself, some like Melancton Smith (1836), argued that a 
limit of Senatorial terms was a “proper medium” or middle 
ground that would allow for the stability that a Senate 
might provide while also protecting the sovereignty of the 
state government (ibid. p. 309).   
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The point here is that Hamilton and the federalists 
argued that a national government required the energy to 
solve the nation’s ills, and the caution and stability to 
protect the liberties of the people and provide for the 
interests of the nation at large.  This is increasing clear 
as one reads Hamilton’s criticism of the nation under the 
Articles of Confederation: 
Our error has been of a very different kind.  
We have erred through excess of caution, and a 
zeal false and impracticable.  Our councils have 
been destitute of consistency and stability.  I 
am flattered with the hope, sir, that we have now 
found a cure for the evils under which we have so 
long labored.  I trust that the proposed 
constitution affords a genuine specimen of 
representative and republican government, and 
that it will answer, in an eminent degree, all 
beneficial purposes of society (ibid. p. 259).   
Hamilton’s view on the above is not unique.  John Jay, 
writing to Chevalier de Bourgoing after the convention 
explained that the constitution would provide for the 
nation “a greater degree of stability and efficiency to our 
national government than it has hitherto experienced” 
(1949, 3:356).  All of this is important because through 
this line of argumentation, the federalist establish the 
position that accommodation and audacity can be 
complementary.  They break the dichotomy between passive 
accommodation, and active audacity, and join the two ideas 
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together in such a way as to create the possibility for 
incredible governmental change while still providing for 
strength and stability.  In addition, the consistent 
application of accommodation to the overall federalist 
position made the argument that the constitutional system 
endangered the liberty of the people increasingly 
untenable.   
As the federalists continued to advance their 
position, the clearest line of attack remained the natural 
aristocracy that the antifederalists saw in the new Senate. 
RHETORICAL CONFLICT 
The New York Convention began to show serious signs of 
strain by the third week.  Hamilton argued that under the 
articles New York often paid more than its fair share in 
taxes to the national government due to the unwillingness 
of other states to pay their fair share, and he presented 
papers to prove his case. (Elliot, 1836, p. 2:360).  While 
Miner (1921) describes this as one of the most important 
speeches Hamilton gave at the convention, it also seems to 
have been the impetus for a great deal of conflict to 
follow, as well as a break down in decorum (p. 110).  While 
Hamilton argued that he made this argument solely to rebut 
the antifederalist position that taxation and the ability 
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to raise a national army were destructive to the liberties 
of the people; the antifederalists claimed that he was 
trying to embarrass them by showing an inconsistency in 
their position, ultimately challenging their integrity.  In 
response to Hamilton’s attacks, the antifederalists 
attempted to introduce amendments that further heated and 
exacerbated the debates.   
Hamilton immediately argued that in exploring the 
antifederal amendments “important proofs” would have to be 
explored that might be injurious to the sensibilities of 
some of the disputants.  For example, Hamilton explained 
that the plan was problematic in that it lacked a 
“deliberate and extensive design” (Bailyn, 1993 p. 2:824).  
While this provoked a rebuke from the antifederalists, it 
did not alter the plan, and Hamilton later offered that 
their “general surmises” were without merit, reflecting a 
discourse that did not seek the “discovery of truth” (ibid. 
p 825).  Moreover, Hamilton used this opportunity to 
question the desire of the antifederalists to create a 
“strong united government” (ibid.).  Finally, Hamilton 
stoked the fire by arguing that the truth of his positions 
“must strike every intelligent mind” (Ibid. 826), while 
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antifederalist arguments were “illogical”, “improper”, 
“unjust”, and “absurd” (Ibid.).   
Hamilton ultimately argued that the antifederal 
position regarding taxation was “unjust and unfair and that 
it was altogether destitute of virtue and prudence” (Ibid. 
828).  He said of their positions that they “were in the 
old track of jealousy and conjecture” and that the 
“premises are as false as their conclusion” (Ibid. 829).  
The essence of his position was that taxation was a 
necessary condition of any government and that whether the 
taxes were direct, or requisitioned, as under the Articles 
made, there was little difference in terms of the role of 
the representative.  Moreover, Hamilton posited that since 
the new system would be more equitable, based on the fact 
of the refusal to comply under the old system, the 
arguments against it were “astonishing” insofar as they 
created a “logical” dilemma that the antifederalists simply 
could not escape (Ibid. 829).   
At the end of the speech Hamilton averred and 
explained that exhaustion might have caused him to speak 
more sharply than was appropriate, that he might have 
overstepped the bounds of propriety.  While Hamilton’s 
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attacks had been unrelenting and pointed, he chose to 
conclude with an apology explaining: 
I am apprehensive, sir, that in the warmth 
of my feelings, I may have uttered expressions 
which were too vehement.  If such has been my 
language, it was from the habit of using strong 
phrases to express my ideas….I confess, Sir, that 
on no subject has my breast been filled with 
stronger emotions, or more anxious concern.  If 
anything has escaped me, which may be construed 
into a personal reflection, I beg the gentlemen, 
once for all, to be assured I have no design to 
would the feeling of any one opposed to me (Ibid. 
834).   
In response to the charges leveled against him that he 
was acting for personal advantage, Hamilton echoed the 
concerns that the Massachusetts antifederalists raised 
about federalist’ invocations of their prowess in 
deliberation for individual gain. 
It has been said, that ingenious men may say 
ingenious things. And that those, who are 
interested in raising the few upon the ruins of 
the many, may give to every cause an appearance 
of justice.  I know not whether these 
insinuations allude to the character of any, who 
are present, or to any of the reasonings in this 
house…. What reasonable man, for the precarious 
enjoyment of rank and power, would establish a 
system, which would reduce his nearest friends 
and posterity to slavery and ruin?... If today, I 
am among the favored few, my children, to-morrow, 
may be among the oppressed many… (Ibid. p. 834-
835).   
Basically, Hamilton argues that one’s position in life 
is not a guarantee, and that prosperity today might well 
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lead to obscurity tomorrow.  As such it is not in the best 
interest of anyone to advocate a system, from a position of 
power, to which they might be subject, uncomfortably in 
less prosperous times.  He reasoned, “it cannot be the wish 
of any reasonable man, to establish a government unfriendly 
to the liberties of the people….  The suspicion, Sir, is 
unjust; the charge is uncharitable” (ibid.).  Insofar as 
Hamilton apologizes for his indecorous remarks, Hamilton 
implicitly recognizes the difficulty of upholding the 
standard of accommodation that has been pressed upon the 
debates by the federalists themselves.  The French charge’ 
to Versailles said of Hamilton: 
Hamilton was a great orator, intrepid in public 
debate, zealous and even extremist partisan of the 
Constitution and declared enemy of Governor George Clinton 
of New York….  But has a bit too much affectation and too 
little prudence (Morris 1985, pg. 5).    
While the delegates called upon one another to 
maintain decorum and accommodation throughout the debates 
Hamilton is an apt example of the difficulty of this 
proposition.  While Governor Clinton and his allies claimed 
that Hamilton, in calling the opposition self-interested 
was a direct assault on the character of the governor 
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himself, Hamilton called this “an unjust and unnatural 
coloring of my observations” (Elliot 1836, pg. 2:268).  It 
is important to note that despite Hamilton’s disavowal of 
offence, these kinds of attacks were a common practice of 
many of the delegates, to attack the character of the 
opposition, and then use disavowal as a means of defending 
ones position and character was quite common.  As a matter 
of fact the charges listed above are quite tame when 
compared to the pre-convention “Phocion” letters.  Clearly 
there is a shift from ad personam attacks to a more focused 
and substantive defense of the constitution.   
It should also be noted that Hamilton was not alone in 
the failure of decorum noted above.  Many delegates ignored 
decorum altogether, and those who did concern themselves 
with appropriateness were not always consistent in their 
propriety.  Notable among these was Robert R. Livingston.   
As indicated above, Hamilton apologized for the 
inappropriateness of his comments.  However, this apology 
did little to alter the growing hostility within the 
convention.  After Hamilton’s address, John Lansing spoke 
about the potential abuses of the power of taxation (Elliot 
1836, pg. 2:371).  While Lansing delivered a pointed attack 
upon the constitution as well as its supporters, the real 
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affront came at the end of the speech in which Lansing 
accused Hamilton of dishonesty and inconsistency.  He based 
this charge on remarks Hamilton made in the Philadelphia 
convention in which Hamilton, indicated that due to 
hostility that he believed would come to exist between 
state and federal government, the states ought to be 
“subverted” (Ibid. pg. 376).   
The inconsistency to which Lansing is pointing stems 
from remarks that Hamilton made in Poughkeepsie regarding 
the importance of the states in checking the power of the 
federal government and protecting the liberties of the 
people.  Lansing hopes to convince the delegates that 
Hamilton’s remarks are not a change of heart, but a lie 
based on necessity.  Lansing implies that Hamilton spoke 
his true feelings in the secrecy of the Philadelphia 
convention, and is now speaking that which is expedient 
(Miner, 1921, pg. 114).   
Hamilton interrupted Lansing, and “contradicted in the 
most positive terms the charge of inconsistency” (Elliot, 
1836, pg. 2:376).  Though the convention reporter did not 
note the exact contents of Hamilton’s objection, he did 
note that “a warm and personal altercation between those 
gentlemen… engrossed the rest of the day” (ibid. pg. 376).  
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The “personal dispute” continued to disrupt the convention 
the following day as well, and required the intervention of 
John Jay to restore order to the convention (Kline, 1973, 
pg 201).   
From this point forward Hamilton’s role at the 
convention seems to have been greatly diminished.  Taking 
his place according to Miner (1921) were John Jay, James 
Duane, and Robert Livingston (pg 115).  Jay called for 
mature reflection, and conceded that the antifederalist 
fear of uninformed representation certainly had “some 
weight,” but that the amendments proposed by the 
antifederalists were too problematic to warrant approval 
(Elliot, 1836, pg 2:380).  Following this there was debate 
over several points until the entry of Robert Livingston 
into the discussion.   
One might argue that from the very beginning of his 
address Livingston rejected the collegiality that Jay had 
attempted to restore to the proceedings.  Reading 
Livingston’s comments one will find that Livingston seems 
to ignore almost every principle of prudence and decorum.  
He [Livingston] opened his remarks by criticizing the 
antifederalists on several fronts.  He pointed out the 
divisions among the antifederalists, their lack of “fixed 
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maxims”, “random” talk, and inconsistencies in the 
positions of each delegate’s positions (Ibid. pg. 382-383).  
While Livingston called the antifederalist position erratic 
and “too delicate to dwell” upon, he nonetheless cited 
several examples to make his case (Ibid. pg. 383).  The 
most egregious break with civility, though, came when 
Livingston attacked the antifederalist position that 
liberty would suffer under the new constitution.  
Livingston said: 
With these melancholy ideas no wonder we 
mourn for the fair damsel of American liberty, 
harassed with oppressive laws, shut upon a dismal 
dungeon, robbed of the light of heaven, and, by a 
beautiful anti-climax, robbed of the money in her 
pocket (Ibid.) 
Livingston continued the attack by criticizing the 
“fine reasoning” of the antifederalist position of taxation 
was “impractable” as well as “dangerous” 
To what should I compare this reasoning?  
Shall I liken it to children in the market-place, 
or shall I like it to children making bubbles 
with a pipe?  Shall I not compare it to two boys 
on a balanced board? One goes up, the other goes 
down, and so they go up and down, down and up, 
till the sport is over, and the board is left 
exactly on the balance, in which they found it.  
But let us see if we cannot, from all this 
rubbish pick out something which may look like 
reasoning (Bailyn 1992, pg 2:837).   
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Livingston’s speech is significant for several 
reasons.  First, Livingston represents a strong departure 
from the decorous accommodation offered by Smith, Jay, and 
even Hamilton.  He [Livingston] challenges the reasoning of 
his opponents in an era [the enlightenment] where reason 
and logic are valorized by the society at large.  Moreover, 
he added salt to the wounds by comparing the opposition to 
children.  But the speech is also significant for it’s 
style.  As can be seen even is the rebuke, Livingston 
creates powerful imagery, and stirring metaphors.  While 
the language may represent a departure from the 
accommodation for which the federalists were aiming, the 
imagery of Livingston’s speech soars.  This places 
Livingston in sharp contrast to the plain style employed by 
others in the debates.  Moreover, a more thorough 
examination of the metaphors Livingston uses reveals an 
important dichotomy between reasons and passions.  
Nevertheless, the appeal to pathos that is evident in 
Livingston’s address is clearly inconsistent with the norms 
of deliberative praxis, and secured for Livingston some 
condemnation.   
On July 2, Gilbert Livingston chastised Robert for his 
“torrent of illiberality” (Ibid.).  He [Gilbert] argued 
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that the comparison of the opposition to children had the 
effect of robbing the argument of its strength.  He said 
that this kind of argumentation would not convince anyone 
to change their positions.  Gilbert said “Robert’s 
argument, (if what was said might be called an argument)” 
was ultimately an inappropriate means of addressing the 
opposition (Ibid.).  However even as he denounced Robert, 
Gilbert employed many of the same tactics in his rebuttal.  
He said: 
It consisted wholly of brass, without any 
mixture of clay; and a luxuriancy of fancy which 
that member is famous for, and I suppose for the 
sake of variety, he has taken it from the feet 
and toes, where, on another occasion, he had 
emphatically placed it, and now displayed it 
wholly in front….  When gentlemen will, for the 
sake of displaying their own parts, or perhaps 
for worse purposes, depart from the line of 
propriety, then they are fair game.  I cannot 
suppose however, that it is disagreeable to the 
member himself, as he appears to delight to 
dabble in dirty water (Ibid. pg 386).   
Ultimately, Gilbert claimed that Robert had damaged 
himself, and the “damsel of liberty” as well as all who 
fought to free the country from the grasp of the King in 
making such indecorous remarks.  Nevertheless, Gilbert was 
not alone in his criticism of Robert Livingston; Melanction 
Smith also joined the rejoinder with a more restrained 
critique: 
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I submit to the candor of the committee, 
whether any evidence of the strength of a cause 
is afforded, when gentlemen, instead of reasoning 
fairly, assert roundly, and use all powers of 
ridicule and rhetoric to abuse their adversaries.  
Any argument may be placed in a ridiculous light, 
by taking only detached parts.  I wish, Mr. 
Chairman, that ridicule might be avoided.  It can 
only irritate the passions, and has not tendency 
to convince the judgment (Ibid. pg 392).   
After such scathing assaults, Robert Livingston 
offered an apology.  However, such apology did little to 
soothe the passions the original speech had excited, and 
served only to highlight and reopen feuds that had existed 
before the convention.  Ultimately, Livingston’s powerful 
invective against the antifederalists was such that the 
prudential discourse was virtually abandoned, and 
substantive issues ignored (Ibid. pg. 391).  Had events not 
proceeded as they did outside the convention, New York 
might have become mired in its own animosities.   
On June 25, an express rider informed the convention 
that New Hampshire had become the eighth state to ratify, 
and on July 2, Governor Clinton was interrupted with the 
news that Virginia had become the ninth state to ratify, 
and without amendments.  Because the constitution 
explicitly required ratification by nine states, on July 2, 
the constitution was now in force.  Up to this point in the 
204 
 
 
 
debates, the strategy of the New York antifederalists had 
been to stall in hopes of securing concessions, the news 
changed that equation dramatically.  Rossiter (1966) 
explains that “the federalists had full reason… to thank 
Governor Clinton for having stalled his unseeing way into a 
situation in which to reject the Constitution would have 
been to invite disaster for New York” (pg. 294).   
From this point forward the entire focus of the 
debates shifted in New York.  Miner (1921) points out: 
the New York convention abandoned its 
opposition to the Constitution in large part 
because the ninth state ratified during the … 
debates, leaving New York with the prospect of 
lonely nationhood to itself (pg. 116). 
As a result of these changes, the debates in New York 
shifted dramatically.  No longer was rejection a serious 
discursive position, despite the numerical advantage held 
by the antifederalists.  From this point forward, the 
question in New York became a question of amendments. 
THE DEBATE FOR AMENDMENTS 
The tone and direction of the New York ratification 
debate changed on July 3, after news arrived from Richmond.  
In effect the fight for ratification was over, and the new 
battleground moved to the call for amendments.  In the days 
to follow the New York antifederalists introduced a total 
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of fifty-five motions for amendments to the new 
constitution (Kline, 1973, pg. 210).  In addition, as the 
fortunes of the antifederalists shifted the animosity that 
was present in the convention before the news seems to have 
shifted somewhat allowing Hamilton to reemerge.  John Jay, 
writing to Washington sums up his feelings on the 
convention: 
The leaders in opposition seem to have more 
extensive views than their adherents, and until 
the later perceive that circumstance they will 
probably continue combines.  The greater number 
are, I believe, averse to a vote of rejection.  
Some would be content with recommendatory 
amendments, others wish for explanatory ones to 
settle constructions which they think are 
doubtful, others would be satisfied with less 
than absolute and previous amendments; and I am 
mistaken if there be not a few who prefer 
separation from the Union to any national 
government whatsoever (Jay, 1949, pg. 3:346).   
Ultimately events brought accommodation back into the 
convention, and cooler heads began to prevail.  On July 4, 
Jay wrote to John Adams of the continued “temper and 
moderation” that he believed would allow accommodation of 
recommendatory amendments (Ibid. pg. 347).  As the 
antifederalists surveyed the ground they were left, many 
realized that their best hope of impacting the new 
government lied not in rejection or even conditional 
amendments, but in the Massachusetts formula.  Federalists 
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seeing this shift renewed their push for accommodation on a 
formula that would allow for ratification.  Miner (1921) 
explains that at this juncture “Hamilton stated his 
willingness to engage in compromise and to accede in any 
plan that was reasonable (pg. 117).  Moreover, at this 
juncture, federalists adopted what had been an 
antifederalist position of asking for an adjournment in 
order that delegates might consult with constituents.   
The ratification of the ninth state substantially 
changed the federalist outlook in New York.  Adjournment, 
unthinkable a day before the news came in from Virginia, 
was suddenly the most prudent course for unconditional 
ratification.  Federalist believing that the citizens of 
New York were not willing to be isolated outside of the new 
union saw in adjournment an opportunity for the 
antifederalist to hear their constituents.  John Jay 
cautioned those antifederalists still demanding conditional 
ratification that such strategy created a risk of rejection 
or even exclusion from the union (Schwartz, 1971, pg. 889).  
In one speech Jay, four times, repeated the admonition that 
conditional ratification was risky, and that the more 
prudent course was adjournment and consultation with 
constituents.   
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In addition to the call for adjournment, New York 
federalists also issued a subtle threat to the opposition.  
Forest McDonald (1979) explains that:  
Hamilton and Jay played upon a threat that 
had been circulated as a rumor for several weeks; 
they declared that if New York did not ratify, 
New York City would secede from the state and 
join the union on its own.  Faced with that 
prospect, the Clintonian majority had no choice 
but to capitulate.  After some negotiations over 
proposed amendments, designed to make the pill 
less difficult to swallow, it did so (pg 114-
115). 
John Jay (1949) writing to Washington said of the 
threat, it [secession by New York City] “has influence on 
the fears of the [antifederalist] party” (pg. 3:335).  Main 
(1929) argued: 
What had the most weight with the 
Antifederalists was the thought of possible 
consequences if New York failed to ratify.  The 
Federalists made much of this point in debate, 
raising the ominous prediction that if the 
Constitution was defeated, the southern counties 
would secede and join the Union.  There is no 
doubt that this threat was made by persons of 
influence (pg. 238).   
Rossiter (1981) explains that “the fact is that New 
York ratified principally because Hamilton raised the 
specter of secession by the city and southern counties” 
(pg. 293-294).   
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As in the calls for adjournment, the timing of this 
tactic was critical.  Neither of these two positions was 
tenable in a country in which the union did not exist.  
While the New York antifederalists began the convention 
stalling in the hope that New Hampshire would fail to 
ratify, or even call for conditional amendments, the 
federalists begin the end in much the same position, 
despite their numbers, events or kairos have given the 
federalists the upper hand.   
ACCOMMODATION AND AMENDMENTS 
New York antifederalists did not discover amendments 
at the end of the discourse, like many of the other states, 
amendments were a part of the process of objection.  For 
the Federalists the challenge was to avoid amendments 
altogether, or secure ratification along the Massachusetts 
model; ratify and recommend amendments to be ratified 
later.  In 1776, George Campbell wrote that “reliance upon 
experience and probability was a primary feature of 
rhetoric” (pg. 746).  In much the same way, Federalist 
argued that the most significant feature of the new 
constitution was its reliance on experience and 
perfectibility, through the process of amendments.  The 
constitutional generation did not believe that it was their 
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task, or even a goal to create a governmental model that 
would last into perpetuity, instead they created a 
government that could be adjusted and perfected as flaws 
were revealed.  Jefferson himself indicated that 
governments were cyclical in nature; he estimated that the 
potential lifespan of any government was approximately 20 
years.  From this thinking Jefferson uttered the famous 
quotation “The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time 
to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its 
natural manure” (Boyd, 1955, p. 356).   
 Given this, consideration of amendments was not 
objectionable to the federalists; they did not believe that 
a perfect system of government had been imagined.  Rather 
they believed that practice would reveal actual rather than 
hypothetical flaws that could be corrected.  As such, while 
antifederalists often relied upon potential theoretical 
flaws, federalists preferred to move from abstraction to 
practicalities.  Eugene Garver (1987) explains that for 
Machiavelli “practical judgment on particulars is more 
reliable than that on generalities” (p. 157).  As such the 
federalists are able to argue that the more prudent course 
is to make adjustment as need based on real practical 
exigencies. 
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The above is clearer when applied to Hamilton’s debate 
with Melancton Smith regarding representation.  Hamilton 
pointing to the clause that allowed Congress to adjust the 
numbers of representative after three years, and then every 
ten was based on the notion that the legislature would be 
able to determine the appropriate level of representation 
in practice better then in theory (Elliot, 1836, 2:238).  
Similarly Garver (1987), making an explicit connection 
between prudential audacity and experience wrote: 
Like Aristotle, Machiavelli encounters a 
reflexive problem about prudence; prudence 
requires that one be responsive to shifting 
circumstances without being passive to them, and 
the reflective articulation of the principles and 
materials for prudence also require that the 
writer find some middle ground between too much 
universality… and too much particularity (p. 39).   
Hamilton and other federalists argued that it was not 
possible to determine the appropriate number of 
representatives forever, and as such a legislative body 
would have to make such judgments as they seemed prudent.  
He said nobody could “pronounce, with certainty, that it 
will be expedient to go beyond this number… [E]xperience 
alone must determine” (Elliot, 1836, 2:239).   
Antifederalists, on the other hand, were not willing 
to allow any such discretion on the part of the new 
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congress.  Smith argued that there must be a higher and 
exact number of representatives to insure proper 
representation (Ibid. 243).  However, even Smith 
acknowledged that there could be no mathematical formula 
that would determine the proper number of representatives 
to create ideal representation (Ibid. p. 244).  Despite his 
admission, though, Smith continued to argue that increased 
representation was necessary to insure the adequacy of 
local interest representation, as well as inclusion of the 
middle class in congressional ranks, to diminish the power 
and influence of the natural aristocracy.  Nevertheless, 
Federalists remained firm in their objections.  Hamilton 
proffered that experience not “curious speculation” should 
guide the discourse (Ibid. p. 259).  Jay (1949) 
acknowledged that while the constitution was an imperfect 
vehicle it “will become more and more perfect in proportion 
as their knowledge and experience increases” p. 3:355).   
Similarly, after the Philadelphia convention Jay 
(1949) mused to John Adams his hope that, “experience and 
the good sense of the people will correct what may prove to 
be inexpedient” (Ibid. p. 258). In each case it is the 
federalist intention that prudence should guide any changes 
or alterations to the governmental plan, not speculation 
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and passion.  While the federalists never contended that 
the constitution was perfect, they argued consistently that 
corrections required experience.  Garver (1987) explains, 
“noting assures that a prudential action will be correct; 
the rightness and the success of a prudential action are 
always open to debate and to refutation by practical 
failure” (p. 16).  While antifederalists point to comments 
made by Benjamin Franklin regarding the imperfection of the 
new constitution, at the end of the Philadelphia 
convention, Jay (1949) responds to this sentiment in a 
letter to John Adams: 
A compact like this, which is the result of 
accommodation and compromise, cannot be supposed 
to be perfectly consonant with the wishes and 
opinions of any of the parties (pg. 3:258).   
Moreover to read Franklin’s comments as an assault on 
the constitution is to take them out of their context.  
Franklin (1982) did argue that the constitution was 
imperfect, but he also added that perfection was an 
unattainable goal, and that this constitution was as 
perfect as any constitution might be (p. 251).  In essence, 
Franklin argues that the constitution is a product of 
prudential wisdom, and that prudence dictated that a 
government be crafted which allowed for its careful 
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modification as exigency dictated.  Franklin explained that 
government required wisdom, accommodation and experience, 
without which no government could effectively function 
(Ibid. p. 251).   
This above discourse illustrates the federalist 
position that perfection was not attainable.  Moreover, 
that wisdom was the accumulation of accommodation and 
conciliation, in favor of the common good.  In the argument 
in support of ratification the federalist exhibit 
phronesis, kairos, prudence and decorum.  They indicated a 
strong belief that the constitution represented careful 
audacity that also provided for a degree of stability that 
was absent from the country under the Articles of 
Confederation.  In the end, though, the federalist argued 
that baring all other remedies, the constitution allowed 
for its own amendments in order to insure that, as 
experience dictated, the government could always provide 
for the common good in under unforeseeable circumstances as 
well as “perform continual acts of innovation” (Garver, 
1995, p. 34).   
JOHN JAY 
As indicated above, the interplay between Hamilton and 
the antifederalists did not always demonstrate the 
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accommodation and conciliation that the federalists hoped 
to demonstrate in New York.  While ratification was of 
paramount importance, governing was still going to be 
necessary at the end of the contest, and with this in mind, 
the prudent choice clearly called for accommodation at the 
end of the convention.   
Hamilton, who took a strong role after the news from 
New Hampshire and Virginia altered the landscape in New 
York, began, again, to step back.  Jay clearly was the 
federalists’ middle ground, and while ratification seemed 
all but assured at this stage, the Clintonian faction was 
pushing conditional amendments.  At the beginning of the 
second week of July, John Lansing and the more virulent 
wing of the antifederalists offered amendment to the 
constitution to be approved before New York ratified.  With 
these amendments the ratification of New York was to be 
“upon condition” of acceptance of the proposed changes to 
the constitution.  On July 11, John Jay replied to Lansing 
with a resolution for ratification.  Jay’s resolution 
included explanatory and recommendatory amendments which 
“might be deemed to be useful, or expedient” (Elliot, 1836, 
p. 2:410).  Melancton Smith opposed the federalist call for 
recommendatory amendments but in Private conversations 
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“Smith acknowledged that he would favor recommendatory 
amendments rather than risk rejection” (Schwartz, 1971, p. 
893).  Gilbert Livingston recorded Williams’ prudential 
call for an accommodation that would allow for action: 
The questn. Is wheather [sic] we shall 
adjourn or not—[William] wishes a middle line—
cannot vote for a rejection--& cannot vote for an 
unconditional adopn. –wishes some mode may be 
thot. of (ibid. p. 893). 
After a few more days of debate Lansing resumed his 
call for conditional ratification.  Lansing demanded a bill 
of rights prefixed, and amendments subjoined (Elliot, 1836, 
pg. 2:411-412).  On July 23, Samuel Jones, a more moderate 
antifederalist called for an amendment to Lansing’s motion 
changing the words “upon condition” to “in full confidence” 
(Kline, 1973, p. 206).  Melancton Smith then delivered an 
address in which he restated his belief that the 
constitution was “radically defective” (Bailyn 1993, p. 
2:852).  Nevertheless, Smith argued that ratification in 
Virginia as well as the possibility of secession by 
southern New York convinced him that amendments could not 
be made prior to ratification.  He said, “the dictate of 
reason and duty” required him to “quit his first ground, 
and advance” by supporting Jones’ motion (Ibid).  Jones 
motion passed by a very narrow margin, and as a result 
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Lansing called for a vote to allow New York to withdraw 
from the union if amendments were not made in a specified 
time period.  Jay and Hamilton both argued that such a 
condition was not a real ratification.  Moreover, Hamilton 
posited that such an action would engender bad feeling 
between New York and other states; he argued that such a 
position would be seen as arrogance (Hamilton, 1962, pg. 
5:177-178).  In addition Hamilton read a letter from 
Madison that indicated that such ratification was a 
rejection rather than an effective ratification.  Madison 
said, “in short any condition whatsoever must violate the 
ratification” (Ibid. pg. 184-185).  The federalists called, 
once again, for “an accommodation… [and to] conclude the 
business with harmony and to the satisfaction of both 
parties” (Ibid. p. 195).   
 After this call, federalists led by Hamilton 
issued a call for a second constitutional convention to 
consider the amendments proposed by New York 
antifederalists (Bailyn, 1993, p. 1:1098).  John Jay 
indicated that the call and the circular letter would show 
compromise and help the antifederalists to save face.  He 
considered it a cheap price to “pay for ratification” 
(Monaghan, 1935, p. 297).  In addition, the call for a 
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second convention had little or no cost for the New York 
Federalists, the resolution was not binding, but allowed 
all in New York to unite behind a single cause.   
In the end, Jay played a leading role in establishing 
a compromise ratification position with the 
antifederalists.  Smith, Jay, Hamilton, and Lansing; 
prepared a letter to circulate among all New York 
delegates.  This letter enshrined the principles discussed 
throughout the ratification process.  It spoke of 
accommodation, of security and experience, of harmony and 
common good, and it tied all of these to wisdom.  The 
letter read in part: 
As we desire nothing more than the 
amendments proposed by this or other states be 
submitted to the  consideration and decision of 
general convention, we flatter ourselves that 
motives of mutual affection and conciliation will 
conspire with the obvious dictates of sound 
policy to induce even such of the states as may 
be content with every article of the Constitution 
to gratify the reasonable desires of that 
numerous class of American citizens who are 
anxious to obtain amendments of some of them.   
Our amendments will manifest that none of 
them originated in local views, as they are such 
as, if acceded to, must equally affect every 
state in the Union.  Our attachment to our sister 
states, and the confidence we repose in them, 
cannot be more forcibly demonstrated then by 
acceding to a government which many of us think 
very imperfect, and devolving the power of 
determining whether that government shall be 
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rendered perpetual in its present form, or 
altered agreeably to our wishes, and that 
minority of the states with whom we unite. 
We request the favor of your Excellency to 
lay this letter before the legislature of your 
state; and we are persuaded that you regard for 
our national harmony and good government will use 
you to promote a measure which we are unanimous 
in thinking very conducive to those interesting 
objects (Hamilton, 1962, P.  5:196). 
After the circulation of the letter, Lansing’s motion 
on the right of secession was put to a vote, the motion 
failed by a vote of 31 to 28.  Smith, Jones and Gilbert 
Livingston joined the federalists in voting no.  On July 
26, the New York Convention ratified the constitution by a 
vote of 30-27.   
CONCLUSION 
New York, perhaps more than any other state was a 
battle ground of extremes.  Both sides had hardened 
positions and in many ways the best minds at their 
disposal.  Prudential wisdom was juxtaposed against theory 
and suspicion, and rancor and distrust were overcome by 
moderation and accommodation.  Competing alongside the 
extremist position of the Clintonites were the more 
moderate voices of Robert Livingston, John Lansing and John 
Jay.  While the New York convention pointed out many of the 
imperfections in the constitution, it also, explored, 
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through Alexander Hamilton, the concept of audacious 
accommodation.  In sum the New York ratification convention 
brings to light the strengths and weakness of prudence and 
decorum particularly in the hands of people as debaters.  
But at least as important is the key role played by kairos 
or timing in the resolution of this debate.  Many different 
roads might have been taken, but instead for the most part 
the disputants in New York chose unity and accommodation as 
the wiser course.  In 1791 James Madison fulfilled the 
Federalist pledge by shepherding through congress and the 
states the first 10 amendments to the constitution.  Since 
ratification of the Bill of Rights, the Constitution has 
been amended twenty seven times, and each time the 
discussions surrounding those amendments have harkened back 
to the original ratification contests in order to glean 
from these words the original intent and desires of the 
framers.   
220 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation began with the assumption that 
analysis of the constitution through the lens of classical 
concepts of prudence and decorum would allow greater 
understanding of the constitution, the discourse that 
created it, and the reasons for the federalist victory. I 
also hoped to enhance understanding of how the classical 
concepts of prudence and decorum functioned.  In 
accomplishing these goals, this analysis has drawn on 
Aristotle and to a much larger extent, Cicero to inform the 
concepts used in the analysis.  Cornell (1994) points out 
that the founding generation, by melding classical 
republicanism with English Whig political thought created a 
new understanding of both discourse and community, as well 
as the relationship of the individual to both (pg. 17-18). 
James Aune (1989) explains that the participants in the 
ratification debate had to overcome the significant 
problems of creating a republican government in a large 
country made up of a multiplicity of varying state 
interests.  He says that “by examining the discourse of the 
ratification debates, one of the “concrete instances of 
political judgment”, one comes to a wider, but by no means 
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perfect, comprehension of the philosophies and principles 
that undergird the constitution (pg. 43-49). 
INCREASING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
As I stated early in this examination, the 
constitution that was submitted to the states in 1787, was 
not the same constitution that emerged ratified in 1788.  
Specifically, a bill of rights was expected and later added 
to codify the rights of the people in the new order.  This 
shift began in earnest in Massachusetts and continued 
throughout the controversy.  As such any examination of the 
powers and prerogatives granted the new government cannot 
be understood absent the serious expectation that these 
privileges and prerogatives would be limited by defined 
statements of rights.  Perhaps more importantly, though, 
because the constitution was a product of deliberation, 
understanding of the constitution comes not simply from the 
text of the document, but from a combination of the texts 
coupled with the discussion that surrounded the text.  In 
other words we understand and define the Constitution based 
upon the discourse that surrounded it’s ratification.   
Given the above understanding, several key areas of 
understanding that are  broadened from studying the text of 
the ratification discourse.  The most significant of these, 
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for the purposes of this study are representation and 
rights. 
Rights 
As indicated above the constitution did not define a 
specific set of rights in its original.  Madison (1976) 
writes Jefferson regarding the proposed Bill of rights: 
My own opinion has always been in favor of a 
bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not 
to imply powers not meant to be included in the 
enumeration. At the same time I have never 
thought the omission a material defect, nor been 
anxious to supply it even by subsequent 
amendment, for any other reason than that it is 
anxiously desired by others. . . . I have not 
viewed it in an important light — 1. because I 
conceive that in a certain degree, though not in 
the extent argued by Mr. Wilson, the rights in 
question are reserved by the manner in which the 
federal powers are granted. 2. because there is 
great reason to fear that a positive declaration 
of some of the most essential rights could not be 
obtained in the requisite latitude (Smith, 1976, 
pg 427).   
Madison clearly believed that the constitution 
guaranteed rights simply because it limited the rights of 
the federal government, and because it contained a clause 
that indicated that those powers not given to the 
government were reserved to the states and the people.  
Additionally, Madison believed that delineating rights did 
not guarantee rights so much as it limited them.  
Nevertheless, as a result of the discourse of ratification 
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it became necessary for the Constitution to contain a Bill 
of Rights.  However, it should be noted that we do not 
understand or interpret these rights in a vacuum; they are 
interpreted through the lens created by statements like 
those of Madison.  Insofar as we see the text as 
intertwined with the discourse, we also understand that the 
discussion of rights is not entirely bound by the text of 
the Bill of Rights, nor is as nebulous as the statement 
made by Madison, but somewhere in between.  In effect that 
constitution is better understood as more than a document, 
but a combination of the document and the discourse in 
which the contested terms are “recursively constituted and 
reconstituted” (Kurland, 1987, pg 2).   
Representation  
In addition to the issue of rights, this investigation 
also focused on the understanding of representatives both 
from the perspective of the framers, and from the 
population at large.  As was clear from the outset of the 
Massachusetts debate, the traditional notions of prudential 
representation were called into question by the delegate 
selection process, and specifically by the issuance of 
binding instructions.  In essence, the people of 
Massachusetts saw the role of a representative as one who 
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was chosen to reflect the will of the constituent.  In this 
case, the declining role of the representative reflected a 
shift in the importance of the assembly as a deliberative 
forum.  Increasingly citizens believed that decisions 
should be reserved for the community and merely ratified by 
the assembly.  While this shift is most clear in the 
discussion surrounding the Massachusetts debates, the 
distrust of the “natural aristocracy” is evidenced in all 
of the debates explored.  It was argued that in order to 
counteract the dangers to liberty that power ambition and 
opportunity and ambition might create, government had to be 
decentralized.  Bellah and Madsen (1985) explain that in an 
effort to protect rights people tried to localize 
government in an effort to police representatives (pg. 35).  
To enact this on a larger scale constituents limited 
representatives through the use of instructions, limited 
empowerment, rotation, term limits, and most seriously, the 
right of recall.   Ultimately, the discourse surrounding 
this issue demonstrated a shifting locus of control in 
governmental authority that was not complete but merely 
beginning in the eighteenth century.  
The federalist argued, conversely that the appropriate 
representation required people of maturity, character, 
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talent, and experience.  They, federalist, argued that 
prudence would help the representative perceive the 
greatest good for the greatest number or people, or the 
“common good” and would exercise power to secure such good.  
This view is most powerfully articulated by Hamilton in his 
Philadelphia Convention address.  Hamilton calls for the 
“better sort” within the community to exercise judgment 
largely free of the constraints of the public at large, 
limited only by the power of the people to vote for or 
against a particular representative.  
Madison, on the other hand, while maintaining the 
importance of the natural aristocracy, and the principles 
of prudential reasoning in representation, saw in the 
constitution additional protections for securing the rights 
of the people.  Madison believed that factional interests 
in society, tension between state and federal government, 
as well and division of powers within the federal 
government itself acted as a check to protect society from 
the potential abuses.  However, while Madison clearly saw a 
need to protect society from the abuse of power, he also 
sought to maximize the potential energies of the 
representational system.  In other words, Madison believed 
the best way to create a stable energetic government that 
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was sensitive to the need for the protection of liberty was 
best achieved through a system of balancing interests.   
Madison’s vision is most clearly articulated during 
the course of the Virginia debates as he explains, when 
pressed by Henry, that this, balancing of interests, is the 
best way to secure liberty.  Madison’s formulation reserved 
for the natural aristocracy, the Senate, as a place of 
stability and prudential wisdom, and the House as a place 
for the expression of other segments of society 
(Brookhiser, 2011, pg. 35). 
Nevertheless, the melding of the representation 
concepts of the ratification debates help clarify the 
continuing difficulty of defining the proper role of the 
representative even in today’s political culture.  Henry 
Fairlie (1984) writing about the “decline of oratory” 
bemoans the absence of deliberative oratory in modern 
political discourse, and sees the roots of this decline in 
the 18
th
 century shift away from classical republicanism.  
In essence then, one can see that the concept of 
representative that was written into the constitution was 
altered by the course and the method of the ratifying 
debates, and it is not possible to understand the subtle 
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shift in the concept of representative absent the 
ratification debates.  
Given the importance of analysis of the debates to 
inform our concepts of rights and representation one might 
credible ask what, if any, influence the method and 
strategies of the debates themselves have on the final 
outcome of these two components of American Democracy.  The 
answer to the question is best illustrated by the shifts in 
meaning that occur.  Had the federalists pursued different 
strategies, refusing to negotiate on a Bill of Rights, or 
even defining rights quite differently, the debates might 
have taken a different course.  Additionally, the 
federalists willingness to encourage debate in the face of 
clear challenges to the classical conceptions of 
representation helpd to create a new understanding of 
representation through the process of the debates 
themselves.   
UNDERSTANDING THE DISCOURSE OF THE DEBATES 
 In examining the debates surrounding the ratification 
of the federal constitution, this exploration has sought to 
explore the interplay of prudence in a large scale public 
controversy.  As discussed previously, the debates 
represent a shift in political discourse, from a classical 
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representative model, to a more populist model that has 
continued to transform American political discourse.   
While this exploration has employed prudence and 
decorum as a means of unpacking and understanding the 
debates, the textual exploration of the debates themselves 
have been critical to this exploration.  As Clifford Geertz 
(1973) explained, in order to understand science, one must 
first look at the practitioners of science (p. 5).  
Additionally Geertz explained that in order to appreciate a 
culture, one should study events within the culture, rather 
than examining abstract theoretical concepts (p. 17).  He 
writes: 
The major theoretical contributions not only 
lie in specific studies—that is true in almost 
every field—but they are very difficult to 
abstract from such studies and integrate into 
anything one might call “cultural theory” as 
such.  Theoretical formulations hover so low over 
the interpretations they govern that they don’t 
make much sense or hold much interest apart from 
them.  This is so, not because they are not 
general (if they are not general, they are not 
theoretical), but because, stated independently 
of their applications, they seem either 
commonplace or vacant… the essential task of 
theory building here is not to codify abstract 
regularities but to make thick description 
possible, not to generalize across cases but to 
generalize within the, (p. 25-26). 
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In essence then, Geertz (1973) explains that the goal 
is to “draw large conclusions from small, but very densely 
textured facts; to support broad assertions about the role 
of culture in the construction of collective by engaging 
them with complex specifics” (pg. 28).  Leff (1993) 
underscores the complexity of this writing: 
The reading and rereading of the text, the 
analysis of the historical and biographical 
circumstances that generate and frame its 
composition, the recognition of basic conceptions 
that establish the co-ordinates of the text, and 
an appreciation of the way these conceptions 
interact with the text and held determine the 
temporal movement (pg. 168). 
As such one understands that in the study of public 
discourse theory development is achievable if the critic 
proceeds from the above premises.   In other words, the 
development of theory proceeding from the study of public 
discourse requires the critic to intertwine the theory with 
the discourse artifact.  As Geerts further notes: 
Although one starts any effort at thick 
description, beyond the obvious and superficial, 
from a state of general bewilderment as to what 
the devil is going on—trying to find one’s feet—
one does not start (or ought not) intellectually 
empty-handed. Theoretical ideas are not created 
wholly anew in each study; as I have said, they 
are adopted from other, related studies, and, 
refined in the process, applied to new 
interpretive problems.  If they cease being 
useful with respect to such problems, they tend 
to stop being used and are more or less 
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abandoned.  If they continue being useful, 
throwing up new understandings, they are further 
elaborates and go on being used (pg. 27). 
 The goal of this dissertation has been to examine 
theoretical concepts like prudence and decorum through the 
lens of an actual public controversy, to see the concepts 
playing out in rhetorical practice.  In this way, and using 
the thinking above, it is then possible to develop 
“thicker” understandings of the concepts under examination.  
Clearly, prudence and decorum were employed as a rhetorical 
strategy in the efforts to create a new national government 
for the United States.  One can see prudence, for example, 
in the calls for open debate in Massachusetts, in the 
invocations of character throughout the discourse, in the 
use of language choices, and even planning of the debates. 
Moreover, the very construction of the representative model 
of the constitution is predicated on a model of classical 
prudence.  Stephen Brown (1993) explains in an examination 
of the discourse of Edmund Burke that “prudence at once 
constructs and is constructed” through discourse (pg 117).   
 In addition to prudence, decorum is visible 
throughout the debates as the federalists wrestled with 
opposition, and the needs of a broad constituency.  For 
example as Madison spared with Henry, it was clear that 
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while the rhetorical style of Henry was soaring and 
compelling it did not meet the exigencies of the situation, 
Henry spoke as a revolutionary at a time when the more 
appropriate choice was policy making.  Additionally, 
federalists chose to reign in Hamilton in New York, in 
attempt to appear conciliatory and accommodating.  While 
circumstance clearly called for audacity, Federalists were 
constantly mindful of the potential of overplaying their 
hand.   
WHY THE FEDERALISTS WON 
This analysis began as an examination of an extended 
public controversy, challenging the notion that the outcome 
could be attributed to single causes.  It is easy, and even 
tempting to try to find simple explanations for major 
events and shifts in public policy, but this impulse should 
be resisted. This is the case when examining the 
ratification debates. 
Using the ratification as a conceptual model, one 
finds, for example that while Beard argued compellingly for 
an economic determinism behind the ratification 
controversy, this lead to a stilted and incomplete 
understanding of the controversy.  Similarly, Jackson 
Turner Main asserted geographic causes for the divide 
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between federalists and antifederalists, leaving little 
room for understanding the effect of the discourse in the 
controversy.  Ultimately, the answer revealed by 
examination of the discourse is that both economics and 
geography clearly played a part on the outcome, but even 
this part is not wholly understandable without an analysis 
of the discourse.   
Quite simply, it is difficult to attribute any single 
cause to the ratification controversy.  Certainly, 
economics and geography played a part, but there are also 
clear indicators, that sometimes these did not.  To 
understand the controversy, as well and as the government 
that resulted, one has to examine a multiplicity of causes, 
perhaps most significantly, timing.   
Michael Leff (1993) points out the significance of 
Kairos in the study of any discursive controversy (pg. 163, 
171).  In this case one might safely say that the 
ratification debates required very specific circumstances 
to even take place.  Madison could not have recommended his 
project to a country with a healthy government, and he 
probably required crises such as the burgeoning economic 
problems enveloping the country as well as Shay’s rebellion 
in Massachusetts to initiate his proposal. In addition, the 
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relatively easy ratification by Delaware, Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, Connecticut, and Georgia lent credibility to the 
constitution and clearly aided the federalists in the 
process.   
Massachusetts created a new template for ratification 
that allowed the Federalists and anti-federalists to seek 
and find compromise.  Massachusetts also substantially 
altered the resulting government by authoring a Bill of 
Rights that came to be the first ten amendments to the new 
Constitution.  The Massachusetts formula appeared to have 
influenced both Virginia and New York delegates.  In 
addition, as the process of conventions proceeded, the 
ratifying states added subtle pressure to those still 
considering.  For example, South Carolina brought 
ratification a step closer, influencing the delegates in 
Virginia.  While the delegates debated in New York, New 
Hampshire ratified, creating a legal union that gave the 
federalists an opportunity to audaciously secession if 
recalcitrant antifederalists refused to compromise.  This 
forced upstate antifederalists to retreat from their tactic 
of obstruction, and return to the discourse.  On the other 
hand, the federalists wisely did not overplay their hand, 
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and withdrew pressure in order to accommodate the 
sensibilities of the more moderate antifederalists.   
The above examples make clear the notion that while 
timing was critical to the success of the ratification 
project, ratification did not require perfect timing.  
Ratification did however require one to be sensitive to the 
surrounding context.   The success of the federalists lied 
as much in their sensitivities to the circumstances 
surrounding them, as it did in their willingness to remain 
cognizant to the sensibilities of the opposition.  In 
making decorous choices of accomodation and compromise, the 
federalists were able to identify with the opposition, as 
well as dispel arguments about the heavy handedness of the 
natural aristocracy they were seen to be advancing.   
While timing and circumstance were important, this 
investigation involved the application of prudence and 
decorum augments to aid our understanding of the success of 
the federalists in advancing the constitution.  In 
examining the debates in Virginia, it became clear that 
while Patrick Henry brought great rhetorical skill to bear 
in opposition to the constitution, he did so as a 
revolutionary in a time when problem solving and compromise 
was the more decorous choice.  In New York the large 
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antifederal contingent required that federalists maintain a 
conciliatory stance in an effort to forestall calls for a 
second convention.  At the same time New York delegates 
anxiously awaited the changing circumstances that would 
surely come with ratification in Virginia and New 
Hampshire.   
Ultimately, this dissertation has argued that the 
constitution is a product of a discursive process 
influenced by the norms of prudence and decorum, and that 
it and the discourse that surrounded its ratification 
broaden our understanding of both.  It is not simply a 
static document, but the sum of the deliberations that went 
into its ratification.  The federalists did not prevail 
because the events were on their side, nor did the 
antifederalists fail because economics were against them.  
Federalists and antifederalists alike engaged great 
speakers like Patrick Henry, and Alexander Hamilton, as 
well as great thinkers like James Madison and Elbridge 
Gerry.  In sum, neither side succeeded or failed over a 
single issue or cause.  The ratification of the federal 
constitution happened because a constellation of events 
came together at the right time, and a people were willing 
to deliberate and compromise regarding the best means of 
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dealing with the circumstances in which they found 
themselves.   
Ultimately, the discourse coalesced around a single 
issue that reflected a multitude of concerns and that issue 
was a Bill of Rights.  The Bill of Rights, like the rest of 
the Constitution, is not the product of a single argument 
or even constellation of arguments.  The calls for the Bill 
of Rights emerge despite the heated and acrimonious 
discourse separating the delegates.  As battle lines were 
being drawn by men like Henry, and Hamilton, Singletary and 
Clinton; more moderate voices were working to create a 
workable national governments.  Into this backdrop emerged 
the Bill of Rights.   
The absence of a Bill of Rights from the original 
Constitution should not be seen as a reflection of intent, 
nor does its adoption suggest a unitary interest.  Instead, 
the Bill of Rights reflects an intersection of interests 
and objections finding some solution in its crafting and 
later adoption.  The issues dealt with range from 
representation, and taxation, to a standing army, and 
economic divisions.  In addition, it also satisfied the 
basic antifederalist objection; that the Constitution 
failed to safeguard individual liberties.  The centrality 
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of liberty to eighteenth century political thought, as well 
as its centrality in fomenting rebellion against Great 
Britain a decade earlier created a powerful and compelling 
argument for the antifederalists.  However, despite the 
power of this position, it was not sufficient, on its own, 
to overcome the challenges faced by an inadequate 
government, and deteriorating security.  The constitution 
was created and considered because the new country faced 
real and serious problems that required some sort of 
solution.  The Bill of Rights, and the Massachusetts 
solution allowed the Federalists to accommodate the 
concerns of the antifederalists, and the antifederalists 
were allowed a victory that did not stop ratification, but 
secured the concessions of the federalists with regard to 
the protection of the liberty of the people.   
The end result of the ratification controversy was not 
one in which Federalists won, and Antifederalists lost, but 
was instead a discourse in which those who engaged had an 
effect on the eventual outcome.  While there were those who 
refused to engage, or who lacked the prudential judgment, 
specifically the Clintonians faction, that might have 
allowed them to see beyond their objections to the issue of 
the larger good that was served by the discourse, for the 
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most part all participants of the discourse can be said to 
have achieved some form of victory in the ratification 
debates. Moreover, even some of the most serious opponents, 
like Henry and Hamilton found much in the plan that they 
liked.  In both cases, though it is not that they failed so 
much as they refused to be part of the success, in the case 
of Henry, specifically because joining in the success of 
the new constitution might have been seen as a violation of 
his character.   
The ratification debates can be seen as a discourse 
that melded prudence and decorum, to achieve ratification 
of a government that federalists argued was efficient, 
stable and energetic.  This government survived the 
colonization and annexation of much of North America, 
slavery, and the Civil War, the Industrial Revolution and 
the Great Depression, and the rise and fall of Communism, 
and two World Wars.  
LIMITATIONS 
It is tempting, when embarking on a study of this 
magnitude to attempt to establish a single cause for the 
success or failure of a particular event.  As indicated in 
the literature review section, this has been part of the 
problem with ratification scholarship in the past.  There 
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is no better example of this “single cause impulse” than 
Beard’s economic determinism.   
The point is, there is no single cause, or conversely 
any single explanation for the federalist success in the 
ratification debates.  In all likelyhood, had the 
federalists tried to introduce the constitution immediately 
after the revolutionary war, it would have failed.  One 
might argue that the federalists needed conflicts like 
Shey’s Rebelion to justify such a radical departure from 
the principles of the revolution.  In addition, had the New 
York ratifying convention been held earlier, absent the 
pressure exerted by the ratification of the ninth state, 
the antifederalists might have been able to force a new 
constitutional convention since no real union was possible 
without New York.  Further, one must not underestimate the 
great intellectual power that was brought to bear in favor 
of the constitution.  Finally, one might argue that the 
federalists benefited from a bit of luck.  The 
Massachusetts conventions excluded some of the strongest 
intellectual voices in opposition, by the method of 
representative election; as such Massachusetts federalists 
had an easier time securing ratification.   
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In Virginia, while the antifederalists brought great 
rhetorical power to the convention, the federalist had the 
singular advantage of James Madison, considered by many to 
be the primary architect of the constitution, to speak on 
behalf of ratification.  In New York, the federalists 
benefited from the fact that the economic interests of New 
York City were aligned in their favor.  Had these events 
occurred differently, the rhetorical skill of the 
federalists may not have carried the day.   
In addition, while examination of the debates through 
the classically grounded lens of prudence and decorum help 
the reader to understand how and why contested terms came 
to be defined and understood as they were, these strategies 
did not happen in a vacuum.  Notions of representation were 
changing before the revolutionary war.  Colonists 
increasingly distrusted, not simply parliamentary 
representatives, but the entire classical understanding of 
representation.  As Massachusetts federalists attempted to 
reconstitute the understanding of representative in such a 
way as to maintain the notion of prudential reasoning 
coupled with electoral safeguards, they did so in a 
historical context.   
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Moreover, while federalists in New York maintained 
decorum designed to reduce alienation of upstate 
antifederalists, even in the face of overwhelming advantage 
after ratification in New Hampshire created a legal 
ratification, real concession in New York came not from 
federalist arguments, but as a result of the positions 
taken by moderate antifederalist Melancton Smith and Samuel 
Jones. Smith and Jones together secured approval of the 
Massachusetts formula in New York, and as such dramatically 
increased the potential for ratification in New York.    
Prudence and decorum are reflected in strategies 
employed by the federalists, and this examination has 
attempted to demonstrate how the understanding of these 
classical concepts can help increasing of not only the 
ratification controversy, but other controversies as well.  
Furthermore, this examination has endeavored to explain how 
and why the disputants in the ratification controversy 
reacted to issues and hurdles encountered in the midst of 
this particular public controversy in an effort to secure 
what they clearly believed was the prudent outcome for the 
new country, a constitution that combined energy and 
audacity in an effort to provide a republican government in 
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such a large territory, and feat that had been hitherto 
deemed impossible.     
(Adair, 1974; Adams, 1913; Andrews, 1989; Aristotle, 1973, 
1984; Aune, 1989; Bailyn, 1967; Bailyn; Beard, 1954; 
Beiner, 1983; Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 
1985; Billias, 1976; Bizzell & Herzberg, 1990; Bogart, 
1923; Borne, 1875; Bowen, 1966; Browne, 1993; Broyles, 
1987; Burke, 1962; Butterfield, 1963; Chernan & Vallasi, 
1993; Cicero, 1934a, 1934b; Cornell, 1994; curti; Einhorn, 
1981, 1990; Elliot, 1836; Fairlie, 1984; Fantham, 1984; 
Farend, 1911, 1937; Farrell, 1993; Farrell & Goodnight, 
1981; Fowler Jr., 1980; Franklin, 1982; Garver, 1987, 1995; 
Gertz, 1973; Goodnight, 1982; Hamilton & Rossiter, 1961; 
Hamilton, Syrett, & Cooke, 1961; Harding, 1896; Harriman, 
1992; Hazan, 1862; Henry, 1891; Hutchinson, 1986; Jasinski, 
1992, 1993, 1994, 2001; Jay, 1949, 1971; Kahn, 1985; 
Kaminski & Saldino, 1990; Kenny, 1978; Kenyon, 1966; 
Kesler, 1987; Ketchem, 1986; Kline, 1973; Kumpfer, 1991; 
Kurland & Lerner, 1987; Lanham, 1991; Leff, 1992, 1993; 
Lienesch, 1988; Locke, 1940; MacKendrick, 1989; Madison, 
1977; Main, 1961; May, 1988; Mayer, 1986; McCants, 1990; 
McDonald, 1979; McLaughlin, 1905; Miner, 1921; Monaghan, 
1935; E. Morgan, 1977; G. Morgan, 1929; Morris, 1985; 
Morse, 1909; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Plato, 
1956; Reid, 1995; Reinhold, 1975, 1984; Richard, 1994; 
Richards, 1936, 1981; Rossiter, 1966; Rutland, 1966; 
Sayward, 1713-1797; Schwartz, 1971; Sherman, 1989; Smith, 
1993; Storing, 1981, 1981, 1985; Szatmary, 1980; Trenchard 
& Gordon, 1733; Warnick, 1993; Washington, 1939; Wichelns, 
1925; Wills, 1984, 2001; Wood, 1969; Wrage, 1947) 
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This dissertation examines the ratification debates for the 
federal constitution in 1787-88.  The goal of this project has 
been to examine the use of the rhetorical strategies of prudence 
and decorum as they are employed within the debates in 
Massachusetts, Virginia and New York.   
In Massachusetts, classical notions of representation are 
challenged by the use of binding instructions given to delegates 
sent to the ratification debates.  In addition, Massachusetts 
federalists had to overcome objections to the proposed 
constitution based on the system of representation, as well as 
the absence of a Bill of Rights.  Federalists Challenged these 
views, and established a method of ratification that garnered 
the goodwill of the Massachusetts electorate, as well as 
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creating a method for ratification in many other states that 
desired more clearly enumerated rights.   
In Virginia, Federalist were faced with prospect of 
debating one of the most popular and respected revolutionaries 
in the newly independent country, Patrick Henry.  While the 
federalists had the advantage of a constitutional architect, 
James Madison, to speak for them, as a rhetor, Madison was 
powerfully overmatched by Henry’s rhetorical acumen.  In order 
to overcome this disadvantage, Federalists positioned themselves 
in the position of the rational problem solvers, leaving Henry’s 
fiery protests largely unanswered, while focusing on the 
immediate problems of the struggling nation.  In this way, while 
Henry was engaging, and memorable, Madison was by far the more 
decorous of the disputants.   
Finally, in New York, the federalist found themselves 
outnumbered and, in many ways, powerfully outmatched by the 
overwhelming opposition of the upstate Antifederalists.  To 
their advantage, federalists had the support of New York City, 
the most important New York constituency, and the overall 
ratification clock.  In this debate, the federalist managed the 
necessity of preventing an adjournment, which might have doomed 
the entire project, while at the same time moving the discussion 
forward without creating undue enmity from the upstate 
opposition.   
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Throughout the debates federalists patiently explained, 
defined and redefined the contested terms of the constitution, 
thus creating through discourse, and energetic and effective 
form of government.   
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